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

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OUTLINE OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

BY

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PREFACE

THIS book is intended to be just what its title suggests — an outline of applied sociology. Dealing with *applied* sociology, it concerns itself but little with questions of origins, and devotes itself to facts rather than to theories. Being an *outline*, it is meant to serve rather as a guide to the study of life in society than as a compendium of dogmatic sociological conclusions or a series of finished dissertations on social problems.

In the preparation of this work I have been animated by the conviction that the time is ripe for a more thoroughly scientific approach to the solution of the problems of social advancement. There is too much of a tendency to treat each question as a thing by itself, and to forget that life in society is not divided into water-tight compartments. I have therefore departed from the method of treatment customary in books of this order, and have sought to take a comprehensive view of the entire field of social life and social endeavor, to correlate in a systematic and logical manner the manifold aspects of the social organization, and to indicate the actual interrelationship between seemingly divergent departments of life. This I believe to be the true, and therefore the scientific view.

Accordingly in this book much more emphasis is laid on accurate analysis and classification than upon the exhaustive treatment of specific topics. In fact, the

handling of each separate question is necessarily summary. I have tried to indicate the salient features of fact and argument in each case, and to point out the chief lines of investigation; I have not tried to set forth final conclusions together with a mass of data adequate to support these conclusions. If some of the conclusions which I state, or seem to state, challenge contradiction and refutation, that fact does not detract from the usefulness of the book for the purpose for which it is designed.

Whether used as a textbook or as a basis of individual study, I anticipate that this volume will render its most efficient service when used in connection with other books dealing in detail with specific subjects. The list of supplementary readings is appended with this in mind. This list does not constitute a bibliography of the subject; a complete bibliography is obviously out of the question. The books listed are mainly books which have been of special help to me in prosecuting this study, and therefore either amplify the treatment of the text or furnish valuable contrasts and different points of view.

I have profited greatly by the suggestions and criticisms of Professor Albert G. Keller, Professor Allen Johnson, and Doctor Ralph A. McDonnell, to each of whom I hereby extend my hearty thanks.

H. P. F.

New Haven,
September, 1916.

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OUTLINE OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE FIELD OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

The meaning of sociology. Many efforts have been made to define sociology in a concrete phrase or sentence, of which the following may be cited as typical: "The science of life in Society." [1] "The science which deals with human association, its origin, development, forms, and functions." [2] "That study which works out scientifically and completely the laws and principles of human association." [3] "Has for its subject matter the growth, development, structure, and functions of the social aggregate." [4] "Deals with association." [5] "The scientific study of society." [6]

From these various definitions, and others like them, one might glean a general notion of what sociology is. But every one of the foregoing is faulty as a definition, in that it contains a word analogous to, or derived from the same root as, the word defined. To say that sociology is the science of society or the study of association is like defining physiology as the study of the physique, or mineralogy as the science of minerals. Such definitions add little to the amount of knowledge possessed.

The following is a suggestive and workable definition of sociology: sociology is the study of man and his human environment in their relation to each other. The word study is used instead of science, because of the prevalent difference of opinion as to whether or not sociology can be called a science — a difference due to uncertainty partly as to the exact nature of sociology, and partly as to the meaning of science. This definition throws more emphasis than is customary on man as the object of study, rather than on any such abstract conception as association or social aggregate. After all, it is man who makes society, and the social aggregate is but a conglomeration of men. Man is the beginning and the end of the social organization, and hence the primary object of study.

Much is said and written in these days about the importance of environment, and its influence on human life. Professor Ward said that knowledge of the environment is the most practical and useful of all knowledge. The environment commonly in mind is the physical environment, and the ultra school of anthropogeographers would have us believe that this environment is the final cause and explanation of all the phenomena of life. There is, indeed, no doubt that soil, topography, climate, etc., are of profound importance to man, through their influence upon his character and manner of life. But there is another environment, no less important though not so consciously perceived as such — the human environment. This consists, not of rocks, water, and air, but of men, women, and children, living in contact with each other, acting upon and reacting against each other. The influence of this human environment, though often unfelt and always intangible

and elusive, is no less determinative than that of the physical environment. The fact that each individual is not only a unit living in the midst of an environment, but also a constituent part of the environment of other units, does not detract from the reality of this environmental influence, but simply makes it more complex and mysterious.

Sociology, then, studies man as an individual living in the midst of a human environment, and forming a part of the environment of other individuals. The phenomena which belong in the sphere of sociology are those which arise from the fact of the interaction of men upon man, and man upon men. Nothing belongs strictly to sociology which would exist if every human being lived in complete isolation from every other. Robinson Crusoe on his island furnishes no subject matter for sociology until he is joined by his man Friday. On the other hand, every influence, every act, every device or institution which arises from the fact that men live in interrelation with each other is proper subject matter for sociology, however trivial, indefinite, and insignificant it may, in itself, appear. Thus anthropology, while sometimes treated as a branch of sociology, and sometimes as a major science including sociology, in its strictest sense, has nothing to do with sociology at all. Man as an animal might be studied in a cage, removed from all contact with others. It is only when he begins to mingle with other human animals, and form relationships and set up institutions, that sociology begins.

The meaning of applied *sociology.* If, then, this is sociology, what is applied sociology? How does it differ from any other sort of sociology?

Many, if not most sciences, present two aspects or departments, closely related to each other but distinct from each other. The first department is that which is called the theoretic or pure science. Its function is to study phenomena, ascertain facts, and establish laws and principles. It has no object in view beyond the acquirement of knowledge. The second department is the practical or applied science. This division has much of the nature of an art, its purpose being to take the facts, principles, and laws worked out by pure science, and devise methods of utilizing them to serve some human purpose. It is "telic" in Professor Ward's phraseology.

In this respect sociology resembles the sciences. It consists of two branches, pure or theoretic sociology, and practical or applied sociology. Pure sociology studies man in his relation to his human environment for no other purpose than to discover the principles which lie back of human association, to discern the forces by which the social organization is built up, developed, and held together, to deduce all possible laws and generalizations as to the nature of social activities. Pure sociology has its eye neither on the future nor the present, but on the past. It would be content to stop its investigations a hundred years ago, providing that by that time all the essential facts could have been ascertained. Because the forces of society are most easily observed and isolated where they are reduced to their simplest terms, *i.e.* in the most primitive forms of society, pure sociology devotes much of its time to the study of human groups low down in the scale of culture, the barbaric and savage races of the present, and the prehistoric societies of the past, so far as evidence exists for studying them.

Applied sociology, on the other hand, seeks to serve wider ends than the accumulation of knowledge. It is concerned less with the ascertainment of truths than with the utilization of truths to serve human ends. Applied sociology turns its face not to the past, but to the present and future, and since the present is but a point of time, preponderantly to the future; it is not so much concerned with finding out why society is as it is, as with determining how society can be made different from what it is — better than it is.

It is evident, however, that applied sociology is immediately dependent on pure sociology. Without the theoretic branch, the practical branch not only would be helpless — it could not exist. It is from pure sociology that applied sociology gets all its knowledge of the fundamental facts, the basic principles and laws which it is to utilize in accomplishing its conscious purposes. In one sense, pure sociology is the handmaiden of applied sociology, but in an even wider sense it is the parent, the creator, the sustainer of applied sociology. Applied sociology needs continually to hark back to the teachings of the theoretic branch. Without the parent's guiding hand it is inevitably doomed to wander blindly and to grope ineffectually. A large part of the failures and miscarriages chargeable to the so-called "practical" sociologists is attributable to a faulty equipment of knowledge of pure sociology, or to a neglect to use the knowledge possessed.

Applied sociology, then, has to do with the task of examining the human relationships of modern civilized societies with the avowed purpose of evaluating them, of distinguishing helpful tendencies and forces from those which are pernicious, and of devising means to perpetuate

that which is good, to eliminate that which is bad, and to reshape the social organization the better to serve human welfare. Just as the applied sciences in the material field seek to control and direct the forces of nature for conscious ends, so applied sociology seeks to manipulate social forces to accomplish human desires. Both are absolutely dependent on the forces which exist; neither can escape from the domination of these forces, nor go a step further than the forces make possible. But both can control and direct the forces, so that they operate as dynamic agents for human welfare, rather than as unconstrained and vagrant powers of evil.

The goal aimed at by applied sociology in this manipulation of social forces is concisely indicated by the term utility, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. To increase the sum total of human welfare, to make life more worth living to the largest possible number of the constituent individuals of society, to make society itself a more efficient agent of human happiness — these are the functions of applied sociology.

Sociology and the scientific method. It has been observed that the claim of sociology to the name of science is still unsettled. But one thing is certain — science or no science, sociology can be studied by the scientific method. That is the only way by which it ought to be studied, and if that is done, it is of little moment by what name sociology is called. The present outline aims to present a method of studying applied sociology according to the scientific method.

Just what are the essential features of the scientific method? They are three in number. First, the accumulation of facts by a process of accurate and unbiased observation. Second, the arrangement or

classification of these facts according to some predetermined logical basis of classification. Third, the induction from these classified facts of general laws, principles, and truths. Any study of applied sociology which promises reliable results must follow this general method.

The accumulation of facts with reference to the life of man in his human environment by methods of scientific observation, and with scientific ends in view is of very recent growth. Sociology is often called the newest of the sciences. Man has always been very reluctant to regard himself as subject to natural laws, and hence as an object for scientific investigation. It was not until all the major sciences were placed on a firm basis that the scientific mind, looking about, like Alexander, for new worlds to conquer, suddenly realized that a great virgin field lay practically untouched in the realm of the social forces and the relations and institutions of organized human existence. Herein lies one great explanation of the unwillingness to call sociology a science. The induction has not yet been carried far enough. Not enough facts have been accumulated, or they have been gathered by persons rendered incompetent by lack of knowledge or of power of observation, or by some prejudice, bias, or ulterior motive.

The accumulation of sociological data. Obviously, the sociological field is one of the most difficult in existence for the ends of scientific exploration, because of its extent, complexity, and variety, and the intangible, elusive, even personal character of many of its data. No individual, in a lifetime, can become master of more than one very small section of the field. This is particularly true of the investigations of applied sociology, because its data are constantly changing, and facts do not stay

facts; one of the most important features of any modern sociological investigation is the date. As a result of these conditions, for the data of applied sociology we are forced to rely upon specialists and experts. This has obvious advantages, but it also has drawbacks. In the first place, it is often impossible to check up and verify the statements of the expert, without engaging in a process of study virtually as extensive and thorough as that which he himself has pursued, which is usually impracticable. In the second place, every expert is but human, and his observations are very likely to be colored by his own prejudices, preconceptions, or point of view. The only way to neutralize factors of this sort — to eliminate the personal element — is to have a number of investigators at work on the same data. This, again, is often impracticable. What happens in practice is that in the case of the more detailed and minute fields of study, students in general depend on the work of one, or a very few investigators, whose data circulate on the basis of their real or assumed authority and reliability. A man who has established a reputation as an authority on a given subject might, if he chose, circulate very glaring untruths for some time before they were discovered. Fortunately, such a man seldom chooses to do so. But it does all too frequently happen that a very eminent authority, through a lapse of attention, or some other oversight, will permit false statements to go out under his name, which may pass current a long time and do much harm before they are detected.

In spite of these difficulties, however, the past few decades have witnessed the piling up of an extremely varied, valuable, and on the whole reliable mass of facts with reference to the relations of human beings in modern

civilized societies. All sorts of special studies of industries, surveys of cities or districts, investigations into housing, food, family relations, industrial relations, etc., are being made every year, and each one, if properly done, adds something to the inductive facts of applied sociology.

The classification of data. Having accumulated as many facts as possible, the next step in the scientific method is to classify these facts. This often seems easy, and frequently is very difficult. At any rate it is necessary. Professor Ward has said that the essential of all science is the classification of knowledge. "Science . . . is the coördination, or, rather, the systematization of knowledge." [7] The first requisite for a logical classification is a basis. It must be determined on what principles of likeness or difference the data are to be grouped into categories. The very fact of classification implies a general set of likenesses among the data. But it also implies some minor differences. It is on the basis of these differences that the data are separated into groups. The basis of classification is the principle of difference upon which the data are to be distinguished. It is evident that there may be several different bases for the same set of data, and that therefore several different classifications may be made. But any single classification, to be logical, must proceed upon the basis of a single sort of difference, so that the classes may be as exclusive as possible as regards each other, and as uniform as possible as regards the units included in each.

The following homely example will serve to make this point clear. A man comes into a grocery store and says, "What kind of apples have you?" The clerk replies, "I have summer apples, fall apples, and winter apples."

If the purchaser has in mind the keeping qualities of the fruit, this may be just the reply he is looking for. It is a logical classification, based upon the time of ripening, which in turn determines durability. But the purchaser may reply, "I care nothing about the time they ripen; I want them to eat now." To which the clerk replies, "Very well, I have sweet, medium tart, and sour apples," another logical classification based on taste. Or the purchaser may say, "None of this interests me. I want these apples to decorate a Christmas tree." "Oh!" says the clerk, "then you will be interested to know that I have red apples, yellow apples, and green apples." So they might proceed to an indefinite number of classifications, all logical and each with a possible utility, while all the time there may have been only three or four barrels of apples in the store. But if the clerk had said, "I have red apples, winter apples, and medium tart apples," his reply would have been meaningless, for it would have rested upon no logical basis of classification, and a single apple might have possessed all the qualities mentioned.

It would seem superfluous and trivial to expend so much time in elaborating so simple a point, were it not for the fact that this point is ignored with amazing frequency by would-be scientific writers, so that many books with great inherent possibilities are rendered almost useless because the neglect of the primary laws of classification robs them of all scientific character.

Sociological induction. The third step in the scientific method is the drawing of conclusions. In the exact sciences, this is the simplest part of the whole procedure. If the investigation has been thorough enough, and the classification accurate enough, only one conclusion is possible to any competent mind. In chemistry,

for instance, if a sufficient number of experiments have been tried in putting acids and bases together, and these have been properly classified, every rational student must agree on the generalizations as to what happens from the combination of acids and bases. But in sociology generalization is one of the most precarious and difficult of all the steps. Given exactly the same data, two equally competent students may reach diametrically opposite conclusions. This is due to the complexity of the subject, and to the difficulty of securing all the data in any case. Almost always there are one or more factors in the problem which are not clearly delineated, and while they may seem of minor importance, they are sufficient to preclude mathematical precision. The simple fact is that if sociology is a science at all, it certainly is not an exact science. There is still room for judgment, discrimination, even for argument, in the drawing of sociological conclusions. Perhaps if our knowledge were perfect and complete this might not be so, but it practically never is, and there is seldom hope that it ever will be. In brief, there is a big personal element in all sociological problems.

Hence it is fitting for the sociologist to avoid dogmatism in his conclusions as much as possible. Let him present all the facts at his command, properly classified. Let him point out the arguments on this side and on that. Let him, if he can, show how common sense seems to point in one direction or the other. But let him refrain from the attempt to force ready-made conclusions upon others. Final judgments are possible, if at all, only through the consideration of a given body of data by a number of competent minds.

CHAPTER II

CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

The basis of classification. Since the subject matter of applied sociology includes practically the entire range of conscious and volitional human activities, it is evident that the primary classification must rest upon some very broad general facts. The basis of classification upon which social phenomena are divided into primary categories must be a difference in some of the universal and fundamental facts of human existence.

In seeking the soundest and most workable basis of classification, recourse is to be had to pure sociology. It then appears that numerous different classifications of social phenomena are possible, and have been attempted. For the purposes of the present study, the basis of classification adopted for the primary grouping is that enunciated and followed by Professor Sumner, viz. the type of social force which lies back of the various social activities. All human action springs ultimately from the feelings, and the resultant social phenomena may consistently be classified on the basis of the feeling from which they originate. According to Professor Sumner there are four great types of feeling in human nature, and accordingly four great groups of social activities. The feelings are hunger, love, vanity, and what is, in its simplest form, the fear of ghosts. The activities which result may be enumerated as the self-maintenance

of society, the self-perpetuation of society, the self-gratification of society, and the mental reactions — religion, science, philosophy, etc.[8]

This grouping has many advantages. It is simple, and the basis of classification is easily understood. Yet it is fundamental, and conforms as nearly as possible to the requirement of a good classification in providing categories which are definite and do not overlap. In primitive societies these types of activities are easily distinguished, and there is little confusion. In more complex societies the dividing lines between the classes become somewhat blurred, and there is inevitably much overlapping, but the essential distinctions still remain. No matter how highly developed a society may be, there may always be distinguished four fundamental types of activities and relationships, corresponding to Professor Sumner's grouping, which may be indicated as follows:

Basis of Classification — Social Force	Activities of Primitive Societies	Activities of Modern Societies
Hunger	Self-maintenance	Economic life
Love	Self-perpetuation	Growth of population
Vanity	Self-gratification	Esthetic life
Fear of ghosts	Mental reactions	Intellectual and spiritual life

The foregoing classification closely resembles that of Professor Ward, which is also based on the feelings, and which in most respects runs closely parallel to Professor Sumner's.[9] Professor Ward's classification, however, is much less simply stated, and is also incomplete as it lacks anything to correspond with "vanity."

The economic life. Under the heading of the economic life belong all those social activities in which men engage

for the sake of making a living — the pursuit of wealth in the economic sense. The force called hunger includes the impulses that demand clothing, shelter, etc., as well as the craving for food. All of the human relationships which arise from the fact of men working together and influencing each other in the search for a livelihood belong in this category.

The growth of population. The term "growth of population" includes not only the family, the institution of marriage, and sex relations in general, but also all the movements which come under the head of migrations, inasmuch as they are factors in the growth of population. In this group, also, belong child problems, since the child is an essential part of the family, and since the growth of population demands not only that children shall be born, but also that they shall be nourished, and grow up. All the phenomena of disease and death belong primarily in this group, though, as will appear, some of them have a close connection with other groups.

The esthetic life. Under the head of the esthetic life belong all those activities which arise directly from the desire for a sense of well-being, the pursuit of pleasure for its own sake. Everything which is done for the sake of winning the approval of one's fellows is included in this class. Recreation, as a whole, also belongs in this group.

The intellectual and spiritual life. The final heading, the intellectual and spiritual life, includes those social activities which arise from the religious motive in the broad sense. With the primitive man this takes the simple form of the fear of ghosts, and it dominates his entire life. From this humble beginning many diverse interests and institutions have emerged, and the activities which are grouped under this head in modern societies

may show slight resemblance to each other or to the crude forms of demon worship from which they sprung. Particularly, in our day, we look upon religion and science as not only separate, but, in the minds of many, antagonistic interests. Yet religion and science have an identical origin. The science of the savage is his religion, and his religion is his science. For science is the attempt of human beings to explain natural phenomena, and to control natural forces. But in the mental outfit of the savage the notion of natural laws and forces, as we now conceive of them, has no place. He explains everything in terms of agency. When the human agent is visible or surmised, the explanation is obvious. But if there is apparently no human agent, the agent must of necessity be one of the denizens of the unseen world — a ghost or spirit. So that all of those activities by which the modern man seeks to understand and control Nature, and which we call science, with the primitive man take the form of efforts to comprehend the ways and to meet the wishes of unseen spiritual beings. This is religion. It was not until man had traveled far up the pathway of culture that a new conception of the material world caused this great interest to split into two divisions, which have since followed separate routes, becoming ever more divergent and distinct. Accordingly, in the group of intellectual and spiritual social phenomena of modern societies is to be found a congeries of interests, institutions, and relationships, which, if they seem to have nothing else in common, at least have the same starting point.

The meaning of normal and abnormal. To separate social phenomena into the foregoing four categories on the basis of the underlying force is only the first step in the process of classification. Not all the activities

of the economic life are of the same sort, nor are those of any of the other great divisions. A further distinction must be made in order that the data may be handled intelligently and profitably. It was stated* that the function of applied sociology is to evaluate social relationships, and to select certain for approbation and perpetuation, and others for disapproval and elimination. In carrying out this purpose it appears that the phenomena in each of the four chief divisions group themselves into three main types, which may be styled the normal aspects, the abnormal aspects, and the efforts toward improvement.

While the word "normal" carries a fairly definite and, for the most part, accurate implication to the mind of any intelligent person, it is nevertheless extremely difficult to define in concrete terms, and in the effort to elucidate it even careful thinkers are sometimes led far astray. Thus Dr. Richard Cabot, in an article entitled "Why not Think More Clearly?" says "Now, 'normal' has two, and only two, possible meanings. It can mean the *average* . . . or it can mean the *ideal.*" [10] On reading this passage the query at once arises, if that is all the meaning to be allowed to "normal," how comes it that we have such a word and use it so generally? Common sense replies that there is, in fact, a special significance in the word "normal," conveyed by no other word in the English language. As commonly used to convey a definite idea, the word "normal" means that which is in harmony with the general make-up and organization of the object under discussion — that which is consistent with other normal factors. We say that the normal temperature of a human body is 98.6. This

* Page 5.

means more than an average of the bodily temperatures of a large number of people. It means that that is the temperature required by the constitution of the human body, in order that the various functions may be performed satisfactorily. This is a very different thing from saying that the average height of a male human being is five feet, six inches. We do not speak of the normal height of people. There is no normal stature. People can live perfectly healthy and vigorous lives whose height ranges from less than five feet to six feet or more. So with various bodily functions. We may speak of the average amount of sleep indulged in by human beings. Arnold Bennett thinks the average is altogether too high, and that a normal amount would be much less. Furthermore, what is normal for one is not for another. This is made evident by the fact that we often combine the terms, and say "the average normal." It is true that the average and the normal are often the same, but this is only because normality is a preponderating characteristic of things. In general, a condition is average because it is normal, not normal because it is average.

The other meaning of normal referred to by Dr. Cabot, the ideal, may be dismissed even more briefly. If normal meant ideal, either there would be no normality, or there could be no possibility of progress. If things were normal, it would mean that the ideal had been achieved, and any change would be for the worse. If, as is much nearer the truth, there is always the goal of something better ahead, normality could not exist, and all life would be abnormal.

The normal aspects of society, then, are those which harmonize with the general organization of that particular society. They may not be ideal, and they may not

be average. Sometimes abnormality is much more common than normality, and the average would be far from the normal. It is said, for instance, that the average annual consumption of tobacco in the United States is 5.57 pounds per capita. Yet no one would want to say that it was normal for every man, woman, and child in the country to use 5.57 pounds of tobacco every year. Even if the average were based on the number of those who actually use tobacco, it would still be far from representing a normal condition. The word normal always carries a certain suggestion of welfare, individual or social. It suggests the harmonious working together of the parts of an organism. Many things of an entirely indifferent nature may be expressed in averages to which the term normal would not apply. Thus, in a certain year, the average number of buttons on men's waistcoats might be eight, but it would be absurd to use the word normal in connection with such a triviality.

In any society the normal conditions are those which are consistent with the general social organization, which tend toward smoothness and accomplishment, not toward friction and retardation. It follows that what is normal in one society is abnormal in another. In a society where bride-purchase is the rule, it would be abnormal for a woman to give herself freely for love of a man, and the fact that such an act is regarded as abnormal in such a society is evidenced by the scorn with which the women look upon a foreign woman who has contracted a marriage according to the American method. Also, in a given society, the normal is not permanent. As societies evolve and develop, that which was normal becomes abnormal, and that which was ideal becomes normal.

The idea of normality becomes clarified in the course of the attempt to distinguish the normal from the abnormal in the case of actual social conditions, and no further time need be devoted to definition in the present connection. There is this, however, which should be said. Just because normal conditions are unobtrusive and regular they come to be taken for granted, and it is often much more difficult to discern and delineate them than the abnormal. They make no noise nor jar, and consequently they attract no attention. To try to describe the normal aspects of life in one's society is like trying to tell how you feel when you are well. When you are well you don't feel at all. Yet for a scientific applied sociology it is absolutely essential that the normal aspects be fully grasped. They furnish the basis and the background for all study of the abnormal aspects, and for all schemes of improvement. To ignore the normal is just as fatal in sociology as in medicine. No board of medical examiners would think of passing a candidate whose entire knowledge of the human organism was limited to diseased conditions. Yet would-be social reformers are by no means rare who rush about trying to remedy social evils, without the slightest understanding of the normal constitution of the society in which they live. In the training of "practical sociologists" altogether too much emphasis is laid on social pathology and all too little on social anatomy.

It frequently happens that the effort to grasp the normal aspects of life in one's own society is greatly forwarded by comparing them with what is normal in another society, or what was normal in the same society at another epoch. It then becomes clear that what we now take for granted, and regard as indispensable, was

either unknown at an earlier time, or was regarded as aberrant or undesirable. This process also helps to a realization of the fact that what we now consider the foundation stones of organized society may some time be discarded as useless rubbish.

The concept of the mores. The normal aspects of life in a given society at a given time become embodied in a set of institutions, ideas, and conventions, the significance of which has been clearly expounded by Professor Sumner in his discussion of the "mores." Society comes to expect its individual members to live their lives in accordance with these conventions. Conformity is taken for granted. The normal life, for the individual, is the life which consists with the mores.

The abnormal aspects of life in society are those which are out of harmony with the general social organization. They are inconsistent with the mores. It may very well be that, in the abstract, they are preferable to conditions that are normal. But they do not fit. They do not work in that particular group. They are anomalies or anachronisms. The abnormal life, for the individual, is that which is lived contrary to, or in violation of, the conventions of society.

Individual gain from abnormal living. It is often very profitable for the individual to live an abnormal life. Just because society expects people to conduct themselves in certain ways, there is often great gain to be won by acting differently. Professor Giddings remarks that good faith is an essential of coöperation,[11] and in fact the whole social structure is built upon the assumption that men will conform. Organized life in society would be impossible if the great majority of men did not conform. An examination of almost any incident of one's

daily routine will reveal how completely and unreservedly we count on the reliability of others — of men in general. We are constantly placing our welfare, our health, our very lives in the power of other individuals whom we may not know, may not see, may not even ever have heard of. One goes into a restaurant, and orders a meal. The viands may not be wholly to his taste, but at least he expects them to be clean and wholesome, and it never enters his head that the cook may be an expert poisoner, working with diabolical ingenuity to see how many lives he may undermine in the course of his career. One buys a ticket for a railroad journey. Unless there has happened to be a succession of recent accidents, he has no thought of special danger. At any rate, he unconsciously takes it for granted that every individual connected with the running of that railroad, from the superintendent and train-dispatcher to the switchman and section hand, is devoting himself single-heartedly to seeing that that train reaches its destination safely. One goes into a haberdashery and buys a hat. He asks to have it charged and delivered. When the bill comes, he pays it with a check. In this simple, everyday transaction, there is a complicated chain of confidences, expectations, and dependences. If there were failure anywhere along the line, the fundamentals of business life would be weakened.

But because this ingenuous trust in others is well-nigh universal, those who are unscrupulous enough, and clever enough, may trade on the faith of others to their own great profit, as long as they can avoid arousing distrust in themselves individually. We call them "confidence men." Check forgers, bogus telephone men, dealers in fraudulent securities, all sorts of swindlers, make their

gains in this way. When discovered, they are treated by society with a severity proportioned not to the concrete loss they occasion to their victims, but to the injury which they do to society by undermining its very foundations. If any class of men in society occupies a position of special trust and responsibility, any breach of faith by an individual of that class is regarded as an especially heinous offense. Witness the special horror and wrath which the community feels when a clergyman "goes wrong" in any particular. We call such "wolves in sheep's clothing," and look upon them with the utmost contempt.

The foregoing, however, are not the only types of persons living an abnormal life in society. There are others who, with no evil intent or purpose on their part, fail to fulfill their part of the reciprocal obligations and services which constitute organized social life. They profit by the organization of society without giving anything in return. They live a life which, if it were followed by all individuals, would make society impossible. In other words, they are parasites. The common "bum" or "hobo" is the representative type of this class, but there are many others. They do not kill, steal, or defraud others. They do no direct harm to anybody. But they live on society, without making any return.

Two types of abnormality. There are, then, two distinct forms of abnormality in modern social life, which may be denominated "immorality" and "incompetence." The principle of classification is the moral constitution and character of the individual. In the case of immorality, the individual consciously chooses to live an abnormal life, although his abilities fit him to live in conformity. The trouble lies with his motives and

purposes. In the case of incompetence, there is something lacking in the make-up of the individual, or in his relation to his human environment, so that he cannot live normally, however much he wishes to. If he is really incompetent, the assumption is that he is doing the best he can, but that his best is not good enough. It is evident that this classification implies the assumption of free will, and if free will is denied, this division is meaningless, and breaks down entirely.

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the question of free will. In spite of all the volumes that have been written on the subject, the question is not yet settled, and nothing would be gained in this connection by attempting to review the arguments on both sides. Suffice it to say, that in our practical, everyday lives, we all of us act on the assumption that we ourselves, and others around us, possess something in the nature of free will, or the power of choice. Particularly, practical sociologists, those who deal at first hand with the actual men and women who embody social problems, constantly operate on the principle that the ordinary individual has something within him which governs his own conduct, within limits to be sure, but positively. It is to this something that the social worker tries to appeal. If any individual appears to lack this faculty, he is at once placed in a special category of abnormality.

Practically all the coercive agencies of society act on this principle. Suppose, for example, that on a hot summer day, while a group of women and children are refreshing themselves about a fountain in a public park, a man suddenly appears, divests himself of his clothing, and plunges into the fountain. The police will be on the spot in an instant, and the man will be arrested. He

has committed an abnormal act, and society has laid its hand upon him. But the first step taken after his arrest will be to determine whether or not he is mentally responsible — that is, whether he has the ordinary power of choice. And on the determination of this question will depend the treatment meted out to him. If it appears that he is an escaped lunatic, he will be sent back to the asylum. If he has been temporarily deranged by the excessive heat, he will be sent to a hospital. But if, on the other hand, his faculties appear to be in good working order, and he has deliberately chosen to refresh himself in this way, in the face of all conventions, he will be fined or sent to jail.

This distinction holds with reference to practically every form of social injury. For instance, to deprive others of their wealth without giving an equivalent is an abnormal act. The burglar and the pauper both deprive others of wealth — the burglar by cracking a safe and helping himself to valuables, the pauper by increasing the tax rate to pay for his support. But the treatment accorded them by society is very different. Again, the murderer and the consumptive both take life — the former by putting arsenic in somebody's food, the latter by spreading contagion. Both require social treatment, but of a very different sort. If in actual fact society made no distinction in its estimation of the thief and the blind pauper, of the assassin and the consumptive, if it regarded them all as possessing the same degree of responsibility and hence the same degree of guilt, and if accordingly it treated them all according to the same principles, there would be no ground for distinguishing between immorality and incompetence. But it does not, and in the ensuing pages it will be

assumed that something of the nature of free will exists, and is to be reckoned with as one of the most important factors in solving social problems.

The foregoing is not the common classification of the abnormal members of society. Perhaps the best-known classification is that which divides them into defectives, dependents, and delinquents. This does well enough for some practical purposes, but it is not scientific, and if used as a guide tends to obscure some of the most essential distinctions which should be made. It does not rest on a logical basis, and hence the classes are not exclusive as regards each other. The term defective has to do with the intellectual characteristics of the individual, the term dependent refers to the source of his support, and the word delinquent indicates moral obliquity. In actual life, many, if not most, dependents and delinquents are defective, and many individuals are both dependent and delinquent. No scientific exactness is possible if such an illogical classification is followed.

The first step in the scientific analysis of the conditions of a modern society is to distinguish the abnormal features of its life from those which are normal; one of the next is to determine what phases of abnormality are to be treated as immorality, and what as incompetence.

CHAPTER III

TYPES OF ABNORMALITY AND IMPROVEMENT

Three types of immorality. Since a large part of the practical work of applied sociology consists in dealing with immorality and incompetence, it is necessary not only to understand clearly the nature of these conditions, but to distinguish the different forms in which they manifest themselves; for each form of abnormality demands a special treatment.

As regards immorality, it appears upon analysis that there are three distinct types in modern society — sin, crime, and vice. Sin is the broad term, and includes all acts which are contrary to the moral code of the society in which a given individual lives. Every society, as has been noted, has its own moral code. This has been built up gradually through the long course of social evolution; it is not fixed and immutable, but changes with changing conditions, material and spiritual. But at any given time it is absolute, and forms the norm to which all individuals are expected to conform. Every individual is expected to live his life in accordance with the code of his own society, and no individual can be expected to possess a personal code different from that of his group. There may possibly be something in the nature of an intuitive sense of right and wrong, but as far as definite acts are concerned, every one of us is dependent for his ideas upon the social

environment in which he is placed. Even the reformers, those whose ideals reach ahead of the actual, simply build upon the material furnished them by their human environment. The moral codes of no two societies are identical, and what is absolutely right in one group is absolutely wrong in another. Whether there are any great fundamental principles of conduct, the application of which is universal, and which apply to all societies, is a fascinating subject for speculation; but as far as actual conduct is concerned, no individual can be expected to live any differently from the standards of his group, and for him those standards constitute right.

Sin. The idea of sin usually has a religious association, and sin is often thought of as a violation of God's law. The reason for this lies in the fact that usually the only formulated expression of the moral code of a society is found in its religious repositories, verbal or written. The nature of religion is such that as soon as a principle of conduct becomes recognized by the leaders of thought in a group, it at once is assimilated into the religious code, and thereafter appears to emanate from religious sources. The naïve interpretation of moral and ethical codes is that they are given by divine authority. A study of the development of culture, however, reveals the fact that the moral and religious codes grow up side by side, with a constant interaction between them, and that the origin of rules of conduct is almost always in social usage or expediency, not in anything in the nature of divine revelation. As soon as a principle of behavior becomes established, the religious organization at once takes it over, and it then comes back to the people with added sanction and per-

manence. Religion tends to be the repository of the best ideals of a group, but it is seldom their originator. It does not always even represent the best. Occasionally religions lack the ethical element almost entirely, or at least do not present a code as elevated as that prescribed by social usage.

The ideas of Christian peoples with reference to sin are undoubtedly largely derived from the writings of Saint Paul, who makes some clear statements on the subject. His idea, that sin is the violation of the law, is clearly expressed in the following quotations: "For until the law sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law." "I had not known sin, but by the law." "For without the law sin was dead." "The strength of sin is the law." Saint John also says, "Sin is the transgression of the law." The law which these writers had in mind was the religious or divine law. But if for "law" we read "social code," we get a very accurate description of the nature of sin in the sociological sense.

Sin, thus, is a very broad term. Including, as it does, anything which is condemned by the opinion of one's group, it includes acts, words, and even thoughts. A man whose outward conduct is perfectly exemplary may be a profound sinner. Such a man usually shows himself up in time for what he is, and it is because of the belief that certain thoughts lead to unsocial action that society brands them as sinful. But any conduct, of any sort, which is contrary to the code of one's group is by definition sinful.

Crime. Crime, on the other hand, is a very different matter. It is concrete and definite, and consists only of acts (including spoken words). Much effort has

been expended to clarify the conception of crime, and many definitions have been offered. But the only one which seems to give crime a definite and usable signification is the following: "Crime is the violation of the established law of the state." Many other conceptions of crime are to be found in the books on the subject, but they all tend to confuse rather than to illuminate. Some writers treat crime as if it were identical with sin, and hence entirely lose the benefit of a restricted conception. Others write of crime as if it must of necessity have something of the brutal, bestial, or degenerate about it. Many of the descriptions of the criminal have not the slightest resemblance to some of the most dangerous and guilty of modern malefactors — the wreckers of banks, and the manipulators of "predatory capital." The so-called "natural crime" is not an intelligible concept.

Every developing society, very early in its organization, differentiates one special aspect of its activity which is known as the state. The purpose of the state is primarily restriction and coercion. It aims to secure by force or intimidation that compliance with the conventions of the group which social solidarity requires. In the pursuance of this end it establishes certain prescriptions, perhaps traditional at first, but written in time, which are supposed to embody the rules of conduct of which the state, as such, proposes to take cognizance. These become the law of the land, and violation of this law is regarded as insubordination to the state, and calls for treatment by the state. It is these violations, and these only, that constitute crime.

Since the state takes no cognizance of thoughts and ideas, but only of overt acts, every crime is an act.

This act may be inherently of a sinful nature, and generally is, for most of the acts which the state picks out for its proscription have already been branded by society as sins. But a crime need not necessarily be a sin, except as violation of law in itself is sinful. Many of our municipal * ordinances and regulations, such as the traffic ordinances, the rules governing street peddlers, etc., deal with acts which are neutral as far as their inherent moral quality is concerned. Yet as soon as the state issues its fiat, anti-legal conduct becomes a crime. There is also the interesting question whether, on special occasions, the commission of a technical crime may not be a highly meritorious act. There is frequent appeal to "the higher law." Perhaps there must be some allowance made for individual judgment as to when laws may be disobeyed. But in modern democracies, the danger is all the other way, that the common man, believing that he is the ultimate source of law, should also conceive that he has a corresponding right to abrogate the law in his own case at his own discretion. Lack of reverence for constituted authority of every sort is one of the menaces to modern civilization.

Since the state is the most concrete, and one of the oldest and most universal, of the forms of social organization, the matter of crime has been studied more extensively and exhaustively than almost any other form of antisocial conduct. The literature of criminology and penology is voluminous. Various theories of the criminal have been propounded and expounded.

* The term "state" of course applies to all forms of social organization for purposes of coercion, whatever their extent. They may be local, municipal, national, or international. The fact that one particular division in a federation is called a state sometimes causes confusion.

His existence has been attributed to environment on the one hand and to heredity on the other. The positive, or scientific, school of criminologists, headed by Lombroso, has attempted to prove that criminality is an inherent trait, due to heredity and indicated by observable signs or "stigmata," and that it is bound to find expression in criminal acts in time. Another school, including many prison officials and others who are in daily contact with prisoners, believes that criminality is primarily a matter of environment, that the criminal, at the time of his *first offense*, is just like anybody else, but that circumstances have gone against him, or that he has been thrown in with evil companions, or that in some other way fate has played him a shabby trick. The finished criminal is the product of society's treatment of the first offender, and is a very different character.

Without attempting to examine these various theories, it may be said that in the case of a certain grade of criminals — the bestial, violent, and inhuman — the criminal type may be clearly distinguished. But in the case of the distinctly typical modern criminal — the one who violates the advanced legislation of progressive states — there may be nothing at all except his moral make-up to distinguish him from the most respectable and law-abiding members of his group.

Vice. There remains the third form of immorality, which goes under the general name of vice. Vice is almost always sin, but it is a specialized form of sin. It is the least social form of immorality. A vice is a practice, indulged in by an individual, which tends to destroy the individual himself, or cause him to degenerate, and through him to injure society. Society frowns

upon vice, not because it is aimed directly at the life of society, but because society cannot afford to allow its members to undermine their own powers and characters, and because vice, while individual in its application, is highly contagious.

In addition to its individualistic character, every typical vice presents certain other distinguishing features. In the first place, it arises from the gratification of some personal desire, generally a natural one in the first instance. In the human make-up there are numerous desires associated with the performance of certain necessary or beneficial functions; neglect of these desires occasions pain, while gratification brings pleasure. When the desires are gratified in the legitimate pursuit of the useful end for which they exist, conduct is strictly normal. But when the desire is gratified solely for the sake of the attendant pleasure there is always the possibility of a vice. Again, in the typical vice a continually increasing indulgence is required to secure the same gratification, either because the organism becomes less sensitive to stimulation or because a higher degree of stimulation is required to occasion the same enjoyment; thus the evil gains a stronger and stronger hold on its victim. In the case of some vices the individual becomes so dependent on them that to break off, suddenly at least, is more disastrous than to continue. Finally, as remarked above, the ultimate result of vice is the destruction of the individual, particularly with respect to that power or quality connected with the gratification in question.

Summing up, it may be said that sin is an infringement of the general moral code of society; a man could not possibly be a sinner if he had lived his entire life

from the moment of his first consciousness (if such a thing could be conceived) absolutely apart from all the rest of humanity. Crime is a violation of the established laws of the state; a man cannot be a criminal until his own group has formulated some definite and knowable rules of conduct which it proposes to enforce by authority. Vice is the violation of the constitution of the individual; a man could indulge in vicious practices of one sort or another if he were living a life of complete isolation. Briefly it may be said, with all the limitations which inhere in epigrammatic statements, that society makes sin, the state makes crime, and the individual makes vice.

Two types of incompetence: Incapacity. Turning now to the second main division of abnormality, incompetence, it appears that it manifests two distinct aspects. It was stated above that in the case of incompetence the abnormal individual is not held personally accountable for his failure to conform. We do not blame him for his condition — we say it is "not his fault." There is something lacking in his situation, and this lack may take two forms, which furnish the basis for the two-fold classification of incompetence. There may be something lacking in the make-up of the individual himself, or there may be something wrong with his relationship with his human environment. The first class, which may be given the special name of "incapacity," includes all imbeciles, lunatics, feeble-minded, etc., all who are blind, crippled, or deformed, all who are hopelessly ignorant. Obviously, incapacity may be either physical or psychical, and it may be curable or incurable. But in every case, it is a state of unfitness on the part of the man as he is.

Maladjustment. The other form of incompetence, which may be called "maladjustment," does not imply any lack on the part of the individual himself. He may be just as well equipped for the struggle for existence as those around him, but he has not made the right connection with his human environment. The man is all right, but he is not in the right place. Our immigrants furnish abundant examples of this form of incompetence. There are many cases of aliens in the United States who are perfectly able to do good and useful work, and to fill a normal place in society, who fail to do so because they have not been able in this country to establish the connections which would enable them to put their natural abilities to service. Men of ability and frequently of education are found, sometimes partly or wholly dependent, sometimes doing work of a grade far below their natural capacity.

But the foreigner is not by any means the sole example of maladjustment. Our modern life, particularly our modern city life, teems with cases of this sort. Here is a man, born in a New York slum, with all the aptitudes of a natural farmer, but with no taste or ability for the few lines of work that his opportunities open to him. Here is another who might make a successful electrical engineer, but who cannot afford to secure the necessary training, and so lingers on at work for which he is not fitted, and for which he has no liking. All too often the boy or girl from the lower walks of life goes into whatever occupation first presents itself, and from that time on drifts from one thing to another, never having the opportunity to get started in the thing for which he or she is fitted, never, very likely, even knowing what that is. In all these cases, what is needed

is some method of taking these people out of the wrong setting, and putting them in the right one. The tendency of modern social students is to emphasize the importance of maladjustments in the social evils of our day. Some go to the extreme of maintaining that practically all forms of abnormality reduce to maladjustment, so that the old notions of personal blame and responsibility might be almost wholly discarded. Without going so far as this, it can be safely said that maladjustments are among the most numerous and important of all forms of abnormality, frequently being so extensive as to include entire social groups or classes.

The foregoing classification of the types of abnormality is not artificial, nor simply academic. It is vital as regards the nature of the abnormality, and, consequently, as regards the sort of treatment called for. Any practical handling of a case of abnormality, to secure the soundest results, must rest upon an analysis which follows, in effect, the classification given above.

Two types of improvement. Having analyzed the normal aspects of a department of social life, and having studied the abnormal aspects, the next step is to consider the systems or methods of improvement which belong in that department. These may have to do with the more immediate problems of bringing the abnormal into conformity with the norm, or they may reach on further, and aim to advance the normal into the realization of what is now only an ideal.

In general two types of remedial measure may be distinguished. The first, which may be called the "specific" type, deals with immediate and special problems. Each social evil is taken up as a more or less distinct phenomenon, and the effort is made to find a

remedy which will relieve that particular evil. The second, or "revolutionary," type includes those schemes or devices which are based upon the belief that social evils are too complex and interrelated to be cured piecemeal. There is no hope, according to this view, of permanently remedying the diseased conditions of society by taking up one thing at a time, for the reason that these separate evils are merely symptoms of some great weakness or unsoundness which permeates all society. Only by attacking the great matter boldly, can relief be secured in the minor matters. The motto of the revolutionary reformers might well be the well-known quatrain of Omar:

> "Ah Love! could you and I with Him conspire
> To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
> Would we not shatter it to bits — and then
> Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!"

Some of the really great problems of applied sociology gather around the relative desirability of the specific and revolutionary forms of remedy.

The agencies of social betterment. Another of the greatest problems of applied sociology has to do with the agency which is to apply the remedy — or the aspect of social organization which is to exert the required energy. There are two main possibilities — one, official or state action; the other, unofficial or private action. This question often becomes intensely practical, and much rivalry and bitterness often arise from the conflict of interests between these two phases of social effort.

The treatment of sin. In general, the treatment of sin as such has come to be left largely to unofficial agencies. The modern state seldom undertakes to control

non-criminal sin. In fact, it is practically impossible that it should. For as soon as the state takes cognizance of a sin, and puts it under proscription, it thereupon automatically becomes a crime. The family and the church are the chief social agencies which undertake to deal with sin as such.

The treatment of crime. The treatment of crime is obviously a matter for state action. Private agencies may, and do, coöperate in the effort to lessen or eliminate crime, but the agencies dealing directly with it are of necessity official. Because of the nature of crime, its relation to the state, and its antiquity as a recognized form of antisocial conduct, the question of the treatment of crime has probably received more concrete study than any other form of social betterment. Penology has long been a recognized science, and every state has extensive and complex machinery for the handling of crime. In view of these facts, it is astonishing how meager are the results, and how lacking in variety and imagination are the practical expedients resorted to by even the most progressive states. The criminal procedure of most states does not reveal even a clear conception of the purpose of punishment. It is taken for granted that the criminal is to be punished, but it would be the rare official who could tell just why he was to be punished, or explain clearly the end sought in punishment, or even justify logically any particular form of punishment, even the commonest.

Historically, five chief theories of punishment have been entertained by the powers of the state, and have been held to justify punishment. These are expiation, retribution, deterrence, reformation, and social utility.

Expiation. The theory of expiation accords with the religious interpretation of sin, and the conception of the state as a divine institution. According to this view, the commission of a crime involves a violation of the moral order of the universe. A wrong has been done, and before the balance can be restored some one must suffer in proportion to the injury done. This theory does not furnish an exact guide for the infliction of punishment, for the reasons that it is impossible to measure accurately the extent of an injury to the moral law, and that it is equally impossible to measure the amount of human suffering that will make good that wrong. This theory has little weight now.

Retribution. Retribution also aims at evening things up, but in this case it is the evening up of injuries as between individuals. This is the old law of retaliation — "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth" — and it is possible of much more accurate application than the foregoing. In a crude state of society it had much to recommend it, even before the infliction of punishment was taken over by the state and was still in the hands of the wronged person or his relatives. There is no doubt that much of this theory lingers on in modern penal codes, and influences strongly the thought of the most civilized peoples. It appeals to the primitive sense of justice. Most of us like to see a man "get what he deserves." But it also fosters some of the worst traits of human character — in particular revengefulness — and as a tenable theory of punishment in modern societies it has little to recommend it.

Deterrence. By deterrence is meant the keeping of people from committing crimes, and this is probably one of the most universally held theories of punishment

down to the present time. A deterrent punishment operates in two ways, first by deterring that particular criminal from committing again that, or any other, crime, and second, by deterring others who are as yet not criminals from breaking the law. As to the individual criminal, there are two safe and certain methods of deterrence — death, and properly enforced life imprisonment. As for others, all that need be said is that deterrent punishments all too frequently do not deter. On the contrary, a public execution for a certain crime has very frequently been followed by an epidemic of that very crime in the immediate neighborhood. At the same time, there is little doubt that wisely conceived punishments do exercise some restraining effect, especially in the case of crimes calling for deliberation, and particularly the gainful crimes as contrasted with the crimes of violence. The worst of the theory of deterrence is that it tends to lead to a constantly increasing severity of punishment. The prevalence of this theory in England led to a condition, lasting well into the nineteenth century, where over 200 crimes were capital. The extremes to which it may lead were gruesomely illustrated during the reign of Henry VIII, during which 72,000 persons are said to have been hanged. That this was, in fact, the theory which actuated Henry is evidenced by the following instructions sent out by him to one of his Dukes, with respect to some people who believed themselves to be at peace at the time: "Our pleasure is (good old phrase!) that . . . you shal, in any wise, cause suche dredfull execution to be doon upon a good nombre of thinhabitauntes of every towne, village, and hamlet, that have offended in this rebellion, as well by the hanging of them uppe

in trees, as by the quartering of them, and the setting of their heddes and quarters in every towne, greate and small, and in al suche other places, as they may be a ferefull spectacle to all other hereafter, that wold practise any like mater; which We requyre you to doo, without pitie or respecte, according to our former letters; remembring that it shal be moche better, that these traitours shulde perishe in their wilfull, unkynde, and traitorous folyes, thenne that so slendre punishment shuld be doon upon them, as the dredde thereof shuld not be a warning to others." [12]

Reformation. In the theory of reformation is presented one of the most modern and most tenable of the principles of punishment. Attention is focused on the criminal, not on the crime. The criminal act is a matter of the past, accounted for by the constitution of the criminal. Whatever may, or may not, be done to rectify the wrong, one thing that must be done, if possible, is so to change the nature of the guilty individual that he may go back into the world, no longer a menace to society, but a useful and normal member of his group. The chief objection to the reformative theory of punishment is that it is not broad nor inclusive enough to serve as the sole principle. In many cases reformation appears to be impossible, and in all cases there are other interests to be considered than those of the criminal himself.

Social utility. The theory which is coming to be adopted by advanced penologists is that of social utility. This simply means that punishment is accorded strictly in the interests of society, and that therefore any sort of treatment which promises to safeguard the highest interests of society — which of course includes the

criminal — is justified. This theory is therefore eclectic, and in practice becomes a composite of all the best features of other theories. It is elastic and adaptable. It allows for experimentation, and avoids the inflexibility and narrowness which come from restricting action to a single hard and fast principle. In applying the theory of social utility, it is essential to remember that no theory of punishment, and no practical penal code, can go too far in advance of the general thought of the group. For instance, as long as the sentiment of vengeance lingers on in the minds of most members of a society, it will not do for the legal authorities, however right they may be in the abstract, to put into practice methods of punishment which entirely ignore retribution. Otherwise, there is danger that the people, feeling that justice is not being done by law, will take matters into their own hands, and lawlessness will result.[13]

Methods of punishment. As regards the methods of punishment, the most striking fact with reference to modern societies is the extreme paucity of expedients. Having abandoned the more barbarous devices of torture, galley labor, etc., and having found nothing to take their place, modern administrators find themselves restricted practically to three forms of punishment for all crimes — death, fine, and imprisonment. Since the first is inflicted only for murder in most states, it comes about in practice that the only available expedients for practically all crimes are fine and imprisonment. The only possibility of variety is indicated by the phrase "or both." Recently, sterilization has achieved a certain prominence as a form of punishment for certain types of criminals, but it has never had any wide

application. Neither fine nor imprisonment has very much to support it on the basis of any modern theory of punishment, and when it is recalled how nearly infinite are the varieties of crime it becomes startlingly clear how slight are the opportunities for the nice adjustment of the punishment to the nature of the crime or the character of the criminal. Probation, the suspended sentence, etc. are obviously not forms of punishment, but relaxations of existing forms. It is particularly noticeable in the traditional methods of punishment how little attention is given to recompensing the injured party.

The treatment of vice. As regards the treatment of vice, it is a great question just how far state action is effective and desirable. Of course as soon as the state undertakes to control any form of vice, it brings it into the category of crime. The practical question is, how far ought vice to be made a crime? This is not the place to go into a discussion of that difficult problem. Suffice it to say that while the private agencies which deal with sin in general are of especial efficacy in dealing with vice, there are, on the other hand, many forms of vice which cannot be properly controlled, not to say eliminated, without some state action.

The treatment of incompetence. Turning from remedies for immorality to remedies for incompetence, it may be said in general that the problems of incompetence are so varied, and opinions with reference to them so diverse, that it is scarcely possible to lay down any general principles as to where private action should cease, and state action begin. Many forms of incompetence are dealt with by both types of agencies conjointly. As regards those forms of incompetence distinguished as maladjustments, there is a strong trend of opinion

toward the view that they are primarily due to a faulty organization of society as a whole, and hence are to be corrected only by state action. Some of the foremost of the revolutionary types of remedy aim to correct the more serious maladjustments *en masse*.

The foregoing pages furnish an outline of the method of analysis and study of each of the great departments of social organization and life. The first department to be examined in detail is that which represents the economic life of a modern society.

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC LIFE: NORMAL ASPECTS

The necessity of recognizing characteristic normal features. The first step in the study of the economic life of modern countries, from the point of view of the sociological relationships arising therein, is to dissect and analyze its normal aspects. The purpose of this analysis is to distinguish and delineate the features of the normal wealth-getting activities of men which exercise a determinative influence on their life together in society. This, as has been intimated with reference to depicting normal aspects in general, is not a simple thing to do. A number of equally competent persons, asked to pick out half a dozen features of the economic life of their society which were of primary importance in shaping the social organization, would probably arrive at very divergent results.

General characteristics of the economic life. The task will be simplified by noting, first of all, some of the characteristic features of the economic life of all societies in general. This is a matter of pure sociology, but it is valuable as furnishing a foundation for the more explicit study of modern economic conditions. Four points stand out prominently with regard to the economic life in general. (1) It is primary and fundamental. The earliest and most insistent of the forces acting upon the human individual is hunger, and it remains

one of the dominating impulses of his life. The satisfaction of bodily necessities is the basic activity of every society. (2) It is universal. Every living human being must attend to his bodily wants, and this means that every human being must participate in the economic life of his society, either in person or through an agent. There are periods in the lives of all of us when we expect (not always consciously) that our wants will be looked after for us by others. It is a law of normal animal life that this should be so. But there is also a period in the life of every person who reaches maturity when he is supposed to take charge of the matter of providing his own sustenance. Some individuals are placed in such a favored position that all the active work of provision may be delegated to agents. Others are so handicapped that they can take no part, not even to the extent of directing, in the supplying of their bodily needs. This at once places them in the category of the abnormal. But, old or young, rich or poor, male or female, every human individual must have some one engaged in economic activities in his behalf, if life is to persist. (3) The economic life involves a struggle. Nature provides sustenance in more or less available forms, but she feeds no one. Even in those regions where she presents her most smiling face, and her bounty seems most complete, some effort, however slight it may be, is required before the gifts of Nature become available for immediate human consumption. And in most regions, and for most people, the securing of the daily bread demands so much of effort as to consume the major part of men's time and energy. This struggle takes two distinct forms, which have been called the struggle for existence and the competition of life. The

struggle for existence is the primary conflict with Nature, to make her yield as much as possible for man's enjoyment. This is a matter which interests each society as a whole, and in which all the constituents of the society participate in coöperation, antagonistic though it may be at times. Every member, every class, in a society has a direct interest in prosecuting the struggle for existence of that society with the utmost possible vigor and effectiveness. What each does in this respect helps all. The competition of life, however, is a very different matter. This means the conflict between individuals, or between classes, in a society to see which can appropriate the greatest portion of what the common efforts of all have produced. The struggle for existence is the conflict of men with Nature; the competition of life is the combat of man with men. It is in the latter that real bitterness and enmity arise. (4) Because of the fundamental character of the economic life it comes about that in connection with this group of activities have grown up some of the most important and enduring institutions of human society. So true is this, and so widely recognized, that many thinkers — Karl Marx, *par excellence* — have held that the form of the economic organization exercises an absolutely determinative influence on all other human institutions. It is not necessary to go this far to recognize the predominant importance of this set of interests and activities.

Distinctive features of modern economic life. The task of practical sociology, however, is to distinguish specifically those features of the normal economic life which are particularly characteristic of modern societies, and which are therefore to be reckoned with in understand-

ing and solving present-day problems. A consideration of the phenomena in question reveals five outstanding features of the economic organization of to-day, which may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) Prevalence of contract, and a corresponding assumption of individual initiative and responsibility, in business relations. (2) Capitalistic organization of industry, typified by large-scale factory production. (3) Extreme development of transportation, with resulting geographical distribution of labor. (4) Diminishing relative importance of agriculture. (5) As a resultant of the foregoing, a high degree of complexity and impersonality in business relations.

The significance of the features just enumerated, common-place and matter-of-course though they seem, arises from the fact that they are strictly modern, and differentiate the economic situation in modern societies from that of any earlier epoch. This fact becomes clearer upon comparison of the economic organization of our own society with that of other societies where our commonplaces were unknown. The best possible comparison is that with our own society, speaking in general terms, at an earlier stage in its development. Our own society, here in the United States, is of course only an offshoot of English society, and many of the most significant comparisons are furnished by conditions in England in earlier centuries.

Contract and individual responsibility. First, as regards the prevalence of contract, and the assumption of individual initiative and responsibility in business dealings. It is necessary to turn back only a few hundred years to find a social organization in England, as well as in other European countries, where the idea of

contract, as we know it, was not only of little importance, but was hardly known. Medieval economic life took no account of contract, but was regulated on the basis of custom, status, and mutual expectation. All society was divided into classes, and there was little thought of leaving one class and rising into another. Between these classes, a complicated and intricate, but well-recognized and universally accepted, system of rights, duties, services, and obligations existed. It occurred to no one that he had any right, as an individual, to alter the terms of his relationships with others by means of a bargain. Wages, as we know them, scarcely existed — certainly the term "wage bargain" would have been meaningless. Prices were supposed to correspond with the inherent value of an article; they were fixed by law at this supposed just figure, and it was both illegal and immoral to charge or to pay a higher price. The energy of society was devoted to perpetuating and stabilizing these customs, and to preventing or penalizing any breach of them. Witness the laws against forestalling and regrating, the laws fixing feudal dues, providing for the apprehension and return of runaways, etc.

It is necessary merely to recall these well-known facts to realize how tremendous must have been the changes in all sorts of human relationships when a society constituted on the medieval plan developed into one dominated by the idea of contract. For contract and status are the direct antitheses of each other. The essence of status is that each individual should do as individuals in his position always have done, and consequently are expected to do. The forces of society are devoted to seeing that these various obligations are fulfilled accord-

ing to custom. The essence of contract is a bargain, implying that each party is free to make any arrangement with the other party that he sees fit, so long as no deception or trickery is used. In a contract each party engages to render something of value to the other, his obligation being contingent on the performance of the reciprocal obligation by the other party. Society concerns itself little, if at all, with the terms of the contract, but devotes all its energies to seeing that contracts, once entered into, shall be performed according to the letter of the bond. On examination, it appears that practically every business dealing in modern societies is in the nature of a contract, and that accordingly every individual is thrown on his own responsibility in carrying on business relations. The assumption is that it is the part of the individual not to enter into business agreements which are not to his interest, and that it is the part of society to see that obligations, once incurred, are fulfilled.

The idea of natural liberty. The notion of contract is obviously a correlative of the idea of natural liberty, and the equality of all men. For as long as each individual is charged with the responsibility of safeguarding himself in the terms of the contract, abstract justice evidently requires that both parties in every contract should be on a plane of approximate equality of knowledge, power, and ability. For if one party is better equipped in any way than the other, he will be able to impose unjust terms upon the weaker one, and the contract, while perfectly legal and therefore enforceable by society, will not represent exact justice. It is logical that the progressive abandonment of the theories of natural liberty and universal equality as guiding

principles of statecraft should have been accompanied by an increasing doubt as to whether universal contract is the soundest basis for an equitable organization of society, with human beings constituted as they are. In many departments of economic life the question is being raised whether something else — not the old-fashioned status, of course, but something new — must not speedily be substituted for free contract.

Competition. A corollary of contract is competition, and so we find competition recognized as the characteristic — some think the necessary and ideal — principle of business relations. This idea finds expression in the well-known saying, "Competition is the life of trade." This confidence in competition has received great support from the doctrine of evolution. It seems to be the "survival of the fittest" introduced into business life. But people are coming to see that in this, as in many other departments of life, even the survival of the fittest is not a thoroughly reliable guiding principle of life. For it appears that in an unregulated competition the fittest is frequently the fittest only for survival, and not for any other, and higher, human end. It will appear repeatedly, in the following pages, that in the absence of social control, the most undesirable conditions are those which are able to maintain themselves, and to force more desirable ones out of existence. The industrial sphere, as Cooke-Taylor has pointed out,[14] is about the last stronghold of unregulated competition, and the weakening of faith in contract has brought with it a corresponding lack of confidence in competition as a safe principle of economic relations. Nevertheless, contract, individual responsibility, and competition are still among the chief foundation stones of the economic

edifice in which we live, and they must be reckoned with accordingly.

Capitalism. The second dominating feature of the economic situation of modern countries is capitalistic production, finding its fullest expression in the modern factory system. This is perhaps the most important single fact in the present economic organization of society. It is closely connected with the entire development of western civilization, and is intimately connected with the institution of contract. A clear conception of the normal aspects of economic life demands a realization of the essential features of capitalism.

Economists distinguish three great factors in production, commonly designated land, labor, and capital. By land is meant the virgin resources of Nature — the things which she offers ready to hand, fit to be developed and utilized for human purposes. This, of course, includes everything on the earth's surface — rocks and water, as well as mere soil. Labor is human power. It resides in the native energies with which men are endowed, and it finds expression when those energies are exerted in the form of work. Capital, as ordinarily defined, consists of material objects, saved up from past production, and now ready to be used for the satisfaction of human wants or for the production of further wealth. From the point of view of production, evidently only the second form of capital is significant, and in common language and in many textbooks, the term capital is restricted to this type of material objects. But it is often impossible to tell to which class a given object belongs, until it is actually put to use. To these three primary factors is often added a fourth, organization, by which is

meant a combination of the other three in an effective manner.

Of the three primary factors of production it is evident that land and capital are much more closely allied to each other than either is to labor. In fact, for sociological purposes, the distinction between land and capital is practically negligible. Both are material objects, useful for production, subject to private ownership under modern codes, and capable of conferring upon the owners certain benefits, privileges, and immunities of one sort or another. Labor, on the other hand, inheres in the human body, is inseparable from it, and is owned in modern societies only by the "owner" of the body.* There are strict limits to the amount of labor that any single individual can contribute to the economic forces of his society; there are almost no limits to the amount of land and capital which may be under the ownership and control of an individual. For the purposes of sociology, the significant distinction in the forces of production is that between the forces owned by an individual in his own body, and the forces owned by him external to his body. It is a change in the relative importance of these two categories in the characteristic production of modern countries which is the underlying feature of capitalism, and the explanation of the social problems which arise in connection with it.

Turning once more to an earlier situation, for the sake of comparison, it appears that English medieval society, characterized by status and custom, was also distinguished by its dominant mode of production. This is known as the gild or the handicraft system. Under

* Though sold temporarily and under restrictions, as explained later. (See pages 61–64.)

this system those branches of production which belong under the general head of manufacturing (a term much more applicable, etymologically, to that system than to the present one) were carried on in the dwelling house. The workshop was the home. The master was the chief worker. His natural assistants were his children, and these were supplemented by other young learners, known as apprentices, who were treated by the master on much the same terms as his children. The number of these helpers was limited by law, and their treatment strictly defined. They were bound out for a term of years, usually seven, after which they became journeymen, and finally independent masters. Wages played a relatively unimportant part in this system. There was no competition between trades for workers, as no worker could change his trade. In fact, the interests of the masters led them to seek to limit the number of workers in a trade, instead of to increase it. There was also little competition in the market between masters, as prices and terms of sale were fixed by custom and statute. About the only competition possible was in the quality of the product. There was great equality between all economic classes. Every master had been an apprentice, every apprentice expected to be a master, and most masters were about on an equality with each other.

The altered relative importance of capital and labor. The most important distinction of all, however, in the present connection, was in the relative importance of labor and capital in the production carried on under this system. Capital held a very subordinate place. The power was applied ordinarily by the person working; none of the great motor forms of capital was utilized. The implements used, also, were for the most part tools,

rather than machines, and such machines as there were were very simple. The tendency of a tool or simple machine is to emphasize the importance of the human element in production; that of a complex machine is to minimize it. Thus the essential element in this type of production was human vigor and skill. The master must know every step in the manufacture of his commodity. It took a long time to learn a trade. The things which gave a master superiority in his group were his knowledge of the fine points of his trade, his intelligence, and his manual skill and dexterity. The amount and kind of capital which he owned was a relatively trivial matter. In brief, labor was a vastly more important factor in production than capital. The amount of capital needed to set a man up as an independent producer was relatively slight, and its cost was so low as to oppose no barrier to almost any person who had fitted himself by training to become an independent master.

The amount of product which could be turned out by any master was physically limited. It was practically impossible to become very wealthy through manufacturing activities. Because of the conditions of transportation, etc., the market was a small one. Much of the production was to order, and the maker was held directly responsible for the quality of his goods. If the newly-purchased chair broke down, if the clock failed to work, if the harness would not stand the strain, there was no question on the part of the purchaser as to where to go to register his complaint. Under such conditions permanent dishonesty in production was almost impossible, and everything tended to encourage high quality. A man was known by the commodity he turned out or the work he did, as is familiarly evi-

denced by many of the surnames commonly met with to-day — Tanner, Dyer, Fuller, Weaver, Smith, Mason, Carpenter, etc.

The outstanding fact in this comparison is that labor was the dominant element in production, and capital was wholly subsidiary, though of course necessary. This fact made it natural that the theory of value commonly accepted at the time should be the labor theory of value.

The influence of the machine. It is not necessary nor profitable in this connection to review the steps by which the system of production of the middle ages developed into that with which we are familiar to-day. The facts are known to every student of economic history. The importance of the modifications involved, however, can hardly be overemphasized. They changed the face of society in England, and eventually in all the nations of western civilization, and have well merited the name "Industrial Revolution." These changes had to do with a series of technical inventions and improvements, connected with the development of power on the one hand, and the mechanizing of certain departments of production, particularly the textile industries at first, on the other hand. The three chief agents which made them possible were steam, coal, and iron. Each of these three is indispensable to the fullest utilization of the other two, and every advance in the mastery of one has made possible corresponding advances with reference to the others. The dominating factor in the whole proceeding is the machine. Scarcely second to it is power. The two together have reduced the importance of the human element in industry to the merest shadow of what it once was.

To understand the nature of modern production, and of the social conditions which accompany it, it is necessary to have clearly in mind the essential features of a machine. A machine is a material device to assist man in the production of wealth. But that is not all. From the time when aboriginal man first seized a club or stone to assist him in slaying his game, man has used material devices to further his economic activities. But the stone ax or flint scraper is not a machine. The distinction between a tool and a machine is fundamental. A tool is a simple device, of few parts, guided and controlled directly by the worker. It requires the eye to direct it, the mind to control it, and power to make it effective. A machine, on the other hand, consists of several or many parts, operating together. It is more or less intricate and complex. But a machine is not simply a complicated tool. A machine is a tool, plus something else. And that something else is a substitute for human power and intelligence. Every machine contains one or more tools, which operate directly upon the material concerned. But these tools are now held and directed by the remaining parts of the mechanism, and it is this combination of a tool with a controlling and directing device which is the essential feature of a machine. Add mechanical power to put it in movement, and the development of the machine is complete. The human element has been reduced to a minimum or practically eliminated.

Under a fully developed machine system the relative importance of the human and the material elements in production is completely reversed. It is no longer a trained human being, making things with the aid of material devices. It is a mechanical device, making

things with the aid of one or more human beings — appropriately called "tenders." The machine does the work — the human being feeds, oils, adjusts, or cleans the machine. The success of production depends much more on the ingenuity and mechanical perfection of the machine, than it does on the skill, training, or intelligence of the human worker. A child of ordinary intelligence, eight or ten years old, with scarcely a week's training, is competent to look after many of the most intricate machines. The climax of the entire process, the goal of machine designers, is the automatic machine, which feeds itself, performs each operation in production, counts the product, wraps it up, and delivers it ready to be packed. In such a machine the human element reaches almost the vanishing point.

The factory system. A natural concomitant of machine production is the factory. The term "factory" is a difficult one to define, and a hard and fast definition is not necessary. But in every true factory three characteristic features are to be found. These are (1) a large number of people, congregated in a definite place, and engaged in production; (2) machinery; (3) power external to the human body. True factories had been in existence long before the Industrial Revolution, and many factories were in operation in England side by side with home manufacture. But it was not till the invention of the steam engine, and the development of modern machinery, that the factory could become the predominant unit of production, and then it was inevitable that it should become so. The very nature of machinery and external power leads to a concentration and centralization of production. Machines are expensive, and can be profitably employed only if the product

is large. Power can be more economically supplied on a large scale than on a small one. The expenses of supervision, and many of the "overhead charges" are relatively reduced as the size of the plant is increased. Uniformity of product, convenience of shipment, avoidance of waste of materials, economy in the purchase of supplies, and numberless other advantages are better secured in the large plant under single management. Thus the characteristic mode of production in modern times is not only machine production, but large-scale production, and there arises what is called the "modern factory system." *

Individualism and capitalism not identical. Such are the essential features of capitalism. It is very easy for those whose human environment is that typical of western civilization to fall into the way of attributing to capitalism, *per se*, all of the features which they observe in capitalism as they are familiar with it. This often involves serious errors. For capitalism, as we commonly encounter it, is capitalism marked by private ownership. Because of the dominance of individualism, already referred to, it transpires that almost all of the industrial capital of modern societies is owned by private individuals. So generally are the two factors linked together that the distinction between them becomes almost obliterated, and people come to think that individualism and capitalism, if not one and the same thing, are at least inseparably correlated, and are necessary complements of each other. This is

* How completely factory production has become the normal mode in modern life is evidenced by the fact that the very worst industrial conditions are now found where production is carried on in the home — as in sweatshop labor, and other forms of home work.

manifestly a fallacy. A society can readily be conceived where individualism prevails without capitalism, or where there is capitalism without individualism. Neither necessarily implies the other. Some of the aspects of modern life are due to individualism, some are due to capitalism, and some are due to the combination of the two. But in all nations of the characteristically western type, the two have become closely interwoven, and if it were desired to express in a single phrase the dominating character of modern economic life, it could not be better done than in the term, "individualistic-capitalistic."

The results of individualistic capitalism. It will be in place to glance briefly at some of the social conditions which are the natural and consistent outcome of an individualistic-capitalistic organization of industry, and hence are to be considered as normal in modern societies.

The inferiority of labor. The outstanding fact is that those who have nothing but the labor of their bodies to offer in the economic market are in a position of marked inferiority compared with those who have both labor and capital, or even with those who have capital alone. Yet those who have to depend on their labor alone for their subsistence form the majority of the population of modern countries. For the amount of capital which is of any significance in modern production, and which will therefore confer upon its possessor the privileges of the capitalist, is very large. In the days of the gild system, as has been shown, the amount of capital necessary to enable a workman to become an independent producer was very slight. Not so many years ago there used to be a common saying, "It is the

first thousand that counts." But a single thousand, under modern conditions, does not count very much in enabling its owner to lift himself from the ranks of those dependent on labor. And most laborers lack the thousand, or anything approaching it.

The wage bargain. It thus comes about that the bulk of the productive capital of a society tends to become concentrated in the hands of a small minority of the population, whose function in production is primarily that of the suppliers of capital, and who are therefore known as the "capitalist class." An individual who owns a sufficient amount of capital may be assured of a life of comfort and ease, even though he never does a stroke of labor in his life, nor possesses an amount of intelligence above the minimum necessary to keep his capital from being squandered. The fact that the majority of the capitalist class prefers not to live a life of indolence, but to do some useful work, does not alter the truth of this statement. On the other side is the great "laboring class." Their ability to make a living depends on their own native powers. Neither capital nor labor avails anything in modern production without the other. Each must seek the other, and by a combination of the two wealth will be produced. Since we live in an individual-contract era, this arrangement between capital and labor takes the form of a contract between capital-owners, acting as individuals, on the one hand, and labor-owners acting as individuals, on the other hand. The outcome is the modern "wage bargain." This wage bargain is the foremost of the economic relationships between the individual and his human environment in modern economic life. Its character probably has a greater influence on human

welfare than any other single factor in the economic field. It is therefore essential that this character be clearly understood

The nature of wages. Many and various are the definitions of wages, and the theories offered to explain their nature. It is not necessary to review them here. From the practical point of view — that which would appeal to the laborer himself, and be understood by him — wages can most helpfully be regarded simply as a purchase and sale of labor. The everyday meaning of most economic concepts becomes clearer if regarded in terms of buying and selling; certainly the concept of wages does. On the one hand is the owner of capital. This capital has inherent possibilities of creating wealth. But before these can be realized, certain purchases must be made. Some of these purchases will consist of other forms of capital — raw materials, fuel, etc. — and others will consist of labor. The raw materials and fuel will be purchased from other capitalists, who have those particular commodities to sell. The labor will be purchased from laborers. Any practical factory manager would subscribe to this interpretation of his activities when he is engaging laborers. It does not occur to him that he is "making advances to the laborer to enable him to subsist during the process of production," or that he is "discounting the marginal product of labor." He needs a certain commodity in his business, and he goes into the market and buys it from those who have it to sell, at the best terms he can make. He contracts for a certain sort of labor, for so many hours per day, at so much per day, for a fixed or indefinite time. The economic laws which apply are those of supply and demand,

modified as they must be to fit human labor instead of material commodities.*

The dominance of the capitalist. It was remarked in an earlier paragraph † that whenever, in a free contract between individuals, there is an inequality of knowledge, ability, or power between the parties, the interests of abstract justice are likely to suffer. The critics of the present wage system believe that that is exactly the situation in the contract between capitalist and laborer. For in their dealing together, *as individuals*, the balance of power is all with the capitalist. The very possession of capital confers power, partly because, as has been pointed out, it is the dominant factor in modern production, and partly because it carries with it the ability to wait. Also, the capitalist is usually the superior of the laborer in point of intelligence, information,

* That this explanation of wages is logical becomes clearer by noting that the wages system is simply the latest step in a series of forms of labor ownership. Under slavery, the very body which furnishes the labor is the property of the owner — absolutely, or with restrictions, according to the form of slavery. In the age of feudalism, the lord had an absolute right to, *i.e.* owned, the labor of the serfs for a stipulated time. The indented servants of colonial times sold themselves to the sea captains, who in turn sold them to the colonists, for a limited period of time. This was practically temporary slavery. The conditions were more humane, perhaps, than in the case of negro slavery, but, while the period of sale lasted, the labor of the redemptioner belonged to his master just as truly as the labor of the slave belonged to his owner. So under the modern wage system — sometimes cynically called "wage-slavery" — the laborer absolutely sells his labor to his employer for a limited period of time. The conditions are fixed by law or custom, just as they are in the case of slavery; the laborer sells his own labor voluntarily, just as did the redemptioner, only for a shorter period of time. But once the bargain is made, the labor belongs absolutely to the employer, and if the laborer fails to deliver it, he defrauds his employer just as truly as though he had sold him a certain quantity of potatoes of a certain grade, and actually delivered fewer potatoes, or an inferior quality.

† See page 49.

foresight, etc. Thus the individual purchaser of labor, under ordinary conditions, has an immense advantage over the individual seller of labor. To the employer of three or four thousand men, it is a matter of slight importance whether John Smith is hired for a certain job or not. The employer will not take time to parley. If John Smith does not like the terms offered, there are plenty of others ready to fill the place. Ordinarily, the business will go on without serious interruption even though the place remains unfilled for some time. But to John Smith it is not a matter of unimportance whether he gets this job or not. It may be the first opportunity for work that has come to him in days or weeks, and it is a question of life and death, for himself and his family, whether he secures employment. So it generally comes about in practice that, in the wage bargain, the employer makes the terms, which the laborer is free to take or to leave as he chooses. He is free to leave them, but only theoretically. In real life, he is forced by necessity to take some terms, if not those of the first capitalist, then those of some other. It is very rarely that John Smith's ideas of what is right and equitable have anything to do with the decision, or that he even has a chance to express them. Neither can the capitalist, of course, fix his terms altogether arbitrarily. The terms he offers will vary within limits set for him by the conditions of the market, involving many subtle factors which perhaps he understands but little better than John Smith himself. But among those factors which determine what he will offer is that very inequality of power as between him and the individual laborer, by which the attainment of abstract justice is impeded.

It is to be noted that the foregoing discussion has to do with the capitalist and the laborer acting as individuals. What happens when they cease to act as individuals, and begin to act in combination, will be discussed in another connection.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC LIFE: NORMAL ASPECTS (*continued*)

The laborer's lack of interest in production. Another of the results of the factory system is the almost complete lack of interest in production or in the product on the part of the laborer. Several different features of the system contribute to this result.

In the first place, the laborer no longer has any ownership in the product. Under the gild system the finished product belonged to the man who had made it — the master. He owned the house in which it was made, the small amount of capital involved in the manufacture, and the raw materials from which it was made. At no time during the process of production did it pass from his ownership or control. When it was done, he sold it, and the proceeds were his. His children, and the apprentices who had helped him of course owned none of the product. But they were mere learners, and as soon as they became mature workers, they, too, owned their products. Under the factory system, the factory, raw materials, and finished product belong to the capitalist. The laborer at no time owns any part of what is passing through his hands or under his eye. Never can he say, "This product, when finished, will be mine, and my rewards will depend on how successfully I can dispose of it." There is much theoretic discussion as to the "right to the whole product of labor," and much query-

ing as to how much of the product belongs to the laborer. These questions never bother the manufacturer or his employee. They both know that, in actual fact, all of the product belongs to the capitalist, and none to the laborer. The latter has sold his labor, and has a right to the stipulated payment therefor. His claims stop there. He has no more ground for assuming a part ownership in the product than has the man who sold the raw materials, or the land on which the factory stands. Accordingly the laborer has little interest in the product.

The second feature of the factory system which tends to eliminate interest in production on the part of the laborer is the minute subdivision of labor which is an essential accompaniment of machine production. A machine may perform an operation perfectly, but it can perform only one operation. It has no flexibility or adaptability. Therefore machine production tends to break up into a series of distinct, well-defined, uniform, and standardized operations, each performed by a separate machine, or a separate part of a composite machine. And the labor of the human beings, who are the machine tenders, follows the same course, and tends to become the repetition, hour after hour, and day after day, of the same minute operation, demanded by the construction of the machine. The further the development of machine production progresses, the more complete does this subdivision of labor become, until even the less mechanical branches of production in great factories become thoroughly standardized. The result is that the actual work of the typical factory laborer has absolutely nothing in it to arouse the interest, or stimulate the imagination, of the worker. The girl worker in a canning factory whose entire working time is consumed

in dropping, one after another, small pieces of pork into the top of a can of baked beans, cannot be expected to find much pleasure in work for work's sake, nor can the girl next her, whose duty it is to drop the round metal caps on the openings of the cans, ready for the soldering machine. In many cases, the indifference of the worker to his product reaches the extreme of not even knowing what the finished product is to be.

All this, of course, is likely to have an unfavorable effect on the quality of the product. But even more serious is the effect upon the worker. Since the major part of the waking hours of most people is spent in labor, the situation becomes most menacing and unsatisfactory when there is nothing about the labor itself which can arouse the slightest interest in the laborer. The prime requisite for a satisfactory economic situation for any individual is that his work should appeal to him, maintain his interest, stimulate thought and attention, provide real pleasure, or at least broaden and develop him, and give him a chance to express his individuality. That sort of labor, however, seems to be inevitably denied to most of the workers under the factory system.

Centralization of production. The tendency toward centralization of production, which characterizes capitalism, extends beyond the mere productive plant itself. It affects the entire organization and management of industry. Not only do factories tend to become larger and larger, but separate plants tend to become combined under a single management and ownership. The result is the enormous increase in combinations of all sorts, and particularly the dominance of the trust, which marks the present epoch. This tendency to combination is due partly to the fact that the highest economy demands

production on a scale so large that the individual capitalist cannot supply the necessary funds, or else does not care to risk all that he has in a single enterprise; combination also makes it possible to utilize in production, through the corporate form of organization, the savings of a large number of individuals, no one of whom owns enough to enable him to become an independent producer. This tendency is also partly due to the fact that combination fosters monopoly, and monopoly is economically profitable.

Combination in ownership, particularly in the form of the corporation, carries with it some undesirable consequences. Chief among these is divided, and in most cases diminished, responsibility. It has been remarked that under the gild system there was a responsible, individual maker for each product. There was no question where the blame should lie if a certain commodity proved faulty. But under our present system it is always difficult, and often impossible, to fix the responsibility on any individual or individuals. Suppose a chair, purchased at a retail furniture store, breaks down. The customer naturally complains to the dealer. The dealer replies that the chair was purchased from a reliable wholesaler, and had no visible flaws when purchased. But he will take the matter up with the wholesaler. The latter tells him that the chair was purchased from such and such a furniture manufacturing concern, and he will take it up with them. The furniture factory is owned by a corporation, and managed by a superintendent chosen by the board of directors. The superintendent shifts responsibility from his shoulders by saying that he is under orders, and runs the factory the way the directors demand. The directors say that they are

responsible for seeing that the factory makes money, so that dividends may be paid, and if any fault is to be found with the way it is run recourse must be had to the stockholders, whose representatives they are. But the stockholders are a scattered body of people, with no common interests save ownership of the same sort of stock, distributed over the entire country, or perhaps in foreign countries. Ninety-nine per cent of them, as the directors say, have no further interest in the running of the factory or in the quality of the product than that dividends shall be generous and regular. It is impossible to fix responsibility on any one of them. There have been abundant instances in the United States in recent years of the extreme difficulty of placing legal or moral responsibility on any individuals in connection with many of our most important industries. Much of the outcry against trusts and "soulless corporations" is due to this condition.

The extent to which this centralization of production and concentration of ownership have been carried in the United States is well illustrated by the following figures: In 1909 there were 268,491 manufacturing establishments in the United States. Of these 52.4 per cent were owned by individuals, 20.2 per cent by firms, 25.9 per cent by corporations, and 1.5 per cent by other forms of ownership. Thus only a little over one fourth of the total number of establishments were owned by corporations. But the importance of this group of establishments is evidenced by the fact that they employed 75.6 per cent of the wage earners, and turned out 79 per cent of the product, measured in terms of money. Of the total number of establishments, 1.1 per cent turned out an annual product worth $1,000,000 or more each. This

1.1 per cent employed 30.5 per cent of the total number of wage earners, and turned out 43.8 per cent of the value of the product.[15] The growth of the large plant is still further illustrated by the fact that in the last sixty years, in spite of the great increase of manufactures, the increase in the number of establishments has been small, and in some important industries there has been an actual decrease. Thus in 1850 there were 123,025 manufacturing establishments, as against 268,491 in 1909. In the cotton manufacturing industry there were 1240 establishments in 1840, and 1324 in 1909; in the woolen manufacturing industry, 1675 establishments in 1850, and 1214 in 1909; in the iron and steel manufacturing industry, 808 establishments in 1870 and 654 in 1909.[16]

Modern possibilities of accumulating wealth through manufacture. Another modern condition which was impossible before the development of the factory system is the possibility of amassing great wealth through manufacture. Under the gild system, as has been shown, the amount of product which any master could turn out during a year was strictly limited by physical conditions, and by legal restrictions. The physical limitations were by far the most important. No man, working by himself, and aided only by a small number of children and apprentices, could possibly turn out goods enough to bring in any extreme return. Only by producing goods of exceptional quality could he raise his income much above the average for his class, and there were strict limits to even this possibility. Comfort was possible to almost every manufacturer, but wealth to none. The underlying reason was that human skill and training were the essential factors in manufacture, and the amount of either of these which any man may own is strictly limited

by Nature. But under the modern system, the dominant factor in industry is capital, and there is no limit to the amount of capital which a man may own. And since capital commands labor, there is no limit to the amount of labor which an individual may employ. And since the product of combined labor and capital belongs to the capitalist, there is no limit to the wealth that the capitalist may accumulate as a result of manufacturing activity. Jonathan T. Lincoln says that the multimillionaire is the inevitable result of the industrial stage as the trust is of the first factory.[17] The "swollen fortunes" of to-day are largely made possible by the individualistic-capitalistic organization of our industry.

Long time consumed in production. Some other features of modern capitalistic production need to be mentioned. One of them is the long time often consumed in the process of production. While a given operation is performed by the machine with lightning rapidity, yet the whole course of production is broken up into so many stages, and these stages are often so widely separated by time and place, that the period which elapses between the commencement and the completion of an article may be much longer than it would have been in the case of house industry. The manufacture of an article may be commenced in one part of the country, and finished in another, or even in a different country. Partly manufactured commodities form an important element in import and export trade.

The speculative element in production. Also much of our modern production is performed on the basis of an expected future demand. Some business is, of course, still contracted for directly, but a great deal of it is carried on in the faith that the demand at a future time

will correspond to expectations. Modern conditions of business have stretched out the connection between demand and supply tremendously. In the fall of the year the drummers are out with the samples of goods for sale next summer and spring. These goods are largely already manufactured. The manufacturer anticipates the demands of the wholesaler, the wholesaler, those of the retailer, and the retailer, those of the consuming public. This gives a highly speculative character to much modern industry. The rewards of those who can anticipate a market with accuracy are high, and the penalty to those who cannot is failure. Under a less stable organization of society the risks of industry lay in fire and flood, in robbers and hostile invaders, in accidents by sea and land. Now the chief risk lies in the uncertainty of the future market.

The benefits of capitalism. The features of the capitalistic system which have been reviewed thus far have not all been such as to incline one to regard the system as altogether ideal. Many of them, considered abstractly, are far from ideal, although they must be regarded as strictly normal under existing conditions. It is evident that capitalism must have some prominent redeeming features to have enabled it to establish itself as the dominant mode of production in all modern civilized countries. Such redeeming features it indeed has in abundance, and they may all be briefly summed up in the single statement — capitalism is by all odds the most efficient wealth-producing system that the world has ever known. Under its *régime* the rate of production of wealth, and the per capita amount of wealth have been augmented almost beyond measure. One laborer, working in conjunction with modern machinery, can turn

out more goods than a hundred men with the tools of the middle ages, and many gigantic tasks are possible which would be practically out of the question without machinery. The variety and abundance of goods have increased enormously, and the prices of many commodities have been correspondingly reduced. Capitalism has given man a mastery over Nature which was undreamed of before. It has made modern civilization possible.

The fact that the advantages of capitalism may be thus briefly stated must not be allowed to obscure their importance. Capitalism, even in its most advanced form, endows man with incalculable advantages, and frees him from innumerable restrictions. There can be no doubt that capitalism has come to stay, and whatever changes result from the demand for the elimination of the undesirable features of the system, will take the form of modifications of the type of capitalism, not the abandonment of capitalism itself.

Transportation. The third outstanding feature of the modern economic organization is the extreme development of transportation, and the resulting high degree of geographical division of labor. Within the past century there has been a revolution in transportation and commerce which is scarcely second, in the importance of its economic and social results, to the Industrial Revolution. Its development has been closely associated with the Industrial Revolution, and neither could have reached its present stage without the other.

The two chief agents in this revolution have been the steamship and the railroad, but there have also been important improvements in other means of transportation, including roads, canals, and sailing vessels. It is hard to realize how great were the difficulties of transportation

only a few hundred years ago. Ships were small and slow, and subject to frequent loss from the perils of the sea. On land, the only means of communication were roads. These were almost uniformly bad, and in many cases were nothing more than mere bridle paths. They were infested by robbers, and intercepted by frequent toll-gates. Rivers and canals were very important as highways. The risks of transportation by both sea and land were enormous, and the prices of transported goods, and the profits gained from successful expeditions were correspondingly high. In the middle ages, English wool in Florence sold for from two to twelve times as much as at home. Risks and profits were exceptionally great in new enterprises. It took a year and four months for Cabral's expedition to India to make the voyage and return, and then only five out of thirteen ships returned laden. But the cargo of these five more than repaid the entire cost of the fleet. The freight of DaGama's ships, on a similar undertaking, paid expenses sixty times over.[18] Even in the early nineteenth century the manufacturer often had to ship goods at his own expense and risk, and wait eighteen months or two years for his return.[19]

In addition to the natural obstacles and barriers to commerce there were many restrictions of a political or pseudo-economic nature. Tariffs, import and export duties, navigation laws, dues and exactions of every sort were the order of the day. Hostility between nations was the prevailing condition, and foreign traders were regarded by most nations with extreme suspicion. Currency was uncertain and undependable, and the means of exchange were primitive.

Under such conditions the only objects of commerce which could be transported any distance were articles of

small bulk and high value — almost exclusively articles of luxury, or designed for the consumption of the wealthy. The goods consumed by the ordinary family were almost entirely produced in the immediate neighborhood, often in the home itself. Goods were sold where they were made, and conversely were made where they were demanded. The market for most commodities was strictly local. The manner of selling was by the market and fair, a system which still prevails in backward countries, as in Turkey, where villages are still named in accordance with the day on which their market is held.

Under these conditions it was almost as nearly impossible to make a fortune by trade as it was by manufacture under the gild system. In those lines of commerce where great wealth was waiting, the expenses and risks were so great as to preclude them to all except those supported or backed by governments. It was not until the joint stock trading companies, and chartered companies, came into existence that commerce began to be looked upon as a promising source of wealth, and even then the losses were so great that the period is known as the "Bubble period."

As in the case of the Industrial Revolution, it is not necessary to try to trace in detail the steps by which the modern commercial and transportation system was introduced and developed. The fact is that world commerce is practically a matter of the last three quarters of a century. While the first locomotive went into operation in 1814, railroad building practically dates from about 1830, and over ninety-nine per cent of the railroad mileage of the world has been built since 1840. In 1830 there were 23 miles of railroad in the United States, in 1870, 52,922 and in 1913, 251,984. The application of

steam to transoceanic traffic is an even more recent development. An American ship, the *Savannah*, crossed the Atlantic in 1819, using steam as an auxiliary to sail. She was equipped with movable paddle wheels, which were hoisted on deck when the winds were favorable, and lowered into the water for use only when the winds were contrary. The first regular steamship to cross the ocean without recoaling on the way was the *Great Western* in 1838. The first large iron steamer, and the first using the screw in ocean navigation, was the *Great Britain*, sailing in 1845.

Other inventions, secondary in importance only to these, which have improved transportation, and have reduced the commercial size of the world, are the telephone, telegraph, submarine cables, improved postal systems, and now the wireless, and aëroplanes and dirigibles.

The results of this tremendous series of improvements are incalculable. The foreign commerce of the countries of the world has increased from approximately 1.4 thousand million dollars, or $2.31 per capita, in 1800 [20] to over 40.4 thousand millions, or $24.46 per capita in 1913.[21] The portions of the earth's surface have been drawn together, for all practical purposes, to a degree that would have been inconceivable even a century ago. Every variety of climate, every form of natural resource, is made to contribute its share to the daily supplies of the humblest individual. Things that were once the luxuries of the wealthy are now the everyday comforts and necessaries of the masses.[22] The social effects are no less important than the mercantile. Old hostilities between societies, based largely on ignorance and lack of acquaintance, have been broken down. Travel has been encouraged, international relations have been improved,

and a sense of world brotherhood has been developed. The likelihood of war (in spite of the seeming evidence to the contrary, furnished by the Great War) has been lessened. At least, the possibility of a world federation has been created.

In some particulars the effects of the Commercial Revolution are similar to those of the Industrial Revolution. The extreme geographical division of labor has tended to increase the impersonality of business relations, and has still further attenuated the bond between supply and demand, or between producer and consumer, and has added to the difficulty of placing the responsibility in business matters. Also, the creation of a world market has vastly increased the possibilities of securing wealth through trade. As long as the market was strictly local, the chances of buying and selling were so limited for any individual that it was impossible to make a fortune by those operations. But now the market is the civilized world, and a man who manufactures a better shoelace than any made before can become a multimillionaire in his lifetime.

The diminished relative importance of agriculture. The fourth predominant characteristic of our normal economic situation is the progressively diminishing importance of agriculture, relative to other forms of business activity, particularly manufacturing, trade, and transportation. This situation is sometimes regarded as almost identical with the growth of capitalism, but this is an error. It is true that capitalism finds its highest development in connection with manufacturing, but manufacturing and capitalism are not the same thing. It is possible to have well-developed manufacturing without capitalism, while capitalism affects agriculture as truly — though not as extensively — as it does manufacturing.

It is partly because agriculture shares in the benefits of capitalism that it is no longer necessary to have so large a proportion of the population as formerly engaged in tilling the soil. Two or three men, equipped with modern agricultural machinery, can turn out a bigger crop than several times as many men could with the old methods.

Thus modern societies are marked by a steady shifting of population from rural to urban districts, and from agricultural to industrial and commercial pursuits. This change is illustrated statistically by the following figures, showing the proportion of the total working population of the United States engaged in different types of activity at different periods.

PER CENT OF POPULATION GAINFULLY EMPLOYED IN THE UNITED STATES

EMPLOYED IN	1820	1880	1900	1910
Agricultural pursuits	80.3	44.4	35.7	32.9
Trade and transportation		10.8	16.4	19.9
Manufacturing and mechanical pursuits		21.8	24.4	28.3

The following figures show the amount of money invested in agriculture and in manufacturing at different periods:

	(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)		
	1850	1900	1910
Value of farm property in the United States (round numbers)	4.0	20.4	41.0
			1909
Money invested in manufactures in the United States (round numbers)	.5	9.8	18.4

This change has been especially observable in the United States, which, in a hundred and fifty years, has passed through stages which have occupied many centuries in older countries. The entire character of our social life and organization has changed from one dominated and determined by agricultural interests and pursuits, to one dominated by industrial and commercial activities. The change is well exemplified by the typical "prominent citizen" of to-day and of a hundred years ago. Then it was the country squire who embodied the characteristic ideals of his group, and who was accordingly respected and honored. To-day it is the entrepreneur, the banker, the large merchant — in brief, the "business man."

Because of the dominance of the economic organization over all other social institutions, already referred to, this change from an agricultural to an industrial economy has involved, and is involving, many profound alterations in the relationship of men to their human environment. The old simplicity and democracy of the rural household has been replaced by the artificiality and pronounced class distinctions of the manufacturing community. It was expected that the "hired man" on the farm should take his meals with the family, and on Sunday should put on his "store clothes" and take the daughter of the house to church. Such a relationship is undreamed of on the part of the entrepreneur, or capitalist owner, and the laborers in the factory. New social problems have arisen on every hand, and old traditional conceptions and modes of life have had to be abandoned or radically modified. Many of the most insistent problems of modern social life are more or less closely bound up with this shifting of the dominant phase of

economic activity. Yet the change is indicative of an improving economic status of mankind, and an increasing mastery over Nature. For, generally speaking, the agricultural activities have to do with the production of the elementary necessaries and comforts of life, while the manufacturing and commercial activities are especially concerned with more elaborate comforts and luxuries. A decreasing percentage of agricultural workers commonly indicates a growing command of luxuries on the part of the society as a whole.

The complexity and impersonality of economic relations. Finally, in summing up the characteristics of the economic life of to-day, there is to be observed an extreme complexity and impersonality in almost all business relations. This has already been suggested in several different connections. It remains merely to point out how nearly universal it is. Wherever we turn, we find an elongated, attenuated, complicated bond between the different factors in business life — between producer and consumer, between employer and employee, between capitalist and laborer. The old personal touch, and intimate relationship between those who represent the different factors in production is a thing of the past. The spirit of the machine seems to pervade all economic affairs. This complexity carries with it a division of responsibility which goes to the extreme where there seems to be almost no responsibility at all. The economic organization presents the aspect of a great mechanical system which seems to run itself, with no human individual directly accountable for any of its features.

The uniqueness of modern economic problems. From this survey of the normal aspects of the economic life of to-day it becomes clear that the relations of men to

their human environment in this great field are of a distinctly modern character. They are determined by conditions which are of exceedingly recent growth — having their beginning scarcely a century ago, and constantly developing even at the present moment. The problems which arise out of these conditions are new. No other generation has ever had to deal with them. No society has ever been constituted on the same plan, nor had to grapple with the same sort of difficulties. Since the alterations have not yet reached their culmination, modern societies are experiencing the difficulties which always attend a transitional period. Old methods, traditional policies, well-established institutions are constantly proving themselves out of date, and inadequate. One who wishes to deal with the social problems of today must be equipped, in the first place, with a thorough understanding of the nature of his own society, and, in the second place, with a readiness to test every idea, plan, or method by the criterion of things as they are, and to abandon any prejudice or pet scheme which does not accord with the conditions and demands of the present.

CHAPTER VI

THE STANDARD OF LIVING

The meaning of standard of living. The foregoing pages have depicted the modern setting of the economic struggle of the human race. The economic organization of a society represents its equipment for the task of making Nature yield her treasures for man's use. It also represents the setting, within which takes place the great conflict of men with each other, each individual, each family, each group responding to the primary instinct of self-advancement.

The success of any group of people in this economic struggle is represented by what is known as the standard of living. This is one of the most important of all economic concepts, and merits careful consideration.

At the outset it is necessary to distinguish between two conceptions of the standard of living which are current, following the two-fold significance of the word standard, as used in everyday language. A standard may be either a type or average, or an ideal. Thus we speak of a standard typewriter, a standard gauge railroad, a standard dictionary, a standard death rate. Used in this way, the word standard means the common, ordinary, accepted, or representative form of an object. In many cases it is practically equivalent to an average. In its other use, connoting an ideal, we speak of a man as having high standards, or another

man as having no standards at all. We say of a third man that he has standards that he cannot live up to. So the phrase "standard of living" is used to mean either an ideal of the way in which people ought to live, or a type or average of the way they do live. This latter interpretation is by far the more valuable and important concept. It is essential, first of all, to know how people actually do live, and then there can be some intelligent speculation as to how they ought to live.

The standard of living of a group of people is the average amount of necessaries, comforts, and luxuries enjoyed by the typical family in that group. The term is sometimes so defined as to apply to individuals, but this conception misses much of the social significance of the term. Societies are organized on the basis, not of individuals, but of families. The "unit of living," so to speak, is the family. All social arrangements and adjustments take it for granted that the majority of the members of society will live in families. It would be almost impossible to make a study of standards of living, based on individuals, which would have any meaning at all.

A complete and accurate delineation of the standard of living of a group of people would be represented by a detailed picture of the life of a single, typical family—what may be called the "standard" family. The conditions of life of this standard family would be found by averaging, as accurately as possible, all the details of the living of the families in the group, and combining these averages as if presented by a single family. The standard family is thus an abstraction, a hypothetical case, just as, in ethnology, the race type is an abstraction.

It would probably be just as hard to find any actual family that lived exactly in accord with the average of the families of the group, as it would be to find a single individual who embodied in his person all the exact characteristics of the race type. That is one of the great difficulties with averages — that they do not really represent anybody at all. Nevertheless, when it is desired to get a concrete conception of the characteristic features of a group of objects which differ more or less widely among themselves, an average is often the best, if not the only, way to do it. The standard of living is practically the only way to represent the living conditions of a group of people.

Two types of standards of living. At this point a further distinction needs to be made. This is the discrimination between the standard of living of a society, and the standard of living of a group within a society. Both are conceivable concepts, and each has its utility in certain cases. Thus it would be theoretically possible to work out the standard of living of the entire United States, and such a standard would be of value in comparing the advantages of life in this country with those in European countries — in connection with immigration investigations, for instance. It would even be conceivably possible to work out the standard of the entire world, in order that life here might be compared with that on Mars or some other planet. But the larger the number of units combined in an average, and the wider the diversities between them, the less significant does the average become, and the more completely does it fail to represent anything in particular. Thus there would be little point in asking a traveler, recently returned from a strange land, what

was the average height of the vegetation in that country. For an answer of "Fifteen feet" might apply equally to a country covered with a uniform growth of scrub pine, or one diversified by every sort of plant, from the creeping vine to the towering cedar. But a query as to the average height of the oak trees might elicit some really valuable information. So the most significant and valuable standards of living are not those of the society, which includes everybody from the ditch digger to the multimillionaire, but those of groups within the society, which are sufficiently homogeneous so that the standard really gives some idea of how the people live.

The standard of a society. But the difference between the standards of living of societies and of social groups is much more far-reaching than this. The two sorts of standards rest on wholly different principles, and are determined by wholly different factors. The standard of living of a society is a matter of the struggle for existence. It is the resultant of three great factors — the size of the population, the amount of land available, and the stage of the arts. Given a certain combination of these three factors, a certain standard of living is bound to result, for the society. The only way to change the standard of a society is to alter one or more of these three factors. The standard of living of a group within a society, on the other hand, is a matter of the competition of life. It is determined by one single factor — the power of that group. This power may be of different sorts, and, in various societies of the past, groups have depended sometimes upon military power, sometimes on political power, sometimes on religious power for their standards of living. In modern societies it is economic

power which determines. Of course the standards of all groups within a society are conditioned in general by the standard of that society — just as the movements of fishes are conditioned by the depth of the ocean, or the flight of birds by the height of the atmosphere — but within this condition they vary independently of the factors which determine the standard of the society. No class, however favored, can rise above the point made possible by the conditions of the society of which it is a part. But how near the top of that society it gets is determined by the ability it has to appropriate for its own special enjoyment the benefits which the society as a whole enjoys.

Thus a given standard of living of a society, resulting from a certain combination of land, population, and arts of industry, may represent a condition where the great majority of the people live on a plane of approximate equality, as is said to be the case in Bulgaria,[23] or it may represent a condition where the class standards vary all the way from that of the family with an income of a million dollars a month to that of the family dependent on a widowed mother who cannot earn a dollar a day, as in the United States. It is impossible to tell from the society standard alone what conditions prevail, among the classes. For this purpose, group standards must be studied. Conversely, it is impossible to tell, merely from a knowledge of the relative power of a group within a society, what its standard of living is. Something must be known about the standard of the society. In two societies organized on about the same system, the standard of any given class will be high in the society with a high standard, and low in the society whose standard is low. Thus shoemakers in

the United States will have a much higher standard than shoemakers in Italy — in fact, shoemakers in the United States may have a higher standard than, say, school-teachers in Italy — just because the society standard is so much higher in this country than in Italy.

It is evident that the interests of all the elements of a society are harmonious as regards the standard of that society. Whatever is done to increase the amount of land controlled by that society, or to bring about a more advantageous density of population, or to improve the arts of industry, so long as these improvements do not injure the interests of any specific class, will meet with the approval and support of all. Consequently, no great social problems are connected with the question of raising the standards of societies, and it is not necessary to devote much conscious thought as to how this may be done. Societies may be trusted to do the best possible for themselves in this respect.

The standards of social groups. But when we turn to the question of the standards of social groups, we find ourselves at once in the midst of a great conflict and antagonism of interests. For the things won from Nature by the united efforts of the members of society must be distributed, and there are an indefinite number of ways in which they may be distributed. They may be divided, as has been remarked, so that all families will share about alike; or they may be divided so that some will have a superabundance, others a comfortable allowance, and many a bare pittance. The division in modern societies is largely on the basis of economic classes, and the share which each class receives is de-

termined by its relative economic power. Thus arise the great and bitter class conflict and class struggle which characterize modern civilized life. In connection with this class conflict emerge many of the most serious and perplexing of the social problems with which modern societies have to deal. This antagonism of economic interests accounts for most, if not practically all, of the class hatred, envy, and rivalry in such countries as the United States. For the variations in economic power are so great that it is quite possible that a situation should exist where the standard of a society is steadily advancing, while that of one or more groups within the society is depreciating. This has been repeatedly demonstrated in history, perhaps the most familiar case being that of the textile workers in England, at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. The successive improvements in spinning machinery on the one hand, and weaving machinery on the other, caused a series of fluctuations in the standards of the weavers and the spinners. After the introduction of a newly invented spinning machine, the weavers, whose labor was then in great demand, would be wearing silk hats and driving to town in carriages. But when the next invention put weaving machinery ahead of spinning machinery, the weavers fell to a pitiable state, while the spinners were on the crest of the wave. But all the while the general standard of English society was advancing because of the great improvements in the technical arts. In fact it often happens that something which is of the greatest service in improving the standard of a society, may seriously injure the interests of one or more classes. Thus the introduction of machinery, which has made modern civilization possible, at the outset worked

grievous hardship to the old handworkers, so much so that the very instinct of self preservation led them to attack the machines and factories as if they were great monsters, come to take the bread from their mouths. So the addition of large amounts of land to the resources of a society — as by the various reclamation projects — will prejudicially affect the interests of the existing landowners. Such effects, however, are always transitory. In time society adjusts itself to the new conditions, and all classes come to share more or less in the new benefits.

The most significant standard. It has been stated that the most significant standards of living are those of groups within a society. And of all the groups or classes in modern societies, the one whose standard of living is of the highest importance, and repays the most careful study, is the wage-earning class. There are three reasons for this. In the first place, the wage-earning class is very much larger than any other class, constituting a large majority of the entire population. At a rough estimate, two thirds to three quarters of the gainfully employed population of the United States are wage earners, and therefore a corresponding proportion of the families are wage-earning families.* It follows that the wage-earning class represents a much greater sum total of human welfare than any other class, or than all other classes put together. In the second place, the wage earners constitute the backbone of democracies, and the strength of any democratic nation depends upon the comfort, intelligence, and contentment of its working people. Finally, the standard of living of the wage-earning class represents the minimum for the

* See pages 91–92.

entire society.* The standard of any other class is that of the wage earners, plus something. Given a clear picture of the standard of living of the wage-earning class, it is possible to form a notion of the economic foundations of a society. The various peaks and pinnacles of the edifice are of minor importance. An important part of the review of the normal aspects of the economic life is a study of the standard of living of the working classes.

Economic distribution of the population of the United States. Before entering upon this study it will be helpful to get some idea of the make-up of the working force of the United States — what proportion of the entire population are at work; in what occupations they are engaged; what proportion of them are wage earners, etc.

The government statistics furnished by the United States with reference to its working population are based upon the term "gainful workers." As used by the Census Bureau, this is practically synonymous with workers for money, boys working full time on their father's farms without financial remuneration being about the only exception of importance.§ The term does not include women doing housework in their own homes, nor other workers whose remuneration does not take the form of money, with the exception just noted.

The class of gainful workers includes the following proportions of the population of the United States, grouped in different ways:

* No account is taken here of the relatively small number of "down-and-outs," the "submerged tenth," what Mrs. Bosanquet calls the "residuum," composed of the dregs of society, who can hardly be said to have a standard at all.

§ For definition, see Thirteenth Census, Volume IV, page 15.

Population Group	Percentage of Group Classed as Gainful Workers [24] (1910)
Total population	41.5
Population ten years of age and over	53.3
Males ten years of age and over	81.3
Females ten years of age and over	23.4
Children ten to fifteen years of age	18.4
Children ten to thirteen years of age	
Male	16.6
Female	8.0
Children fourteen to fifteen years of age	
Male	41.4
Female	19.8

These workers are distributed among the occupation groups as follows:

Occupation	Percentage of Total Number of Gainful Workers [25] (1910)
Agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry	32.2
Extraction of minerals	2.5
Manufacturing and mechanical industries	27.9
Transportation	6.9
Trade	9.5
Public service (not elsewhere classified)	1.2
Professional service	4.4
Domestic and personal service	9.9
Clerical occupations	4.6
Total	100.0

As to the proportion of these gainful workers who are to be classed as wage earners, no figures are furnished. It is possible, however, to make a general estimate. Out of every 100 persons engaged in manufactures, 86 are wage earners.[26] Probably the proportion would be virtually the same for the class listed above as manufacturing and mechanical industries, which includes 27.9 per cent of the gainful workers. In the mining industries 93 per cent of the workers are wage earners.[27] In the railroad industry in 1910 there were 5476 general officers directing the activities of nearly one and three quarters million employees, most of whom would be

wage earners.[28] Thus in the manufacturing and mining industries, and in transportation, from 85 to over 90 per cent of the workers are wage earners. This proportion would probably hold for trade, and for domestic and personal service. The percentage of wage earners in the small groups, professional service, public service, and clerical occupations might not be so high. There remains the largest group of all, agriculture, etc. This group included 12,659,203 persons in 1910. Of these, 6,361,502 were farm operators, including owners, tenants, and managers.[29] This is half the group, or about 16 per cent of the whole number of gainful workers in the entire country. The other half of this group would be mostly wage earners. Combining these various groups, with an eye on their relative numerical importance in the total working population, it appears that the wage earners of the United States constitute from two thirds to three quarters of the entire class of gainful workers. The remainder are independent producers, salaried workers, members of professions, etc.

Two phases of the standard of living. Every standard of living has two phases — income and outgo. Both of these are expressed in terms of money. The income is the amount of money which comes into the possession of the family for its own use during the course of the year. The outgo is the amount of money spent for the "goods" consumed by the family during the year, including, of course, that most excellent good called "saving." The standard itself consists in the actual necessaries, comforts, and luxuries — satisfactions of all sorts — which result from expending the income in certain forms of outgo. Some families, particularly rural ones, have a considerable portion of both income

and outgo which is never actually reduced to dollars and cents. The satisfactions come directly as a result of labor, or of the possession of capital. But any statistical delineation or comparison requires the reduction of all elements of both income and outgo to terms of money.

It is obviously a fallacy — and yet one not infrequently met with — to assume that standards of living may be compared by comparing either income or outgo alone. It is particularly common to compare the welfare of different groups by setting side by side their average yearly incomes.* But this is evidently inadequate. In a given human environment, incomes will serve as a sufficient guide to the relative standard of living of different groups. But in different human environments — that is, in different social surroundings — the factors connected with outgo may differ so much that mere income comparisons will be wholly misleading. The factor which is likely to present the most important variations in this connection is the purchasing power of money, or the price level. It is not enough to know how much money a family receives. The essential thing is what they can purchase with the money received. This is a question of outgo. The importance of this balance of income and outgo is recognized by economists in the concept of "real wages."

Income. Wages, the primary source of income for wage-earning families, may be earned by father, mother, or children. There are also some subsidiary sources

* Thus Hourwich, in *Immigration and Labor*, is continually making comparisons of the condition of laborers at different times or in different places on the basis of wage scales alone, taking no account of different price levels. See pages 300–310, etc.

of income, the most important being payments by boarders and lodgers. In a study of 25,000 families the percentage of income from various sources was as follows:[30]

Earnings of husband	79.49 per cent
Earnings of wife	1.49 per cent
Earnings of children	9.49 per cent
Payments of boarders and lodgers	7.78 per cent
Other sources	1.77 per cent
Total	100.00 per cent

Professor Chapin in his study of conditions in New York City places the percentage of total family income derived from the earnings of the father even higher, *i.e.* from 76.5 per cent to 96.8 per cent.[31]

Thus it is evident that the most important factor in the income of the wage-earning class is adult male wages. But the wages of women and children are also to be considered. While the total contribution to the family income from these sources, as shown in the foregoing table, amounts to only about eleven per cent, yet this small increase counts for a great deal with the laborer's family, and the number of families whose income is supplemented from these sources is very large. Out of the 25,000 families referred to above it was found that 8.54 per cent had some income from the wife, and 22.19 per cent from the children.[32] Probably from 40 to 50 per cent of the wage-earning families of this country are dependent on the earnings of the husband alone.[33]

Weekly wages. Those who have made a specialty of studying wages have found it impracticable to work out anything like a general average of wages for the entire country. There are too many sorts of wages, and they vary between too wide extremes. Even if

such an average were figured out, it would have relatively little value for the reasons suggested in an earlier paragraph — it would not represent the conditions of anybody in particular, and it would be impossible to tell how many of the workers were above the average and how many below, nor how far they were above and below. A much more efficient method of delineating conditions is to divide wages into a number of groups, and show the percentage of wage earners whose earnings fall within each group. The following table represents an effort to distribute the wage earners of the United States on the basis of their weekly earnings for the year 1905.

ESTIMATED WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE EARNERS (1905)[34]

WEEKLY EARNINGS	PERCENTAGES			
	All wage earners	Men 16 years and over	Women 16 years and over	Children under 16 years
Less than $3	4.1	2.2	7.3	34.7
$3 to $4	4.8	2.3	10.9	32.7
4 to 5	6.2	3.5	14.9	19.8
5 to 6	6.7	4.2	16.3	7.8
6 to 7	8.3	6.4	16.5	3.6
7 to 8	8.3	7.7	11.7	0.9
8 to 9	7.8	7.9	8.1	0.3
9 to 10	11.3	13.1	5.8	0.1
10 to 12	13.0	15.4	5.1	0.1
12 to 15	13.5	16.9	2.5	(a)
15 to 20	11.3	14.4	0.8	(a)
20 to 25	3.1	4.0	0.1	
$25 and over	1.6	2.0	(a)	

(a) Less than one tenth of one per cent

The total number of wage earners included in this table is 5,470,321, of whom 4,244,538 were men sixteen years of age and over, 1,065,884 were women sixteen

years of age and over, and 159,899 were children under sixteen. Less than 30 per cent of the entire number earned over $12.00 per week; 20.4 per cent of the men earned over $15.00; less than 15 per cent of the women earned over $9.00; only 12.8 per cent of the children earned over $5.00.

In Massachusetts in 1908 one half of the adult male wage workers earned less than $12.00 per week.[35] Wages in New Jersey were similar.[36] In Kansas wages were somewhat higher, 30 per cent of the adult males receiving over $15.00.[37] Among the workers investigated by the Immigration Commission, the following average wages were found: Native born of native father, white, $14.37, negro, $10.66; native born of foreign father, $13.91; foreign born, $11.92.[38] The New York State Factory Investigating Commission found that in 1913 and 1914, 50,000 men in four trades alone in New York were earning under $8.00 per week. Out of 15,000 female employees in industrial lines in New York City 8000 received less than $6.50 during the busy season. 53 per cent of the women in the large department stores of New York City earn less than $8.00 per week. Out of 104,000 wage earners investigated by this commission, one eighth received less than $5.00 per week, one third less than $7.00, two thirds $10.00 or less, and only one sixth $15.00 or more.[39]

The foregoing are merely representative figures, taken from a mass of material which is rapidly becoming very voluminous, but they give a general idea of the weekly incomes of the wage earners of the United States. It will be seen that the wages of women average about two thirds of those of men, while the earnings of children are about half those of women.

Yearly wages. Weekly wages, however, are not an adequate indication of the income of wage-earning families. If annual incomes could be secured by multiplying weekly wages by fifty-two, the problem would be simple enough. But unfortunately this is not the case. Unemployment is a factor which must be taken into consideration, and a very important one. As will be shown later, it is the most exceptional worker who is engaged in remunerative toil the whole year round. The great majority experience periods of unemployment, and consequent cessation of earnings, which run all the way from a few days or weeks to several months every year. Weekly wages, taken by themselves, are a very misleading index of yearly incomes.

A general notion of the yearly incomes of wage-earning individuals may be gained from the following typical figures: In Massachusetts in 1908, out of 350,000 adult male wage workers, slightly more than one third received less than $459 per year; seven tenths received less than $686, and nine tenths less than $915.[40] The following tables are compiled from the Report of the Immigration Commission:[41]

APPROXIMATE AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS OF WAGE EARNERS IN MINES AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES

NATIVITY		GENERAL AVERAGE
Males, 18 years and over		
Native born of native father (white)	43.5 % under $600	$666
Native born of foreign father	60.1 % under 600	566
Foreign born	77.9 % under 600	455
Females, 18 years and over		
Native born of native father (white)	64.2 % under $400	$365
Native born of foreign father	68.6 % under 400	339
Foreign born	81.9 % under 400	284

Approximate Average Annual Earnings of Wage Earners in Cities [42]

Nativity	Males 18 Years and Over	Females 18 Years and Over	Male Heads of Families
Native born of native father (white) . .	$595	$278	$657
Native born of foreign father	526	292	625
Foreign born . . .	385	219	452

Perhaps the best approach to a general average of yearly wages for the United States is secured by dividing the total yearly amount of wages paid by the average number of wage earners in the various industries of the country. These figures are furnished in the Statistical Abstract and in the volumes of the Census Report. Thus in the year 1909 the total average number of wage earners in the manufacturing industries of continental United States was 6,615,046, to whom was paid in wages a total of $3,427,037,884, or approximately $518 each.[43] In the mines and quarries of the United States, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, there were, on a representative day, 1,065,283 wage earners. The total wages paid during the year were $586,774,079, which makes approximately $551 each.[44] In both of these cases the resulting yearly income would be higher than that received by the majority of workers, for the reason that the method of computation assumes steady employment, which very few wage earners enjoy. The higher figure for the mines and quarries is probably accounted for by the larger proportion of male workers in these occupations.

A general estimate made by one of the best authorities on wages in the country is that of the American

industrial adult male wage workers about 10 per cent are skilled, that is, earn over $1000 per year; 40 per cent are semi-skilled, earning from $600 to $1000, and 50 per cent are unskilled, earning less than $600.[45] There is a general agreement that about one half of the adult male wage earners of the United States can command an income of less than $600. Assuming that at least two thirds of the workers of the country are wage earners, this would mean that one third of the gainfully employed population of the United States receive as remuneration less than $600 a year each, making no allowance for woman and child workers, whose wages are even less than those of men.

Family income. There remains the question of total family income, which is the essential thing in estimating standards of living. On this point, there are very few official statistics. Perhaps the best are those of the Immigration Commission, which show that of the families of workers in mines and manufacturing industries the average annual yearly incomes are as follows:[46]

Nativity of Head of Family	Average Yearly Income of Family
Native born of native father (white)	$865
Native born of foreign father	866
Foreign born	704

Since the great majority of these families are foreign born, the last figure is much more nearly representative of the group than either of the others. Mrs. More, in her study of wage earners' budgets, found $851.38 to be a representative family income in New York City.[47] Professor Chapin, in a similar study, found the largest number of families in the income group $700 to $799.[48]

Thus it is possible, and very common, for families to raise their total income above the earnings of the

husband by the wages of wife or children, and the payments of boarders and lodgers. It is to be noted, however, that while these measures add to the family income, and thus tend to raise the standard of living as measured by material comforts, yet the employment of wives and children in wage work is itself a lowering of the standard. Suppose two families, constituted in the same way, the earnings of each husband being $600 a year. Suppose the first family increases its total income by allowing the wife and one or more of the children to engage in wage work, while the second family contents itself with the earnings of the husband, in order that the wife may be free to attend to her household duties, and the children to go to school. It might very well be said that the second family had a higher standard than the first, although the fact would not be revealed by the balance of income and outgo expressed in money. Even worse, if anything, in its results, is the practice of increasing the family income by the taking of boarders and lodgers. It is a very insidious temptation for families living on the border line of want, because the additional income appears to be almost clear gain. No more rent has to be paid, little more for fuel and light, and even the food bills are not increased proportionately. The elements of the standard of living which suffer are those which are less tangible, and cannot be measured in money — privacy, family life, decency, air, light, and rest and leisure for the housewife. The additional income, however, is very concrete. Once a family adopts the expedient of taking an outsider under its roof, the tendency is to take in others, one after another, until every available foot of space is occupied, and the limit of congestion is reached.

Hours of work. Before turning to the question of outgo, there is one other matter connected with income which must be noted. This is the amount of labor time expended in securing the income. Leisure is a most important element in the standard of living. Of two men who earn the same wages, the one who works only eight hours a day will be able to provide a higher standard for his family than the one who works ten hours. This matter of leisure is of especial importance in modern societies for the reason, mentioned above, that there is little pleasure in work itself for most laborers, and people really live for what they do in their leisure hours.

In respect to hours there has been a greater improvement over the conditions which prevailed during the early years of the Industrial Revolution than in almost any other phase of factory life. Early in the nineteenth century small children were customarily kept at work in the factories twelve, fourteen, sometimes even sixteen or more hours a day, and the working day of adults corresponded. Since that time the hours of women and children have been progressively limited, and now a twelve-hour day, even for adult men, is becoming rarer every year. Ten, nine, and eight hour days are the rule in most industries in advanced countries. The average working day has been estimated at eight hours for Australia, nine hours for Great Britain, nine and three quarters hours for the United States, and longer for all other countries except Denmark.[49]

Outgo. To reduce the outgo of the "standard" family to concrete terms is much less simple than in the case of income. Both are measured in terms of money, and the total mounts are identical, since every family spends all it earns, inasmuch as saving, benevo-

lence, etc., are parts of outgo. But the items of outgo are much more numerous and varied than those of income, and much harder to reduce to a representative type. The first step is to divide the total outgo into certain great classes. The pattern for this process has been set by Dr. Ernst Engel, a noted Prussian statistician, whose studies on the standard of living have become classic.

Two classes of expenditure. There are to be distinguished two chief classes of expenditures for every family, which may be designated essentials and non-essentials, or necessaries and luxuries. In the former class belong all expenditures which go for merely sustaining life at a fair degree of efficiency; in the latter class all expenditures for pleasure, positive happiness, peace of mind, etc. Following the classification made by James MacKaye expenditures of the first class go for satisfying needs, those of the second class for gratifying tastes.[50] The first sort of outgo secures little more than the avoidance of pain; when all of these expenses have been met, there is little if any surplus of happiness, and if outgo stopped there life would practically not be worth living. Outgo of the second sort provides pleasure; it is, as Professor Chapin has pointed out,[51] for the sake of the items included in the second category that we all live. Consequently the amount or proportion of outgo available to a family for expenditures of this sort is the best possible single index of the height of its standard of living. The importance and variety of the interests served by the second division of outgo has led to their being called "culture wants," and this is perhaps the best term by which to refer to them.

Necessaries may easily be divided into four main items — food, shelter, clothing, heat and light. These

include practically all the primary needs of man as an individual. The subdivision of culture wants is much less simple, since their variety is almost infinite. In treating of the wage-earning class many things will be included here which would be regarded as necessaries by families higher up in the economic scale. Commonly included in this division of outgo, in studies of the working classes, are expenditures for health, religion, education, saving, insurance, recreation, artistic development, etc. The division between necessaries and culture wants is, of course, not absolute, and varies with the general standard of living of societies. Things may reasonably be regarded as necessaries in the United States which would be classed as luxuries in Patagonia.

Apportionment of outgo. The results of Dr. Engel's studies of the budgets of working families have been summarized in the following schedule of expenditures, graded according to income groups: [52]

Object of Expenditure	Percentage of Total Family Expenditure for Average Family with an Income of		
Necessaries	$225–$300	$450–$600	$750–$1,000
Subsistence	62	55	50
Clothing	16	18	18
Lodging	12	12	12
Firing and lighting	5	5	5
	95	90	85
Culture Wants			
Education	2	3·5	5·5
Legal protection	1	2	3
Care of health	1	2	3
Comfort, recreation	1	2.5	3·5
	5	10	15

From this table, and the studies upon which it is based, have been deduced the following four propositions, which are known as Engel's laws:

1. As the family income increases, a smaller percentage is spent for food.

2. As the family income increases, the percentage for clothing remains approximately the same.

3. With all incomes investigated, the percentage of expenditure for rent, fuel, and light remains invariably the same.

4. As income increases there is a constantly increasing percentage spent for education, health, recreation, amusements, etc.[53]

These laws were first formulated to express conditions in Germany at the middle of the last century. But later and wider investigations have shown that in the main they express universal tendencies. Only minor modifications are necessary to make them express the situation in any modern country. The following set of modified Engel's laws has been worked out by one of the best authorities on the subject in the country to represent present-day conditions in the United States:

"As the income increases:

1. The proportionate expenditure for food
   a. decreases for the country at large from 50 per cent to 37 per cent, but
   b. in New York City it amounts to almost 45 per cent of the total outlay until an income of $1000 is attained.

2. There is a strong tendency for the percentage of expenditure for clothing to increase.

3. Relative expenditures for housing
   a. remain about constant for the country at large, falling very slightly after $400 incomes have been reached, but
   b. decrease rapidly from 30 per cent, or more, to 16 per cent in New York City.

4. Proportionate expenditures for fuel and light decrease.

5. Expenditure for culture wants increases absolutely and relatively." [54]

The differences between New York City and the rest of the country are significant, as revealing the tendency of life in great cities. In the metropolis, the rent of even the poorest apartments is so high that a smaller proportion is spent for food in the lowest income groups than in the third or fourth groups higher up. Food expenditures may be pared down indefinitely, but rent not below a certain point.

A comparison of the many excellent budget studies which have been made with reference to wage-earning families in the United States shows that a standard family, composed of father, mother, and three children under fourteen, with an income of about $600 a year, would apportion their outgo about as follows:

Item	Percentage	Amount
Food	48	$288
Shelter	20	120
Clothing	12	72
Light and heat	6	36
Culture wants	14	84
Total	100	$600

It would manifestly be beyond the scope of the present volume to undertake to show in detail just what goods are represented by the outgo of the standard family. No two families spend their income in just the same way. Some sacrifice food for the sake of a better lodging; others pinch themselves within the home in order that they may make a good appearance when they go out; some live on the narrow margin of subsistence in order that they may save a little, while others spend as they get, and leave the future to care for itself. Any one

interested in the concrete details of the standard of living of wage earners' families may find an abundance of realistic pictures in such studies as Chapin's, Kenngott's, Mrs. More's, and others.

The adequacy of the laborer's standard. Two general questions, however, demand consideration. First, how nearly does the average standard of living of the laborers' families approach what may be considered a reasonably adequate basis of existence? Second, is the standard improving or deteriorating?

With reference to the former query, it may be briefly stated that a family with an income of $600 could secure about the following provisions under each of the main heads: For the amount allotted to food, a sufficient amount of nourishment for a standard family could be secured, provided the money was expended wisely and the household was run economically — more so, it is to be feared, than could reasonably be expected of any but the exceptional housewife in wage-earning families. In the way of shelter, the ordinary accommodations would be represented by a four-room apartment in whatever sort of tenement was customary in the locality. As regards clothing, it is practically impossible to see how a family could equip itself even decently on the amount allowed. One of the mysteries which remain unsolved after reviewing the various budget studies is how laborers' families manage to clothe themselves at all. The amount available for heat and light will allow the minimum amount of lighting of the apartment, under favorable conditions, and very insufficient lighting if, as often happens, some of the rooms are dark or gloomy. Enough fuel can be secured to provide for the necessary cooking, and to heat one room — the kitchen, of course —

adequately in moderate winter weather. In the severe cold spells, very many working families actually suffer from cold. The necessity of conserving all heat leads to the practice of keeping windows closed, and shutting off every stray breath of fresh air from outside as far as possible.

There remains the $84 allotted for culture wants. Out of this must come all expenses for doctors and medicines, dentistry, books, pictures, music, recreation of all sorts, insurance, saving, etc. It is evident that only in the severest sense can such items be called "non-essentials." It is also evident that only the most meager provision can be made with reference to any one. Dentistry is very generally neglected — it is cheaper to let one's teeth go as they will, and get a set of false ones when necessary, than it is to preserve the ones Nature supplies. The inability of the ordinary working family to look after this matter — due partly to ignorance as well as poverty — is recognized in the widespread movement for dental hygiene in the public schools. A relatively large amount of money is spent on insurance. This is largely of the fraternal sort, and largely also it takes the form of insurance on the lives of young children to provide for their burial expenses in case of their not improbable death. Sometimes the policy is turned over to the undertaker from the very beginning. All lodge dues, trade union payments, etc., must of course come out of this portion of outgo. Saving is almost unknown among families of this class — it is clearly out of the question. Parents rely upon their children to look after them in their old age, as they have looked after their own parents. A family with a number of children over fourteen years of age is regarded as in a favorable

economic situation; one with several small children is considered to be going through a very difficult period, but is in a hopeful situation as regards the future if only it can weather the existing strain. It is taken for granted that practically all children will enter wage work as soon as they reach the legal age, whatever that may be. As for the remaining items of culture wants, it can simply be said that families do what they can, but in many respects they are forced to rely on agencies which are more or less charitable in their character, thereby sacrificing something of that most valuable family asset, self-respect.

Is such a standard as this reasonable in the United States? Many students think not. The Special Committee on Standard of Living of the Eighth New York State Conference of Charities and Corrections, as a result of its investigations (later embodied in Professor Chapin's volume), reported its convictions as follows: "$600–$700 is wholly inadequate to maintain a proper standard of living and no self-respecting family should be asked or expected to live on such an income." "With an income of between $700–$800 a family can barely support itself, provided it is subject to no extraordinary expenditures by reason of sickness, death, or other untoward circumstances. Such a family can live without charitable assistance through exceptional management and in the absence of emergencies." "$825 is sufficient for the average family of five individuals, comprising the father, mother, and three children under 14 years of age, to maintain a fairly proper standard of living in the Borough of Manhattan." [55] It will be recalled* that the largest number of families investigated

* See page 99.

in this study were in the income group from $700 to $799. These figures of course refer to New York City where both incomes and expenses are higher than for the rest of the country. What has been said above about the standard family with an income of $600 is supposed to represent as nearly as possible average conditions for the entire country.

Estimates from other portions of the United States are as follows: Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics, $754.[56] Charity Organization Society of Buffalo, $634 as the "lowest tolerable budget which will allow the bare decencies of life for a family of five." [57] Streightoff, $650 "as the extreme low limit of the Living Wage in cities of the North, East, and West. Probably $600 is high enough for the cities of the South. At this wage there can be no saving, and a minimum of pleasure." [58]

Comparing these various estimates of the minimum income, which will provide a reasonable standard of living for the ordinary working family, with the average actual incomes of such families, as summarized in the preceding pages, it becomes convincingly clear that even the average standard of living possible to wage earners' families in this country is likely to fall below what the authorities set down as "proper" or "tolerable." And in this connection emphasis must once more be laid on the fact that an average does not represent anybody in particular. There will be many families above the average, but probably more below. And if the situation of an average family is so unsatisfactory, what must be the conditions of those who are below the average!

Such a discussion as this at once introduces the second conception of the standard of living — that of an ideal.

The average standard represents things as they are; the "proper" or "tolerable" standard represents things as somebody thinks they ought to be. As stated previously, the latter conception has its own value. It is undoubtedly profitable to consider actual conditions in the light of what may be considered reasonable in the abstract. It is fair to compare the amount of comfort enjoyed by the wage-earning class, representing two thirds of the entire population of the United States, with the total amount of comfort and luxury enjoyed in a country so favorably situated, so progressive and prosperous. It is not altogether futile even to try to make out a detailed account of such a standard as it seems reasonable to consider should be within the reach of every industrious, sober, self-respecting family in the country. Such comparisons are legitimate, and certainly lend much weight to the opinions of those who hold that the wage earners of this country are compelled to submit to a standard much lower than the general conditions of our society seem to justify.

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that this low standard of living of the wage-earning classes of modern countries is an absolutely normal situation. It is perfectly consistent with the general economic organization. No other sort of standard could result from the combination of forces and factors which have been shown to characterize the industrial situation in progressive societies. All efforts to deal with the general standard of the laborers must, in the first instance, clearly recognize the normality of the existing type.

The course of the laborer's standard. The second question of general interest with reference to the standard of living of wage-earning families is the rate and direc-

tion of its movement. Is it improving, or deteriorating, and how fast? This is a matter of primary importance. For a situation, however bad, which is remedying itself, may perhaps be endured. But a painful situation which offers no hope of amelioration, or even threatens to become more aggravated, is grievous to bear, and calls for careful consideration.

The mention of the progress of the standard of living at once calls up the specter of the "high cost of living" which has haunted all classes and all societies so constantly in recent years, and has so consistently refused to be laid. In spite of the immense amount of discussion and study which the phenomenon has called forth, there is still current in the popular mind a great deal of misconception, and many erroneous notions, as to the exact nature of the situation covered in general by the phrase mentioned. This confusion is largely due to the failure to make certain simple but fundamental distinctions with reference to the concepts involved.

Distinction between cost and price. The first of these is the distinction between cost and price. The terms are frequently used interchangeably, and many writers treat of the cost of living and the prices of commodities as if they were one and the same thing. A moment's consideration, however, reveals the fact that there is a distinction here which cannot be ignored. While there is an almost unlimited number of definitions of price, in its accepted usage the term refers to the exchange value of commodities, measured in terms of money. The price of a commodity is the amount of money which must be expended to secure it. Cost, on the other hand, refers to the amount of pain, effort, or suffering necessary to secure a commodity, irrespective of the

monetary measure of that sacrifice. Cost is evidently much the more important concept. Prices are purely relative affairs. Costs are absolute. High prices in themselves are no evil and work no hardship, provided all prices are equally high. High costs are always a hardship. It is quite possible to have high prices and low costs in one society, and low prices and high costs in another society. Costs, in general, are a matter of the standard of living of societies; prices are a matter of the amount of money metals and various other purely relative factors. Thus the general price level is much higher in the United States than in Italy. But the average cost of commodities is much lower here. In fact, high prices and low costs quite generally go together. If the term "cost of living" covers anything of real significance, it is because it does actually refer to cost, and it is a misleading mistake to transfer the discussion to the field of prices, except in so far as they are actually indicative of costs. In a given society, at a given time, prices are a fairly reliable general index of *relative* costs.

Distinction between high and rising. The second distinction which must be made is that between high costs and prices, and rising costs and prices. It was stated just now that high prices injure nobody, provided that all prices are correspondingly high. The same is true of rising prices — they injure nobody as long as they all rise at the same rate.* In real life, however, prices never do all rise at the same rate, and a period of rising

* The term price as used in this discussion of course includes prices of all sorts. Any monetary payment for any good, commodity, or service of any sort, including labor and the use of capital, comes under the head of price.

price levels affects different classes very differently, some favorably, some prejudicially. A period of rising prices has its problems very different from those of a state of high prices, as Professor Irving Fisher has so clearly shown in his various writings on the subject. The evils are practically confined to the period of rising prices. When the rise is over, and conditions have become adjusted, the fact that the resulting price level is high, in itself hurts nobody.

The case is very different with costs. Rising costs and high costs are both undesirable. The one indicates a deterioration in the conditions of the society concerned, the other reveals a definitely unfortunate situation. The evils of rising costs are not eliminated when the transition period is over. Society merely settles down to endure a condition worse than the previous one.

Distinction between general and particular costs. The third distinction, and the one of special interest to the wage earner, is that between the cost of things in general, and the cost of specific classes of things. Goods in general may be divided into classes, the cost of each of which may fluctuate independently of the general cost level. The most important classification of goods, in this connection, is that already referred to — the division into necessaries and luxuries. This is evidently not a hard and fast classification, and it is seldom clearly revealed in statistical tables. But it is a very real and important one, and has a vital bearing on the welfare of the lower economic classes of society.

It is quite possible that in a given society, the cost of necessaries may be high and the cost of luxuries low, or *vice versa*. Again, it is possible that in a society

the cost of necessaries may be advancing rapidly, while the cost of luxuries remains stationary, or even declines. Such a condition would not be revealed by ordinary lists of prices in general, nor by the indexes of price levels based upon them. The only method of detecting it would be to make separate lists of necessaries and luxuries, and to compare the prices of each list with those of the other, and with the general average of prices.

The disproportionate rise in the cost of necessaries. There is much reason to believe that exactly this condition has prevailed in modern countries for the past quarter of a century. The rise in prices is a familiar, and almost universal, phenomenon. It is generally assumed that costs have risen accordingly, and that the rise in prices and costs has been pretty evenly distributed among all classes of commodities. A more careful examination, however, reveals the fact that those commodities, the prices of which have risen most rapidly, are the ones which occupy the largest place in the budget of wage-earning families, while those commodities, the prices of which have risen in less degree, or have remained stationary, or have even fallen, are those which are consumed largely by the well-to-do classes, and in many cases by them alone. If a typical budget of the outgo for necessaries of a wage-earning family is prepared, and the prices of these items are compared (by means of index figures, price lists, etc.) at the beginning and end of a period of twenty-five years or so ending in a recent year, the fact is disclosed that, in spite of the rise in money wages, it would take a larger proportion of the income of a laborer's family — at least in the unskilled class — to secure exactly the same commodities at the end of the period than at the beginning.

As a result, the proportion of total income available for culture wants is smaller now than it was a quarter of a century ago, which is the best possible evidence of the fact that the standard of living is lower now than it was then. This fall in the standard of the wage-earning class seems also to be a normal accompaniment of our present organization of industry. This condition is not confined to the United States, but has been discerned in England,* and very likely exists in some degree in other societies.[59]

The process by which this discrimination between the prices of necessaries and of luxuries is brought about may be briefly sketched as follows: The productive forces of a society at any given time are a fixed quantity, consisting of land, labor, capital, and organization. They are utilized in turning out goods of various sorts in definite amounts. With the lapse of time, however, the proportion of these forces employed in the production of various classes of goods may be altered. Land, labor, capital, and organization may be diverted from one sort of production to another — from the manufacture of bicyles to automobiles, from the manufacture of cheap woolens to expensive silks, from the raising of wheat to the provision and maintenance of golf links. In general, the proportion of the total productive forces of a society engaged in making necessaries and luxuries may be radically altered. At any given time, the distribution of production among the different classes of goods will correspond broadly to

* "Even if money wages had risen equally with the general level of prices, this excessive rise of food prices would have involved some loss to the wage earners." Hobson, J. A., "Gold, Prices, and Wages," p. 118.

the desires of those who dominate and control production. And as time passes, the changes in distribution will correspond to the changes in the desires of this class.

Now, as has been shown, the control of industry in modern countries resides with a small minority of the population. They are the capitalists. They own the major portion of the characteristic and dominant factor of production — capital, including land — and as capital commands labor under modern conditions, they are able also to direct the application of labor to a very considerable extent. The capitalist class being, in general, the well-to-do class, it follows that those who control industry are mainly the wealthier members of society. Production will be apportioned practically according to their wishes.

The wishes of the wealthy classes, as regards the distribution of production, differ radically from those of the laboring classes. The latter, practically all of whose income goes for necessaries, are interested that necessaries and simple comforts should be abundant and cheap; they care nothing about the price or cost of luxuries, which they never expect to consume. Only a very small part of the outgo of the wealthy classes, on the other hand, is for necessaries, and they care very little if the price of this class of commodities is doubled, if thereby productive forces may be set free to turn out the more elaborate comforts, and luxuries, in abundance. Every opportunity will therefore be utilized to concentrate production on luxuries, and keep the production of necessaries down to a minimum. This minimum is represented by the amount necessary for the maintenance of the laborers on a standard of living not too

different from that which is customary or traditional in the society involved.

There seems to be no doubt that this is the tendency of the individualistic-capitalistic organization of industry. It must be recognized that there are many forces which tend to counteract it, and prevent its reaching its extreme limit. Nevertheless, the facts of the case all support the conviction that the forces back of this tendency are strong enough to have brought about a considerable decline in the standard of living of wage-earning families, in the United States at least, within the past quarter of a century.[60]

CHAPTER VII

PLANS FOR RAISING THE STANDARD OF LIVING

The nature of efforts to raise the standard of living. Since a low standard of living for the wage-earning class is a normal aspect of modern economic conditions, it follows that efforts to raise it are to be classed, not as attempts to bring abnormality into conformity with the norm, but as methods for advancing the present normal into correspondence with what is now but an ideal. This, it is to be observed, is a perfectly legitimate and defensible form of social action. Man's intelligence, knowledge, and control of social forces have advanced too far to be restricted solely to attacking pathological conditions in society. They warrant his invoking the scientific imagination to portray a new norm, which shall conduce more fully to human welfare, and devising expedients which will bring this ideal concept into reality.

There are many grounds for feeling that so low a standard as now prevails among laborers' families is neither logically defensible on the grounds of abstract justice, nor intrinsically desirable from the point of view of ultimate social solidarity. In other words, dissatisfaction with the normal type of economic organization in industrial societies is well founded. Particularly, the working classes themselves are not to be blamed if they feel that their material rewards are not proportioned to their real contribution to production, nor to their actual impor-

tance in society, and if, feeling so, they seek for means by which the situation may be so altered as to secure a larger portion of society's product for themselves.

Inasmuch as the existing low standard is attributable to a small degree of economic power on the part of the laboring class, any practical methods for raising the standard must involve some method of increasing the power of labor as such. This may conceivably be done through the efforts of the laborers themselves, or it may be done by society as a whole. In the latter case, it implies a more or less arbitrary transfer of power, by means of social coercion of some sort, from the more favored classes to the less favored. Systems of betterment have been proposed and put into operation resting upon each of these two principles. The most noteworthy instance of the former is trade unionism; of the latter, the various factory acts, housing legislation, food inspection laws, in fact, nearly all of what is called in general "social legislation," are representative. In all of these latter expedients, society, in the guise of the state, exercises its power to deny to certain favored classes the full enjoyment of that power which would be theirs under unrestricted competition. The benefits thus secured are conferred upon the weaker classes, who lack the power to secure them for themselves by purely competitive means. Somewhat the same sort of result is secured when members of the favored classes, unofficially and voluntarily, yield some of the fruits of their natural power to the weaker classes, from motives variously styled "charitable," "benevolent," "philanthropic," etc.

In the economic field, as in each of the other great divisions of social life, the systems of betterment fall into

two classes, which have been designated, in an earlier paragraph, the specific and the revolutionary. Those which call for consideration in the present connection are the specific devices for improving the standard of living of the wage-earning class. There are also revolutionary schemes which seek the same end. But they propose to achieve much wider results than the mere elevation of the laborer's standard of living, and consequently will best be considered later on.

Trade unionism. Of all the specific devices for improving the standard of the wage earner, none compares in importance with trade unionism. This purpose is its chief reason for existence and the basis of its main claim to support.

In the discussion of the reasons for the present distribution of power between the capitalist and the laborer, it was pointed out that in the making of the wage bargain between an individual employer and an individual laborer, the advantage all lay with the former, for the reason that the employment of a certain individual for the job in question was of small moment to him, but of vital interest to the laborer. The institution of trade unionism is based on the recognition of this fact. There is nothing revolutionary about trade unionism. It takes the economic organization as it finds it, recognizes its stability and inevitability, and squarely faces the task of increasing the power of the laborer without altering the general economic constitution of society.

From the point of view of trade unionism, the weakness of laborers is due to the fact that they act as individuals. The unimportance of labor in modern production is denied. It is pointed out that labor is absolutely essential to production, now as always, and that if labor

were eliminated the wheels of every machine in existence would stop turning, and the value of every piece of productive capital would shrink to zero. Labor has importance enough, and therefore power enough. The trouble is that the power is broken up into infinitesimal units, and therefore cannot be effectively exerted. In order that labor may reap the full benefit of the power that is its by right and in fact, it must be combined into large compact units. The more complete the combination, the greater will be the results. The principal human relationship in which this new power is to find its field is in the making of the wage bargain. It may be said, then, that the soul of trade unionism is "collective bargaining." This bargain includes many things besides wages — hours, factory conditions, methods of payment, etc. — and trade unions render many services to the laborer beside strengthening him in the wage bargain — in the way of insurance, education, social diversion, etc. But all of these are wholly subsidiary to the great aim of exerting the full power of labor to secure the best possible terms in making the wage bargain.

In their historical development, the trade unions are the offspring to a certain extent of the old craft gilds. But their methods, functions, and aims are radically different. The modern trade union could not have come into existence until the era of modern industrialism, and the rise of a wage-earning class.

The trade union, very early in its history, was recognized as an efficient device, and its menace clearly discerned, by the privileged classes, particularly of England, where it first achieved importance. All the power possessed by the favored elements was exerted to conserve their traditional advantages, and the trade unions

were fought with every possible resource. The most effective weapon against them was the combination laws, by which all meetings of laborers to devise means to improve their conditions, and all combined action to make these means effective, were made illegal. For many years the progress of the unions was extremely slow, and was won at great cost. It was not until 1875 that they were entirely freed from hampering restrictions in England. In the United States the great need for trade unions did not arise until considerably later than in England, and the restrictions placed upon them were never so severe here as there. Gradually, in all industrial countries, the increasing solidarity of the wage-earning class, combined with the growth of humanitarian feeling on the part of many of those whose natural interests are contrary to those of labor, has advanced the importance and strength of trade unionism, until it is now a factor which has to be seriously reckoned with in most important industries.

As the name implies, trade unions are organized on the basis of trades or occupations. The aim is to combine in a single organization as many as possible of those who do a certain sort of work, in order that that class may assert its importance as a factor in production. These various unions are then combined into larger units, the culmination being the national federation, such as the American Federation of Labor.

There can be no doubt that the accomplishments of trade unionism during the past century have been of primary importance. It has won many positive gains for labor, and has presented the chief barrier — apart from humanitarian feeling — which has prevented the operation of natural economic forces from dragging the

wage earner down to a level far lower than that which he occupies at present. The claims of its most enthusiastic supporters, as to its past achievements and its future promise alike, are very likely extreme. But it is the most effective agency yet devised by the laborer for his own protection.

It was not necessary for the trade union movement to reach very great proportions before capitalists and employers of labor realized that their best method of counteracting the effects of the new institution was to adopt for themselves the very principle upon which it rested — that of combination. It has already been observed that the natural trend of capitalistic production is toward combination. The trade union movement added one further incentive. As a result, there arose various combinations of employers, such as the National Manufacturers' Association in the United States, designed to give the employing class the same advantages of consolidated power that the trade unions give the laborers. And once organized, it appears that the former balance of power is in part restored. Combined capital is stronger than combined labor, for the same reasons that the individual capitalist is stronger than the individual laborer, and the margin of advantage in the wage bargain still lies definitely, though perhaps not to so great an extent, with capital.

It is obvious, as already remarked, that the relationship between capital and labor is one of struggle and conflict, and that occasionally the conflict develops into actual war. In the strict economic sense the interests of capital and labor are of necessity antagonistic. The interest of the employer is to get as much work done as possible for the least amount of wages; the interest of

the laborer is to get the largest possible payment for the least amount of work. The necessity of production forces these opposed factors to unite and coöperate. But the natural anatgonism is never eliminated. Trade unions and employers' associations are merely methods of organizing the struggle. The chief weapon of the union, when it comes to actual warfare, is the strike; that of the employer is the lockout. During the years 1881 to 1905 there were in the United States, 36,757 strikes, involving 181,407 establishments and 6,728,048 strikers. In the same period there were 1546 lockouts, involving 18,547 establishments and 716,231 employees locked out. The total number of employees thrown out of work was considerably larger in each case, since the effects of industrial war, as in other forms of war, are largely visited upon non-combatants. Measured by the number of establishments affected, the strikes were successful in 47.94 per cent of the total, partly successful in 15.28 per cent, and failed in 36.78 per cent. The lockouts succeeded in 57.20 per cent, partially succeeded in 10.71 per cent, and failed in 32.09 per cent of the cases, as measured by establishments.[61]

It was not to be expected that an instrument so powerful and effective as the trade union, in the hands of a body of people no more intelligent, self-controlled, and responsible than the average wage-earning group, should not sometimes be used arbitrarily and tyrannically. In the early years of trade unionism complaints were numerous and well founded of the irresponsible conduct of trade unions. Agreements were made, and broken at the first temptation; union delegates acted beyond their authority, and unions repudiated the acts of their accredited delegates. Time has brought improvement in

these matters. Legal responsibility has come with legal recognition. Even yet, many of the methods of the unions fall short of the best social standards, and there is too much of a tendency to regard a worthy end as a justification for any means. There is a constant temptation to inaugurate strikes on the basis of the hope of success rather than of justice. Barring the time lost, and the deprivation incurred, prospective strikers are likely to feel that they have everything to gain and nothing to lose. For even though a strike fails, the workers seldom go back to conditions worse than before, and to the extent to which the strike is successful, the gains are positive.

From the point of view of the general public, the great objection to the whole system of strikes and lockouts is that they constitute war, and war is economically wasteful. Society has to pay a part of the bill, though it has nothing to do with the particular conflict. Nevertheless, until some better method is designed of safeguarding the welfare of the laboring classes, trade unions are to be commended and encouraged. Wars of every sort are a costly means of advancing the ends of social progress, and all reasonable men hope for their elimination. But they are better than no means at all.

Coöperation. Next to trade unions in the list of wage earners' schemes for the betterment of their standard, probably comes coöperation. Various schemes are included under this head, but the principle underlying them is the same.

Like trade unions, coöperative schemes recognize the existence and importance of capital in the economic constitution of society. But they differ from the unions in seeking to advance the interests of the laborer, not by

increasing his power as a laborer, but by enabling him to secure some of the benefits of the capitalist. It has been observed that the amount of money required in modern times to enable a man to become an independent producer, or to enter the economic life as a capitalist, is so great as to be quite beyond the hopes of the average wage earner. Even the most moderate accumulation of capital through saving is almost out of the question for the ordinary laborer. The purpose of coöperation is to furnish a means by which the minute savings of a large number of people may be combined so as to make them effective in production, and at the same time to make possible the accumulation of more capital by reason of the saving which the original investment permits. This principle finds practical expression in the formation of organizations of wage earners for the ownership and conduct of business enterprises, thereby securing for themselves both the interest on capital and the profits of management.

Coöperative ventures may be divided into two main classes, corresponding to the two chief methods of utilizing capital — manufacturing and merchandising. These are commonly referred to as producers' coöperation and consumers' coöperation. A more accurate designation, perhaps, would be productive coöperation and distributive coöperation. Consumers' coöperation, strictly speaking, should refer to buyers' associations, of which there are many in existence, but which are of minor importance.

Of the two chief forms of coöperation, the distributive kind has been much more widely developed, and has achieved much more marked success. The reasons for this are clear. The management of a store, especially

when the patrons are provided in advance, is a much simpler task than the management of a factory. The capital required is less, on the average, the risks are not so great, and the ability demanded of the manager is much less. One of the chief difficulties encountered by those who undertake productive coöperation is always the question of management. Either they must content themselves with a manager secured in open competition at less rates than ordinary factory owners are paying, in which case the enterprise is doomed to almost certain failure; or they may attempt to run the concern through a committee chosen from their own number, which is equally precarious; or they may engage an able manager at ordinary rates, in which case the much-desired profits of management are largely diverted from the pockets of the coöperators. Accordingly, the branches of production in which coöperation has been most successful are those of a simple sort, enjoying a certain and steady market, and involving as little as possible of the speculative element. Of these enterprises, the numerous coöperative dairies in this country and in Europe are typical.

The most famous instance of distributive coöperation, which has furnished the model for almost all other successful coöperative stores, is the Rochdale Pioneers of England. This organization was founded in 1844 by a group of twenty-eight flannel weavers, in the town of Rochdale, who drew up a plan for a coöperative store. From this humble beginning the movement has grown to enormous proportions. In 1864 the local associations were federated for wholesale distribution, and centralized coöperative manufacturing was begun in 1873. In 1911 the federated coöperative associations in Great Britain comprised over

2,700,000 members, who jointly owned $60,000,000 of stock in trade, $80,000,000 in land, buildings, machinery, and fixed stock, and house property worth $40,000,000. In addition to these sums there was $95,000,000 otherwise invested. The sales for that year amounted to over $500,000,000 and the profits saved to $60,000,000. It is to be noted, that manufacturing done by the federation is for the purpose of supplying the coöperative stores themselves, and is subsidiary to the selling functions of the organization. Thereby, the risks attendant upon ordinary coöperative production are eliminated, and most of the other obstacles obviated.

The principles of the Rochdale Pioneers have so thoroughly justified themselves, both by their own success, and by the very general failure of organizations which have departed widely from them, that they may be set down almost as the *sine qua non* of successful distributive coöperation. Briefly stated, they are: Open membership, with shares of a low denomination — say $5.00, payable on the installment plan; Democratic government — one vote to each member, irrespective of the number of shares held; The sale of pure goods, with fair measures, at the prevailing market price, thereby forestalling the antagonism of individual merchants; Cash sales; The payment of not more than five per cent interest on shares; The distribution of the balance of the profit into a depreciation and reserve fund, an educational fund, a fund for charity, and the remainder among the purchasers, whether members or not, on the basis of the amount of their purchases.[62]

Perhaps the most remarkable instance of coöperation in the United States is the farmers' elevator movement, which lies on the border line between productive and

distributive coöperation. This movement has grown from a situation when, in 1903, there were only about thirty-five farmers' elevators in the entire grain belt of the middle western states, to a position of great importance. By about 1914 there were nearly 1500 elevators in Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Kansas. They owned and operated elevator property worth at least $8,000,000, and handled more than 200,000,000 bushels of grain, besides doing much incidental business in the way of handling coal, lumber, etc.[63]

Coöperation in agricultural and dairy lines has been most highly developed in Denmark, which has probably been more profoundly influenced by the coöperative movement than any other country in the world. It is said that in thirty years coöperation "has raised the whole country from poverty to prosperity and efficient democracy."[64] Germany, also, is notable for the number and variety of its coöperative undertakings. Figures for 1911 report the following enterprises of a coöperative nature in that country: 18,126 credit societies; 3303 dairy or milk-vending societies; 3151 other agricultural purchasing or selling societies; 2355 consumers' societies (coöperative stores); 1107 other industrial purchasing and selling societies; 1167 building societies.[65]

Within certain natural limits, there appears to be the possibility of a great future for this method of improving the standard of living of the common people.

The two systems of improvement just discussed rest upon the initiative of the working classes themselves. As mentioned in an earlier paragraph, there are other types of devices for raising the standard of the wage

earner which involve increasing his economic power not by his own efforts, but by a voluntary or enforced transfer of advantage by those who have much to those who have little.

Profit sharing. Three of the foremost devices by which capitalists yield a part of their natural advantage to their employees are profit sharing, the sliding scale, and "welfare work." In each of these cases there may very probably exist the conviction, in the mind of the employer, that his plan will conduce to his own advantage in the long run. Nevertheless, the advantages accorded to the laborers are such as they could not secure by their own efforts. There are various forms of profit sharing. According to the commonest one, the profits of a concern, above a certain fixed minimum, are distributed among the employees on the basis of the wages received. Thus every worker is given a personal interest in the success of the business, and a certain *esprit de corps* is established. Usually it is provided that any employee who leaves the concern within a certain fixed period of time thereby forfeits his bonus. This furnishes an incentive to steadiness of employment. The logical weakness of profit sharing schemes is that, to be entirely just, they ought also to include loss sharing. It is fair, in the abstract, that if the employees are to profit by the success of the business in good times, they ought also to share its losses in bad times. But this is out of the question for obvious reasons, the chief ones being that the workers, at the best of times, are not prepared to stand any losses, and that inasmuch as the workers are not, and ordinarily can not be, admitted into the management of the business, they feel that they should not be compelled to participate in the effects of bad judg-

ment and poor management. On the contrary, workers who have become habituated to a regular bonus for a number of years, come to look upon it as a right, and resent its loss, even when amply warranted by market conditions. The industries in which profit sharing is likely to be most successful are those involving the least risk, and subjected to the fewest fluctuations of demand and profit. Recently, in the United States, the eyes of students of economic affairs have been fixed on the so-called profit sharing scheme established in the Ford automobile works. It should be noted, however, that this is not strictly a system of profit sharing, but a sort of combination of profit sharing and minimum wage. The amount of the bonus is fixed in advance, and the additional payment is included in the weekly pay envelope. The bonus is not apportioned on the pro rata wage basis, but is determined by adding to the wages in force previously a sum sufficient to bring the total daily income up to $5, $6, and $7 respectively for different grades of workers. While it is too early yet to judge of the final results of the scheme, the best data available indicate a very remarkable improvement both in the standard of living and habits of life of the workers and the efficiency of the plant. The Ford management states frankly that it expects its workers to make up for their increased pay by increased efficiency. Systems of factory management and efficiency often include bonus plans.

Sliding scale. The sliding scale involves a wage payment varying according to the selling price of the product, though wages may never fall below a certain fixed minimum. The logical weakness of this plan is that prices do not vary in direct ratio, but rather in inverse ratio, with the efforts of the worker. For if the workers succeed,

by extra efforts, in largely increasing the amount of the product, the tendency will be for the price to fall, though the profits of the concern may increase. Nevertheless, this device has had a measure of success in some industries, as mining, and the iron and steel industries.

Welfare work. Under the head of "welfare work" are included all those methods by which the employer improves directly the standard of living of his workers, particularly in connection with their factory life. The provision of restaurants, libraries, gymnasiums, parks, etc. in connection with the factory, the building of model homes, etc., are cases in point. Here, too, the employers often look for a financial return in the increased efficiency of the laborers. The chief drawback to measures of this sort is that they tend to infringe the feeling of independence of the workers, who are likely to look upon them as substitutes for just wages. Aside from actual factory conditions, which of course ought always to be the best possible, it certainly would be preferable, if it were possible, to pay such wages that the workers could supply their own needs for education, recreation, good food and shelter rather than to have these needs met by any practice which savors of benevolence.

Social legislation. There remain to be noted those devices for raising the standard of the wage earner by which power is compulsorily diverted from the stronger to the weaker members of society, by the action of organized society itself, — in short, the legal methods. As already suggested, the number of these is legion, and for the most part they concern themselves with preventing the standard from falling to an abnormal state, rather than advancing it to a condition above the present normal. Consequently, they can best be considered

in a later connection. It should be observed in passing, however, that although these measures owe their existence in part to the activity of the workers themselves, yet many, if not most of them, would never have been possible if there had not been a noteworthy number of the more powerful and favored classes whose motives extended beyond mere self-interest, and who were willing to see measures put into operation which would curtail their own natural power and consequent profit, in the interests of the weaker members of society. Without the support of countless altruists among the well-to-do classes, the wage earners alone could never have maintained their standard even at the level where it is now.

The minimum wage. There is, however, one set of measures which aims so directly at improving the standard of the wage earners by increasing their income, that they may well be considered in this connection. These fall under the general head of minimum wage legislation.

A society which adopts any form of official regulation of wages breaks absolutely with the old *laissez-faire* doctrine of economic utility. It abandons the theory that the most desirable wage adjustment will result from the free and unhampered play of economic forces as between individuals, and in its place erects the doctrine that the absolute welfare of wage earners is of greater importance than any amount of theoretical freedom and liberty, and that it is the duty of organized society to provide that the standard of its workers shall not fall below a certain point. Consequently, it is only the most progressive societies that have sufficiently freed themselves from the tremendous weight of the *laissez-faire*

tradition to put into operation anything in the way of a legal minimum wage. And in even the most progressive societies it is a relatively modern movement.

The underlying theory of the minimum wage may be briefly stated as follows: The history of the nineteenth century demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt the fact that if the arrangements between capitalists and laborers are left entirely without legal control, the great margin of power possessed by the capitalists will enable them to force upon the laborers conditions which are neither equitable in the abstract nor conducive to social solidarity, stability, and progress. Accordingly, society must use its authority to prevent the utter degradation of its weaker members, and the best way is the most direct way, that is, to fix a minimum below which the remuneration of the workers shall not be allowed to fall. It is pointed out that this does not eliminate competition, but fixes the plane above which competition shall operate. The justification for this action lies in the unity of social interests, and the consequent right of society to adjust power and advantage in a way which would seem arbitrary from the strictly economic point of view, but is logical from the social standpoint.

A modified form of minimum wage, which rests on somewhat different principles, is that which limits its operation to women and children, or either class alone. The end aimed at by these measures is the protection of public health and morals, rather than the safeguarding of the standard of living, and the power of the state which is primarily invoked is the police power. The arguments for and against this form of minimum wage are of a different sort from those which apply to the general minimum wage.

The arguments against the general minimum wage are of two chief sorts — first, that it infringes individual rights and personal liberty, and second, that it will not work. There is no room for discussion of the first class of objections — they must be granted at once, as observed above. To one whose philosophy of life forbids him to accept anything which runs counter to the old *laissez-faire* notion of rights and liberties the minimum wage stands condemned on the face of it. There is nothing more to be said.

Objections of the other sort call for some consideration. These arguments, and the answers to them, may be briefly summed up as follows: (1) The minimum wage will not benefit the wage earner, because the additional cost of production represented by his increased earnings will be added to the selling price, and will increase his cost of living by just so much. If labor cost were the only element in the cost of production, and if prices were closely adjusted to cost of production, this argument would have much weight. In fact, wages are only one element in the cost of production, often a very small one. Wages which are now above the proposed minimum would not necessarily be raised at all. In lines of production where there is more or less of monopoly, prices are not fixed on the basis of cost of production, but on the basis of maximum net profit. Taking all these things together, it is clear that the increased cost resulting from increased wages, which would go directly to augment the income of the poorer paid laborers, would be so thoroughly distributed and disseminated throughout production as to raise the price level little, if at all. It would merely accomplish a sort of taking up of slack between cost and price. Furthermore, it is probable

that the increased efficiency of the workers, resulting from their higher standard, would so increase their productivity as to offset the increased cost of their labor. (2) The increased cost of production would drive out of business certain industries now operating on a narrow margin of profit. As to the truth of this assertion, experience alone can furnish a demonstration. One thing, however, is certain. Any industry which would be driven out of business by a reasonable minimum wage ought to be driven out of business. Society has no right to demand the continued production of goods for which it does not care enough to pay a price sufficiently high to provide a decent livelihood for the workers engaged in the production. (3) The minimum wage tends also to become the maximum wage. Employers make up for the better wages of the poorer workers by cutting down the pay of the better workers. This, again, is a question to be settled by experience. There is no rational ground for expecting it. The competition of employers for the better grade of laborers would be just as keen as ever, and the laborer who had justified his employer in paying him high wages would continue to do so. (4) The minimum wage is hard to enforce, and has disagreeable inquisitorial features. There seems to be much truth in these arguments. The only question is, whether the drawbacks more than outweigh the advantages. (5) The minimum wage will throw out of employment all of those who are not competent to earn the minimum — who do not actually produce as much as they would have to be paid, — and society would have to assume the support of these individuals and their families. Some results of this sort will undoubtedly follow the introduction of the minimum wage. It is possible

to provide for some of these by establishing a class of slow workers as is done in Australia. But society would have to face the burden of supporting some, without doubt. It is better, however, that society should wholly support a few incompetent and abnormal families than that they, by their competition, should drag down the standard of the whole group of wage earners.

The only countries in which the general minimum wage has been in effect on a broad enough scale and for a long enough time to furnish grounds for general conclusions are those of the Australian federation. According to the best reports as to the results of these laws it appears that the Australian experiments afford a practical refutation of all the stock arguments against the system. Wages and the standard of living have been very materially raised; prices have not been seriously affected; industries have not been driven out of business; no serious amount of unemployment or burden of pauperism has resulted.[66]

England has recently introduced the minimum wage into a few trades, particularly those where wages and working conditions were worst, the sweated trades. Up to the present, the experiment has apparently been markedly successful. In the United States nine states have passed minimum wage laws, but they are all of the restricted type, limited to women and children.[67]

CHAPTER VIII

DOUBTFUL CASES. ECONOMIC IMMORALITY

Social restraints on economic abnormality. Because of the primary importance and great variety of the economic interests in human life, it is inevitable that there should be a large number of abnormalities of all sorts connected with this group of social activities. That there are not more is due to the fact that the interests at stake are fundamental and vital. Societies cannot afford to tolerate more than a limited amount of abnormality in this department of life. Any society which grows too careless in this respect, marks itself out for elimination.

Woman labor. Before taking up the abnormal aspects of the economic life of modern societies, it is necessary to glance briefly at two great phenomena which it is very difficult to place as regards their normality. The first of these is the work for wages of women in industrial pursuits. This is treated by many writers as if it were in itself abnormal, and there is no doubt that it presents many abnormal features. Yet it has become so thoroughly incorporated in modern economic life that, as an institution, it must be accepted as normal. Out of a total of 303 occupations listed in the United States Census of 1900 there are only seven in which no women appear. The classification of occupations in the Census of 1910 is much more minute, and there are

accordingly more in which no women are found. But the fact is that there are practically no important occupations in twentieth century societies in which women have not entered as independent wage earners. The abnormalities, then, must be in some of the incidental aspects of the system, rather than in the institution itself.

The explanation seems to be simply this: Because of the great economic changes involved in the industrial and commercial revolutions of the nineteenth century, the maintenance mores of western nations have been going through a transition period involving most stupendous and far-reaching modifications. From sheer necessity, a general consistency has been preserved among the economic mores themselves. But as regards the other mores, which are dependent on the economic mores and closely connected with them, there has been a much slower development. All mores possess an enormous amount of inertia, and change only in response to irresistible forces. The forces of economic change were sufficient during the nineteenth century to compel the alteration of the maintenance mores. But the other mores, which felt these forces indirectly and in a transmitted form, have lagged far behind. Consequently there has resulted a great mass of inconsistencies and false adjustments between the economic mores and those of other departments of life, particularly of marriage and the family. The anomalous situation of women in industry is largely accounted for by these inconsistencies in the mores. Some of them will be discussed in a more appropriate connection later.

Poverty. The second of these great phenomena, whose position in the economic classification is hard to determine, is poverty. Is poverty normal or abnormal?

The mere asking of this question brings up the further one, What is meant by poverty? And in searching for the answer to this question it becomes clear that the word "poverty" means different things at different times and in different connections. In our common use of the term there are to be discerned two distinct ideas. According to the first of these, poverty is a purely relative matter. It means having less than somebody else, or less than one would like to have. This is one of the truest and most significant conceptions of poverty. For the sense of poverty is dependent much less on the absolute amount of one's possessions than on the relation which those possessions bear to those of others in one's society. A family feels poor, and is poor, in New York City which would be rich among the Bushmen of Africa. If an individual lives in a community where everybody wears homespun, and has only one suit at a time, wearing it as long as it will hold together, it is no sign of poverty, and no one feels it a hardship, to own but one suit of threadbare homespun. If a boy grows up in a village from which no one goes to college, and where higher education is merely a name, it is no mark of poverty not to go to college. But if all one's companions are richly attired, or if all one's boyhood companions go off to college, then to wear ragged homespun and to be compelled to leave school at the eighth grade is a mark of poverty, and is felt as such. The same is true of riches. The time was, not long ago, when a millionaire was a marked man, and esteemed amazingly wealthy. Nowadays a man must be many times a millionaire to cut any financial figure at all.

Herein lies the fallacy of trying to determine whether a given class in society is growing richer or poorer by

comparing its absolute condition with that of the corresponding class in an earlier epoch. In these days, nearly everybody lights his house with electricity, gas, or kerosene, and the man who can afford nothing but a tallow candle feels a sense of poverty. It is no consolation to him to remind him that in his great-grandfather's day the richest squire used the same form of illumination. In the days before modern plumbing was heard of, the wealthiest households did not boast a fully equipped bathroom. In the twentieth century, in cities at least, it is a mark of a certain degree of poverty not to be able to afford an apartment which includes modern bathroom facilities. So instances might be multiplied. In a very real sense, poverty and riches are purely relative terms, and in a society where the general standard of living is steadily rising, a group whose standard is stationary, or is rising at a slower rate, may truthfully be said to be growing poorer.

In this sense, poverty is unquestionably normal. It has always existed, and always will exist. It is scarcely possible to conceive of a society so organized as to secure a distribution of wealth so uniform that no one would feel poor.

But there is another equally legitimate conception of the term "poverty," which presents a wholly different aspect. This is the absolute lack of the necessaries requisite for a decent or efficient livelihood. Even here, it is difficult to escape entirely the influence of the relative conditions of different societies. But there is a standard which approaches the absolute. This is the amount of economic goods which are requisite to keep an average family at a reasonable degree of economic efficiency, and provide for the efficiency and moral and

physical health of the next generation. A family which lacks these bare necessaries may be said to be poor in a very different sense from one which simply feels the difference between itself and its well-to-do neighbors. To avoid confusion it is desirable to adopt different terms to refer to these two types of want. The word "poverty" may be confined to the purely relative condition of having less than those around one. Destitution may be defined as that condition where the income of a family is insufficient to enable it to maintain the minimum normal standard of living of the society of which it is a part.* So defined, destitution is always abnormal.

Economic sin. Turning now to the consideration of the various types of economic abnormality, the first matter to demand attention is economic sin. By economic sin is meant all activities or forms of conduct, entered upon in the pursuit of wealth, which are branded as immoral by the social code of one's own society. At the very outset, it is evident that in this department of life it is probably more difficult than in any other to know just what constitutes sin. The dividing line between right and wrong in business pursuits is very hazy, and difficult to discern. It is never exactly the same in any two societies, nor in the same society in any two periods. Among the Homeric Greeks it was a

* This definition is purposely worded to apply to families. Destitution is, to be sure, a condition which may apply to individuals without family ties. But the number of individuals who entirely lack relatives near enough to be socially accountable for their support, if they are able, is so slight as not to vitiate the conception of destitution as a matter of the family standard of living. Any necessary modifications of the definition to make it apply to such rare individuals can be easily made.

sin to steal cattle from the members of one's own immediate tribe; but to steal cattle from a neighboring tribe was a highly meritorious act. In modern societies, stealing is discountenanced, whatever the race or nationality of the victim. At the present day, in such countries as Turkey, it is customary and right for a dealer to get the highest price he can for his wares, by a process of skillful haggling; the business morals of western nations discountenance such practices.

Particularly within very recent times has the discernment of economic sin in industrial countries become exceedingly difficult. The immense changes of the industrial and commercial revolutions, and the consequent rapid changes in the mores, have left modern societies without any clean cut rules of business ethics, or criteria of conduct. The twentieth-century business man is constantly confronted with moral problems, demanding the nicest discrimination, and lacking any well-established precedents as guide.

Professor Edward A. Ross has discussed this whole matter admirably, particularly in his book, "Sin and Society." He shows that the entire modern organization of society, especially in the economic field, has involved new conceptions of sin, and new forms of wrongdoing. Modern economic sin partakes of the character of most modern economic relations — it has become impersonal, systematic, refined. There is an attenuated bond between the sinner and his victim. The typical sinner of to-day no longer deprives others of their wealth by highway robbery or burglary, but by manipulating stocks, misusing trust funds, and selling package goods in short weight. The modern method of taking the lives of others is not by means of the rapier and the

bludgeon, but by the less obvious though equally certain methods of adulterated food, inadequate protection of workers in factories and mines, cutting under the specifications in building contracts, etc. The typical modern sinner usually never sees his victims, and frequently never hears of them, nor knows from positive evidence whether there have been any. Thus modern sin has lost much of its brutality, vulgarity, and revolting character, along with its loss of hand-to-hand methods. This is what makes it possible for some of the worst of twentieth-century sinners to hold eminent positions in the community, to be known as unexceptionable husbands and fathers, and to keep the sincere respect of their fellow citizens. The currents of modern sin run far below the surface, and escape the observation of the average citizen, and often even of the men who are primarily responsible for them. Occasionally there comes a crash, and some "eminent citizen" is shown up as an exploiter of woman and child labor, a wholesale adulterator of food, or an owner of houses of prostitution. With respect to such sinners, however, the community is likely to judge tolerantly and deal leniently. The old adage, "Business is business," like the mantle of charity, covers a multitude of sins. Let such a man drop out of the public eye, and remain obscure for a time, and the chances are that, if he wishes, he may in time reinstate himself in some other equally profitable, and no more commendable, line of activity.

Graft. This is well illustrated by those various forms of unsocial conduct which go under the general name of graft. Graft is the economic representative of the sort of conduct known as corruption, which has been defined as "the intentional misperformance or neglect of a

recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal." [68] Graft, in its commonest form, results from the interplay of interest between the possessors of the two great forms of modern power — the economic and the political. Corruption may appear, and does appear, in connection with every important form of social activity. But its most serious and most characteristic manifestation in modern societies is in the field of business.

The origin of graft is perfectly simple to understand. The bulk of the power in modern societies is vested in two great interests, the economic and the political. Other forms of power still exist, but hold a decidedly subordinate place. Religious power still persists, but to a degree insignificant as compared with medieval conditions. The power of family or birth is steadily diminishing. Even the military power, though at present* in the ascendancy, holds a much inferior place in modern societies to what it once did. In modern life business and politics stand supreme.

Now, just as in medieval society there was a continuous and highly important interrelation between the ecclesiastical interests and the political interests, so to-day there is a parallel connection between the economic interests and the political interests. This connection takes the form of a system of bargaining. Each of these interests has something to give to the other, and something to gain from the other, because the power that each possesses may be used to the advantage of the other. Because of the growing tendency of modern governments to extend their control into the realm of

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private business, the success of business in general, and of specific businesses in particular, is continually dependent on the attitude of the governing agents. Consequently, it is incumbent on the business men to keep themselves in the good graces of the legislators and administrators. The political authorities, on the other hand, are dependent on the business men of the community for the maintenance of their power. To secure and preserve political power requires votes, and votes cost money, — in legitimate as well as illegitimate ways. Accordingly the politicians are continually appealing to the business men for the sinews of war. In such a situation as this a bargain is bound to result. The two things to be exchanged are money and patronage. In the simplest terms of the problem, the business men have the money and the politicians have the patronage. But in actual life, while this division of power still remains typical, each party in the end comes to have the disposition of some money and some patronage. The result of this interplay of interests, and exchange of power, is what has come to be known as "the system." Judge Lindsey and Mr. O'Higgins have given it the name of "The Beast." The novice who contemplates the lineaments of this beast, as it is described by those who know, finds himself in the state of mind of the countryman, who, having seen a giraffe for the first time, shrugged his shoulders in disgust and walked away, remarking, "There ain't no such animal." Unfortunately, however, the evidence as to the existence and character of The Beast is altogether too strong to be set aside so lightly.

There are two types of business which, being especially subject to government control, or "interference," are particularly liable to be drawn into the system. These

are the highest and the lowest. "Big business" is always a favorite mark for legitimate and illegitimate political attack, while the trades of the underworld, though for somewhat different reasons, are equally subject to government attention. This fact explains the extraordinary combinations of interests which are frequently found arrayed in political contests. The directors of a vast street railway system and the keeper of a gambling hell are alike concerned in putting into official positions men who can be "influenced," who favor a general policy of non-interference, who are impressed with the sacred character of business. The ordinary, small business man in a legitimate industry, who has little to gain or lose from governmental activity, and who has little to offer to governmental agents — the man of the type of Professor Sumner's "forgotten man" — is little subject to temptation, and so is seldom found in the toils of the system.

Once under way, the system develops tremendous force and impetus, and it is almost impossible for any one, however upright his original motives, who engages in any of the activities bound up in the system, to keep himself wholly untainted by its influence. The story told by Judge Lindsey of the experiences of himself and his partner, is strikingly significant.[69] Appeal is made by the agents of the system to every possible motive, good and bad, by which the initiate may be made to conform himself to the habits of The Beast. Loyalty, friendship, gratitude, and ambition are requisitioned, as well as selfishness, cupidity, and lust of power. After the first step is taken, after the first compromise is made, it is almost impossible for the victim to escape from the meshes. And if he steadfastly remains aloof,

every possible device of cunning, craft, and duplicity is employed to discredit him in the eyes of the public.

The whole thing rests ultimately, of course, upon the natural selfishness of human nature, as does every other form of immorality in the final analysis. But the proportions attained are made possible only by the character of the present economic and political organization of modern societies. The study of graft can be profitably prosecuted only on the basis of a full understanding of the prevailing social system.

Since graft has been branded as abnormal, it follows that there must be some social injury connected with it. Who, then, are the sufferers from graft? Briefly, "the dear people." Why do the people not rebel? They are the ultimate source of political power in modern societies. Why do they not take matters into their own hands, and put an end to graft? Primarily, because they are less than half conscious that they are suffering, and almost wholly ignorant as to why and how they are made to suffer. Consistently with the general nature of modern economic sin it is characteristic of graft that most of its social injury is administered in small doses, and widely disseminated over a large number of people. The tribute which the system exacts takes the form of unnecessarily high gas and water rates, and trolley fares, of short weights and adulterated foods, of prices augmented by "protective" tariffs, and of a thousand and one other minor additions to the daily expenditures of the common man. He, on his part, scarcely recognizes the imposition, or, if he does, feels that the specific amounts are so small as hardly to make it worth while to do anything about it. The total social loss, however, represented by the aggregate gains

of grafters, is enormous. Recently, there are signs that the people are waking up. Not only do successive waves of reform sweep over our great cities, but there are indications of serious efforts to put permanent obstacles in the way of the development of the system. The present baiting of the railroads, arbitrary and unfair as it often is, is merely the natural reaction from the days when the motto of railroad magnates was, "the public be damned." Education, a sensitized social conscience, a heightened feeling of public responsibility, and a keener resentment for small injustices are the weapons by which graft may be reduced to its minimum proportions, as long as the present economic organization persists.

Unsocial utilization of capital. There is another great branch of social evils which lies so squarely on the border line between sin and maladjustment that it is difficult if not impossible to place it in the general classification. This includes all those forms of social injury which result from the careless or indifferent use of capital. As instances, may be cited the high death rate in insanitary tenements, industrial accidents and diseases resulting from remediable factory conditions, and the exhaustion of laborers incident upon a too long working day. Society has not yet definitely decided to what extent the responsibility for these evils should be placed upon those who own the capital in connection with which they arise. It might seem at first thought that every owner of capital ought to be held strictly and solely accountable for the evils which result from his use of his capital. There are extremists who take this view. Some one has said that "you can kill a man just as surely with a tenement as with an ax," and Robert

Hunter says, "These men are murderers." [70] But a closer analysis shows that this attitude is unwarranted. Many of the evils in question appear to be inseparable from the competitive use of privately-owned capital. Accordingly, a society which sanctions the private ownership of productive capital, and allows free competition, must be prepared to accept the social responsibility for the evils which accrue from that system. For example, a certain manufacturer in a competitive industry may feel that an eight hour day is long enough, and may attempt to establish it in his own plant. But unless the industry is of such a sort that the shortening of the day is an actual economic advantage, he will soon find that his cost of production has increased so much that he can no longer meet the competition of his rivals, and must either go back to the long day, or go out of business. A study of the facts of industry reveals countless illustrations of the truth that under a competitive organization of the economic life, those individuals who set the standards are those who have the least sense of social responsibility. The conditions of life in any given industry tend in the long run to be drawn down to the level established by the least conscientious of the efficient producers in that industry. As long as anti-social conditions are economically profitable to the individual in control, they will be maintained by a sufficient number of self-centered individuals to nullify the desires of other altruistic individuals who would be glad to sacrifice a part of their natural power in the interest of the general social welfare.

For this reason, many thinkers are inclined to put the entire responsibility for evils of this sort upon society, and call them all maladjustments. But this

extreme view will bear analysis no better than the other. It is evident that the ultimate responsibility for these evils does, in many cases, rest with some individuals — not with all, and often not with a majority. If *no* capitalist were willing to tolerate in his plant conditions which menaced the health of his operatives, the entire competition would take place on a higher plane. We have here, then, one of the typical situations which demand and justify social control — a situation where a few antisocially minded individuals can compel an entire group, in the absence of regulation, to conform to their standards. Society has gradually learned, and is learning, this lesson. The old doctrine of *laissez faire*, in its extreme applications, has been relegated to the rubbish heap, and in its place we have the extensive and complicated system of factory laws, pure food laws, tenement house laws, etc., by which society, while seeming to restrain whole groups of producers, really restrains only the antisocially minded elements (often a small minority), and leaves the socially minded individuals free to do what they would gladly do, anyway, but could not do under unregulated competition.

It is evidently impossible to lay down any inflexible generalization as to the responsibility for the class of evils in question, and accordingly it is impossible to classify them definitely as either sins or maladjustments. Only in specific cases, and often then only by the individual immediately concerned, can it be determined whether these types of abnormality involve any breach of the moral code. The trend of social evolution is in the direction of asserting social responsibility by fixing individual responsibility. In other words, such use of capital as results in social injury is progressively being

brought into the category of crime. Such social evils as sweatshops, dark bedrooms in tenements, improperly ventilated mines, etc., start as maladjustments, and ultimately become crimes. Sometimes the transition from the stage of maladjustment to the criminal stage takes place directly. Sometimes there intervenes a period when the maintenance of such conditions is condemned by the moral code, though not yet proscribed by the legal code. Frequent instances of these border line cases will present themselves in the course of this study.

Economic crime. Under the head of economic crime fall all acts committed in the pursuit of wealth which are definitely forbidden by the legal code of the state. The oldest and most fundamental is theft — the taking of wealth to which one has no right. In fact, almost all economic crimes might be interpreted as theft in some sense. But the typical modern crimes in this field are not the simple, direct forms of theft, such as robbery, burglary, piracy, etc., but the more complicated, indirect, and impersonal methods of depriving others of their wealth, such as have already been referred to in the discussion of economic sin in general. As soon as societies become progressive enough to prohibit these acts by law, they become crimes, and then the financier who makes a combination in restraint of trade is just as truly a criminal as the train robber. This fact is often overlooked by criminologists, who talk about a criminal type as if it were a definite and concrete thing. A moment's consideration reveals the fact that the determination of who is a criminal depends upon the attitude of society, no less than upon the constitution of the individual. Whether a man is a criminal or not

depends not only upon what he does, but upon where he does it. At one time, one of the United States had 158 crimes, and another only 108.[71] A man might do fifty different things in one state without fear of the law, which would make him a criminal in the other. It follows that the amount of crime in any state is no infallible indication of the badness of its population. It may be an indication of the progressiveness of its social policy, and the sensitiveness of its public conscience. Accordingly, in the economic field, a certain way of making a living which will mark a man as a clever business man in one society, will brand him as a sinner in another society, and as a criminal in a third.

To determine the amount of economic crime in any society is difficult, if not impossible. The measurement of criminality of any sort is exceedingly difficult, for the primary reason that account must be taken not only of the number of crimes committed, but of their gravity — that is, the amount of criminality involved in each crime. If all that were necessary were to enumerate the number of criminal acts within a given time, the task would be comparatively simple. But it would evidently be misleading to put spitting on the sidewalk on a par with murder in estimating the degree of criminality in a community. Official statistics take one or two brief steps in this direction by differentiating between major and minor offenses, misdemeanors, etc. Another method of getting a vague idea is by the severity of the punishments imposed. But, as has already been shown in the discussion of expiation as a basis of punishment (page 38), men have never found it possible to apportion punishment exactly in accordance with the degree of criminality.

The effort to estimate the amount of economic crime is further complicated by the fact that official statistics do not classify crime on the basis of the major interest involved. The standard classification rests upon the object of the act instead of upon the motive of the agent, and divides crimes into those against property, against the person, against chastity, and against public policy. Obviously it would be quite impossible to pick out from such a classification all crimes committed in the pursuit of wealth. Much nearer to the conception of economic crime is the classification adopted by the Immigration Commission. Its category of "gainful offenses" rests upon virtually the same basis as the present definition of economic crime. According to the figures of the Commission, about 8 per cent of the cases dealt with by the City Magistrates' Courts of New York City in the years 1901 to 1908 were gainful offenses, the majority of the cases being offenses against public policy. In the New York Court of General Sessions, from October, 1908 to June 30, 1909, 74 per cent of the cases were gainful offenses. In the New York County and Supreme Courts, in 1907 and 1908, 71.7 per cent of the cases were gainful offenses. Among the police arrests in Chicago, 1905 to 1908, about three fourths of the offenses were against public policy, and 13.1 per cent gainful, while of the commitments to Massachusetts penal institutions, Oct. 1, 1908 to Sept. 30, 1909, 12.3 per cent were for gainful offenses.

It is thus apparent that while the proportion of economic crimes is relatively small, as compared with all crimes, yet in the case of the more serious crimes, dealt with by the higher courts, economic crimes constitute a large majority. Figures showing the relative severity of

punishment for different sorts of crime also reveal the fact that economic crimes are regarded as very serious by modern societies.

Economic vice. There are two main forms of economic vice which demand consideration, both very ancient. One is now so thoroughly condemned by public opinion as to have little practical importance in modern life; the other is still extensively practiced. The first of these vices is gluttony, the second gambling. Gluttony is the gratification of the sense of taste merely for the pleasure connected therewith, instead of for the legitimate purpose for which it exists — nutrition. In New Testament days apparently the glutton was about as common as the winebibber, and occupied about the same place in the public estimation. The feasts of the Romans were also marked by extremes of gluttony. But the practices connected with gluttony are so thoroughly disgusting and revolting that, while it is still said that some people live to eat instead of eating to live, the vice itself has been practically banished from civilized societies.

Gambling, on the other hand, being one of the oldest of vices, is also one of the most universal, and is still widely prevalent in the most civilized societies. There is no need to examine its different forms in this connection, but merely to consider briefly the distinctive characteristics which place it in the category of vice. Gambling is a vice for three chief reasons. First, while ostensibly a method of securing wealth, it is wholly non-productive from the social point of view. Mankind has never been one whit the richer for all the gambling it has indulged in. Second, gambling represents a net loss in satisfaction to society. According to the law of

marginal utility, the gain of the man who wins in a gamble, other things being equal, is always less than the loss of the man who loses.[72] This is the great economic justification for the condemnation of gambling. Third, gambling tends to destroy the individuals who practice it, particularly with respect to those qualities which are essential for the legitimate pursuit of wealth. There is scarcely anything which will so surely undermine habits of industry, frugality, forethought, honesty, justice, and all the other characteristics which enable men to prosper in normal ways, than addiction to gambling. The confirmed gambler becomes utterly unfitted for any legitimate form of business activity.

For these reasons, gambling demands and receives social attention in all progressive societies, and the control of gambling becomes one of the great practical problems of modern communities. The tendency, in the United States at least, is to seek to accomplish this end by means of legislation. But the very nature of vice makes this method inadequate to secure the desired result. To forbid gambling by law is to make it a crime. There is no doubt that there are certain forms of gambling that should be made crimes, and can be best controlled in this way. It is hard to see, for instance, how the great interstate lottery system could ever have been so effectively grappled with by any other than legal means. Also, some of the glaring temptations to gambling, and some of its commercial manifestations, may be reduced or eliminated by law. State action, then, is highly desirable with reference to gambling, and is decidedly effective within limits. But the vice itself can never be eradicated by legal means. The social agencies which can successfully cope with gambling, and reduce

it as near to a minimum as possible, are those enumerated in an earlier chapter as fitted to deal with vice in general — the school, the church, and the home. The individual integrity of its citizens is the only sure safeguard which a society can have against gambling.*

In a certain sense, prostitution might be considered under the head of economic vice, since it is a practice entered upon in the pursuit of wealth which tends toward the destruction of the individual, particularly with respect to those qualities relied upon to secure gain — youth, charm, health, beauty, etc. But the number of women and girls who enter a life of prostitution primarily for the conscious purpose of making a living is relatively small, and for a variety of reasons the whole question of prostitution is most fittingly included in the second great department of social life.

In a similar way, some aspects of the abuse of alcohol take the form of an economic vice. Especially is this true of the practice known as industrial drinking, by which workers indulge in alcoholic drinks in the belief that they are thereby made more efficient in their work. This form of vice is said to be very common in England, less so in the United States. The prevalence of the practice rests upon a misconception as to the effects of alcohol on the human body. The first effect of a moderate dose of alcohol is to induce a sense of vigor, well-being, and increased muscular strength. The latter impression, however, is wholly illusory, being due to the stimulation of the nervous system, not the strengthening

* The distinction should be clearly observed between gambling and speculation. The latter, in many of its forms, is not only legitimate, but socially advantageous. It is difficult to draw the line between the two in verbal definitions. This fact is one of the obstacles which societies meet in trying to deal with gambling by legal means.

of the muscular system. Equally mistaken is the idea, so generally held, that better skilled work can be done under the influence of alcohol. Repeated experiments have proved that, although workers are convinced in their own minds that they do better work than their average while under a mild stimulation by alcohol, the results show that work done under these conditions is inferior. It can readily be understood, however, that as long as these misconceptions prevail, there is a great temptation for workers to resort to alcoholic stimulation as a means of increasing their efficiency. The logical result of the practice is a progressively diminished efficiency, a constant pressure to increase the amount of stimulation, and eventually chronic alcoholism. It is said that a continuous use of small amounts of alcohol, even though intoxication never results, is more likely to induce chronic alcoholism than a periodic indulgence in large amounts of alcohol, with consequent complete inebriation.[73] Education is clearly the first step necessary for the elimination of industrial drinking. For the most part, however, the use of alcohol can be most logically considered under the head of self-gratification.

CHAPTER IX

ECONOMIC INCOMPETENCE. DESTITUTION

Numerous forms of economic incompetence. Whether the social evils which fall under the head of economic incompetency are to be classed as incapacity or maladjustment depends, according to definition, upon whether the weakness or insufficiency lies in the make-up of the individual, or in the constitution of society and social relations. The number of these evils is legion, and it is one of the great unsettled problems of applied sociology just how to interpret them and how to account for them. Anything for which an individual is not personally responsible by choice, which prevents him from earning a normal living in a normal way, furnishes an instance of economic incompetence. As instances of economic incapacity may be cited blindness, deformity, old age, feeble-mindedness, or any other physical or psychical handicap which interferes with the pursuit of wealth. As illustrations of economic maladjustment may be mentioned unemployment due to crises or the seasonal nature of industry, reduced wages due to fluctuations in the market, the neutralization of technical skill by the introduction of new machinery, etc. Some forms of incompetence are personal in their application, but social in their origin, such as injuries from industrial accidents, and sickness caused by impure city water.

Destitution. It is evident, then, that the mere enumeration and classification of the different forms of

economic incompetence would be an almost endless and very profitless task. The treatment of these types of abnormality will be simplified by observing that they all have one grand result — destitution. The most practical method of attack in this field accordingly is to take up the question from the point of view of destitution, to examine its extent and its causes, and to consider the possible means for its elimination.

It should be borne in mind that destitution is a relative matter, conditioned by the normal standard of living in a given society. In the common discussions of the subject, the line is not clearly drawn between destitution and poverty, nor is it always possible to make a sharp distinction. In endeavoring to estimate the amount of destitution in a modern country, as the United States for instance, it must be remembered that the normal standard of living of the working classes is, as has been demonstrated above, very low in comparison with the total wealth of the society as a whole. There will therefore be much less of destitution than of what might justly be considered serious poverty.

Amount of destitution. There is no way of accurately ascertaining the amount of destitution in the United States. When Robert Hunter stated[74] that he had no doubt that there were 10,000,000 persons in poverty in this country, and that the number might be fifteen or twenty millions, he probably had in mind a situation somewhat different from destitution in the exact sense. All that can be said is that there is certainly a very large amount of destitution, an amount wholly out of proportion to the total wealth or total income of the United States. Perhaps as good an idea as any may be gained by considering, first, what sort of standard of living is

procurable with a family income of $600 a year, and then the number of families who must exist upon less than $600 a year.

Pauperism. It is not until the extreme stage of destitution, pauperism, is reached that there is a definite criterion for judgment, and consequently the possibility of accurate and complete statistics. By pauperism is meant that situation where a family or individual receives the whole or a part of its support from sources other than those upon which it naturally has a legal or social claim.* The term dependence is sometimes used to cover this situation, but not very accurately. For every one is dependent during a considerable period of his life — infancy and childhood — and many for a second period, old age. But as long as those who provide subsistence during these periods are the members of one's immediate family, or others with some direct social responsibility, there is no pauperism. So an adult, under our present social system, may be supported by his parents indefinitely without incurring the charge of pauperism. In general, if the support comes from near relatives, it is not considered pauperism. To just what degree of relationship the social responsibility for support extends is a matter of the general social organization, and seldom causes any practical confusion.

Although pauperism is a definite state, and statistics are therefore possible, complete statistics do not exist in the United States. On January 1, 1910, there were

* The definition of pauperism which limits it to a "state of *legal* dependence" is not strictly logical, as it is based not upon the condition of the family or individual, but upon the method of relieving that condition. The earmark of pauperism is the receipt of support from without the family. Whether this support comes from official or unofficial sources is not essential.

enumerated in the almshouses of the United States 84,198 paupers. But the almshouse population represents only a small fraction of the total amount of pauperism. Not only are there large numbers of publicly supported paupers who are maintained outside of institutions, but there is also the enormous class of privately supported paupers, concerning whom it is still more difficult to get accurate facts. If the current estimate is correct that about 5 per cent of the total population of the country are the recipients of some form of charitable relief in a single year, it means that nearly five million people experience pauperism annually.[75]

Not all of this number, of course, remain paupers. Pauperism may be temporary or permanent, acute or chronic. But even temporary pauperism, though it lasts only a few days or weeks, is a much more serious matter than might appear at first sight. The distinction between destitution and pauperism is by no means merely academic. The line of demarcation is sharply drawn, not only in the definition, but in the minds of the poorer classes themselves. Pauperism is the great haunting fear of the destitute, and they fight against it with every ounce of energy and perseverance, aided by that wonderful store of fellowship and helpfulness which is to be observed in poor neighborhoods. But once the line is crossed, a family loses something which it is very difficult for them ever to regain. The longer the period of pauperism lasts, the more fixed do the habits of dependence become, and the more difficult is it to restore the old feeling of self-respect. Herein lies one of the greatest curses of our frequently recurring economic crises. The evil which they do to the poorer classes is not to be measured by the amount of actual suffering alone, but also by the great

loss in independence on the part of those families who are forced over the line, even though it be only for a season.

Chronic pauperism is one of the most hopeless and intractable of all social diseases. When it reaches its final stage of vagrancy it seems to be practically impossible of cure.

Scarcely any department of social inquiry and activity has received more attention than the causes and treatment of destitution and pauperism. Numberless classifications and analyses of the causes have been made, and a great variety of remedies suggested. Some are scientific to a certain degree, but many are random and incoherent.

The causes of destitution. As regards causes, it is evident that the causes of destitution and pauperism are virtually the same, and no effort need be made to distinguish them. The only new element in pauperism is the consent to receive support from outside sources. This may be due to the extremity of destitution or to a certain weakness of character. But at any rate, the chains of circumstance which lead up to the two forms of abnormality are the same.

A typical classification of the causes of pauperism is the following, adopted by the Immigration Commission: The general percentages of all cases recorded by the Commission, due to each cause, are appended.

Apparent Cause of Need	Per Cent of Total[76]
1. Death or disability of breadwinner:	
Accident to breadwinner	3.2
Death of breadwinner	5.7
Illness of breadwinner	20.8
2. Death or disability of another member of the family:	
Accident to another member of the family	.7
Death of another member of the family	1.1
Illness of another member of the family	17.6

Apparent Cause of Need	Per Cent of Total
3. Lack of employment or insufficient earnings:	
Insufficient earnings	19.9
Lack of employment	43.2
4. Neglect or bad habits of breadwinner:	
Desertion by husband	7.5
Incarceration of breadwinner	1.9
Intemperance of breadwinner	7.7
Neglect by breadwinner	4.6
5. Old age	6.2
6. Other:	
Loss by fire	.3
Other	9.9

A glance at this table suggests several criticisms. In the first place, "insufficient earnings" might be interpreted broadly enough to cover every case of destitution except those due to willful waste or utter inefficiency in expenditure. It is essential to know more explicitly why earnings were insufficient. Several of the other conditions enumerated, as "intemperance," "illness," "old age," etc., might well be the cause of insufficient earnings. The same might be said of "lack of employment." Furthermore, it is remarkable that no mention is made of sexual immorality, which is considered by some as one of the most prolific causes of destitution.[77]

The chief criticism, however, of classifications of the above type is the general one that the causes enumerated are merely proximate, and give no indication of the actual conditions which have brought the family into destitution. The Commission recognizes this fact by designating the conditions enumerated as the "apparent causes of need." This is often as far as it is possible to go in a general investigation, but it is by no means far enough for scientific purposes.

A classification of the causes of destitution which corresponds to the general scheme adopted in this study

would distinguish first of all between the personal causes (incapacity) and the social causes (maladjustment). But as soon as personal causes are mentioned, it at once becomes clear that many personal causes do not come under the head of incompetence at all, but of immorality. Such are intemperance, sexual vice, crime, etc. Plainly, a portion of destitution is a matter of personal responsibility.

Incapacity, in turn, may be divided into physical — illness, accident, deformity, blindness, etc., — and psychical — idiocy, insanity, feeble-mindedness, ignorance, etc. Youth and old age are both physical and psychical. Incapacity, both physical and psychical, may be curable or incurable. Under maladjustment may be enumerated faulty industrial connections (*i.e.* a skilled cabinetworker out of employment in New York while there may be plenty of work in Grand Rapids, about which he knows nothing, and of which he could not avail himself if he did), unemployment due to crises or the seasonal nature of industry, closure of plants due to war, etc.

But this classification, too, is inadequate, in that many of the causes enumerated, particularly under the head of personal, are also only proximate. We need to know what are the causes of illness, insanity, etc. Also we find here many of the vicious circles so familiar to students of sociology. Illness may be due to intemperance, or intemperance to illness. Undernourishment may be the cause of unemployment, and unemployment the cause of undernourishment. Ignorance may be both a cause and a result of small wages. Most of the personal characteristics mentioned as causes of destitution are frequently results of destitution. In fact, it is

seldom that any case of destitution is due to a single simple cause, which may be isolated.

Particularly is it true, as intimated above, that many of the causes of destitution which are immediately personal, are nevertheless social in their origin. Accidents and diseases which result from normal employment in a legitimate industry are familiar examples. Physical inefficiency often results from bad factory conditions. Loss of independence and energy may be the result of a period of pauperism caused by an industrial depression. For this reason tabulations of the proximate causes of destitution tend strongly to overstate the personal causes and understate the social causes. This is made clear by a consideration of the conditions which prevail during a slack industrial season. A study of cases of pauperism at such a time will reveal many where the immediate reason for unemployment or small wages seems to be personal — intemperance, inefficiency, ignorance, etc. But the fact is that these very individuals were employed at sufficient wages during the preceding busy season, and will be employed again as soon as things pick up. Any one who has studied wage earners at first hand has almost surely been impressed by the sorry types of individuals who can secure steady work when business is booming. Of course, they are the first to be laid off when the depression comes, and so, in one sense, their unemployment may be attributed to personal reasons. But it is more fundamentally due to social reasons. For if all employees were on an equality of reliability and efficiency, some would nevertheless have had to be laid off, or all put on short time. In the latter case, the total number of cases of destitution might be larger than in the former.

So thoroughly have social workers been impressed with

these facts, that it is common among many of them to assign practically all cases of destitution to social causes in the final analysis. According to this view, even such distinctly personal conditions as imbecility and intemperance might have been prevented in an ideal state of society.

The final result of the foregoing discussion of the causes of destitution is merely to demonstrate the futility of generalizing at all about destitution, its causes or its cures. Every sort of abnormality which may affect the ability to earn a normal living — which is to say, every sort of economic abnormality, and many others — may and does result in destitution. Destitution, then, can be eliminated or cured only by perfecting the social organization, at least in its economic departments. And that means, that the study of destitution is almost as broad as the study of applied sociology.

Remedies for destitution. It does not follow, however, that nothing is to be done about destitution. Applied sociology deals largely with individuals, and in individual cases of destitution much may be accomplished in the way of cure or alleviation, as a result of scientific analysis and wise treatment. Many of the personal causes of destitution can be remedied. Some, too, of the social conditions which give rise to destitution give promise of yielding to scientifically conceived and wisely administered social action. And if destitution cannot be cured, it frequently must be relieved.

All societies have recognized these facts more or less clearly, and, from the earliest dawn of civilization, have given some attention to the destitute classes, particularly to those who have reached the extreme stage of pauperism. Methods and policies of relief are among the most

ancient forms of concerted social action. And, in almost every case, a part at least of this burden and responsibility has been considered to fall upon the state.

It would evidently be inappropriate in such a study as this to attempt to summarize the development of the poor laws of civilized states. All that is necessary is to give enough consideration to some of the salient points to discern the general principles involved.

Among primitive peoples in all ages a common method of dealing with those who are no longer able to provide their own support is to put them to death. This custom prevailed in European countries down to a surprisingly recent date. Where this practice is embodied in the mores it occasions no horror, nor do those who are to die feel any resentment or sense of wrong. In fact, it is said that if those whose function it is to perform the execution are reluctant to do their duty, the old people will sometimes taunt them with their indecision, and urge them to act. With the growth of more developed social relations practices of this sort were abandoned, and not only the duty, but the social desirability, of providing for the incompetent was recognized. Among ancient peoples, the Hebrews present a system of poor relief which is most clearly the prototype of those in vogue in modern countries. Not only was private giving commended and encouraged, but there were various legal provisions designed to prevent the people from falling into extreme destitution.

In the early Christian church charitable giving was regarded as highly meritorious, and the notion grew until in the Middle Ages the very act of giving came to be regarded as a means of acquiring merit, irrespective of the results of the gift, or the deserts of the recipient. Many

institutions were founded for the express purpose of assisting the destitute. As a corollary, begging was not only tolerated, but beggars were highly esteemed — the line of reasoning being, apparently, that since it is more blessed to give than to receive, it is a sacrificial act to afford others the opportunity of giving. The converse of the hospitals and monasteries was the begging orders.

The English system of poor relief. It was in England that the effort was first made to grapple intelligently with the problem of destitution as it existed, and the foundations of modern relief systems were laid. As long as the feudal system was in full swing, pauperism in the strict sense was almost unknown. Most individuals belonged to some one, and the lord was chargeable socially for the support of his serfs when they became incapacitated. The same situation prevails in a society where slavery is in the mores. Pauperism was almost unknown in the southern sections of the United States before the emancipation of the slaves, for every individual in the classes most likely to become dependent was the property of some one. Pauperism is a part of the price we pay for freedom. With the break up of the medieval system, and the great economic changes which followed the Black Death, the laboring population of England became detached from the land, and large numbers of them began to wander about practically as vagrants. The development of sheep farming and the inclosure of the common lands added to their number.

For a time England contented herself with comparatively mild measures, forbidding her people to give alms to sturdy beggars, and endeavoring to force the population to go to work at the old wages. In 1530 the

first of a series of vagrant acts was passed. These were also relatively mild in their provisions at first. Able-bodied mendicants were to be whipped until they were bloody, returned to their domicile, and there whipped until they put themselves to labor. But "as no labor was supplied, the legislation failed."[78] Accordingly, Parliament next tried the experiment of killing off the unemployed. By the second act of the series it was provided that vagrants were to be first mutilated and then hung as felons. In 1547, "The landowners held absolute power, and before they yielded to the burden of feeding the starving they seriously addressed themselves to the task of extermination. The preamble of the third act stated that in spite of the 'great travel' and 'godly statutes' of Parliament, pauperism had not diminished, therefore any vagrant brought before two justices was to be adjudged the slave of his captor for two years. He might be compelled to work by beating, chaining, or otherwise, be fed on bread and water, or refuse meat, and confined by a collar of iron about his neck. For his first attempt at escape his slavery became perpetual, for his second he was hanged." [79]

Measures of this sort could, of course, never be consistently enforced, nor could they remain permanently the nominal basis of social action. The next development of importance was the introduction of the principle of the workhouse, an institution for the refuge of the destitute, where employment might be provided for the able-bodied. This expedient became thoroughly imbedded in the English system of relief, and eventually willingness to enter the workhouse was made the criterion of the receipt of public assistance. This "workhouse test" rested upon the distinction between the two chief

methods of relief, "indoor" and "outdoor" relief, the significance of which will be considered a little later. This attitude of extreme severity toward the destitute was characteristic of English policy well into the eighteenth century. The laws of settlement, by which every individual was chargeable for relief upon the parish of his legal domicile, were an integral part of the relief system, and had a great influence in preventing the mobility of labor.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century the great wave of humanitarianism which swept over the nations of western Europe produced, among other effects, a revolutionary change in the character of the English poor laws. Instead of being treated as almost worse than criminals, the poor classes found themselves the object of great social solicitude and consideration. The law of settlement was set aside to the extent of allowing poor persons to be adopted into a parish by a two-thirds vote of the landholders. The workhouse test was abolished, and it was provided that work should be furnished to the able-bodied poor near their door. A little later the practice was introduced of making allowances for the poor according to a sliding scale depending upon the price of wheat and the size of the family. The industrious poor could receive aid in their homes in case of sickness. In case wages were inadequate, the balance necessary for support was to be made up from the public funds.

These laws are among the most remarkable examples of well-meant, but unscientifically conceived, legislation that the modern world has ever seen. If the veriest rudiments of social science had been included in the mental outfit of the lawmakers of the day, the results could easily have been foreseen. But social science

being almost non-existent, experience alone could demonstrate the results of these laws. The demonstration was appalling. With the removal of the economic check to large families and improvident marriages, the birth rate among the lower classes increased. Employers of labor took advantage of the new provisions to cut wages down to a lower and lower figure, and soothed their consciences (when necessary) by considering the extraordinary burden of the poor rates, which increased nearly threefold in seven years. The fact that these changes were contemporaneous with the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, when the working classes under the most favorable circumstances would have been hard put to it to hold their own, aggravated the evil consequences of the laws. It looked for a time as if the entire working population of England were in danger of pauperization. It was at just this time that Malthus wrote his famous Essay on Population, and it is not surprising that he took a decided stand against lax poor laws.

A definite attack upon the situation was undertaken by the Reform Parliament of 1832. A commission was appointed which went into the whole question with exemplary thoroughness. It was discovered that with the abandonment of the workhouse test, most of the able-bodied poor were being relieved in their homes, and that relief was usually given in the form of money. The workhouses had become practically asylums for the incapacitated. Some of them were in wretched repair, while others were more comfortable than the homes of the self-supporting. Faults were found to lie both in the law and its administration. An elaborate and inclusive program of reform was outlined, which has formed the basis of the poor relief system of England down to the

present. Prominent among the changes instituted were the restoration of the workhouse test and a more systematic and centralized administration. The law of settlement has been steadily liberalized, and different classes of dependents have been more and more segregated in separate institutions.

Among the relief systems of other nations, one of the most noteworthy is the so-called Elberfeld system, common in Germany, by which the administration of relief is intrusted to volunteer visitors, under official direction and control. Relief is usually given in money, on the theory that a poor family can spend money more advantageously than any one else can spend it for them. Abuses are guarded against by limiting the number of cases handled by each visitor to a maximum of four.

Poor relief in the United States. In the United States the burden of poor relief has been placed primarily upon the local governments, town or county. The systems of relief employed have followed in general the English pattern, but with a much wider use of outdoor relief proportionally. Pauperism has never been such a pressing problem in the United States as in the older European countries, because of the naturally high standard of living of the nation as a whole. In the early days, paupers were so few in number that it was much cheaper and more expedient to aid them in their own homes, or to board them out, than it was to build and maintain institutions for them. With increased density of population and the change from rural to urban economy, many almshouses have been built, but the bulk of the paupers of this country are still cared for outside of institutions. With only three or four notable exceptions, American cities still administer public outdoor relief.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century the states have assumed more and more of the oversight of relief through their boards of charities, etc.

Alongside of legal relief there has continued to exist the practice of private relief, administered by individuals or unofficial organizations in the interest of religion or common humanity. In some cases the tie between helper and helped is so close that there is no question of pauperism; in the majority of cases the pauperism is just as actual as when relief comes from public sources. Frequently no small rivalry exists between the official and unofficial agencies.

The desirability of different forms of relief. Leaving aside all the technical details of the organization of relief agencies and the administration of relief, two questions of large sociological importance stand out clearly. These are the relative merits of indoor and outdoor relief, on the one hand, and the merits of public and private relief on the other. As regards the problem of where relief shall be administered, it is generally admitted that outdoor relief, while usually preferred by those who are assisted, tends to be unscientific in character, to foster laziness and dependence, and to be abused. There is danger that it will be granted on insufficient grounds, and will come to be considered as a right. It is likely to be expensive and wasteful. Yet there are many cases, especially of temporary relief, where it is much preferable to the other method. Indoor relief, on the other hand, while economical, efficient, and not liable to abuse, tends to become mechanical, impersonal, and, at its worst, brutal. It loses much of the element of human fellowship and sympathy, and is likely to exclude many who need and deserve help most, but who shrink from institutional life.

As between public and private relief, it appears that public relief tends to be impersonal and stereotyped. It is likely to be regarded as a right by those in need, and to be administered as a routine duty by those in charge. Investigation is likely to be inadequate, and the entire administration unscientific. In democracies there is always the danger of the corrupting influence of politics, especially where there is no property qualification for voting. Private relief, on the other hand, while sympathetic and individualistic, is also likely to be unscientific and emotional. Under proper jurisdiction, however, there is much greater possibility and probability of adequate investigation, analysis, and diagnosis, and much closer adaptation of the type of relief to the needs of the individual case, than in public relief. Where private agencies undertake to manage institutions, there is always the danger of rivalry and duplication, and the temptation to make a better showing from the point of view of numbers than the funds in hand will warrant.

The present sentiment of social workers seems to be that none of these forms of relief should as yet be discarded, but that, as a general rule, outdoor relief should be abandoned by public agencies, and intrusted to unofficial agencies, whereas institutional relief should as far as possible be administered by the public through official representatives.

The experience of Brooklyn in abolishing public outdoor relief in 1879 furnishes a striking illustration of these principles. During the previous year, 46,000 persons had received public outdoor relief and 9706 public indoor relief. Notwithstanding the fact that the outdoor relief was discontinued at a stroke, the total number receiving indoor relief rose by less than 2000 for the next

six years, in spite of the growth of population, nor were the burdens of the private relief agencies increased. The saving to the city was very great, and yet the condition of the very poor showed actual improvement.[80]

Scientific treatment of destitution. Throughout the foregoing discussion, the assumption has been followed that the poor we have always with us, and that they must be helped. The type of help administered by practically all charitable agencies, public or private, has always been of the sort appropriately styled "relief." But within recent years clear thinkers have come to see that there is one sweeping criticism of the whole traditional system of relief, by whomsoever administered, viz. that it makes paupers. As long as a person or a family remain self-supporting, however destitute they may be, self-respect and character are left intact. But as soon as some one, on whom they have no natural claim, gives them material assistance, though their temporary situation is improved, yet they lose something of infinite value — they have become paupers. And even though the relationship is only transitory, yet the blemish remains, and the step over the line is vastly easier at the next period of hardship.

Consequently, within very recent years the conviction has become deeply seated that while extreme destitution must, of course, be relieved, yet real assistance to the poorer classes consists not in relief in the old sense, but in two new expedients; first, helping the poor to help themselves, without the contribution of any material goods; and second, preventing extreme destitution by prophylactic measures. On the basis of these two principles has grown up the modern Charity Organization movement. Its fundamental tenets are coöperation,

investigation, and prevention. At its best, its work is thoroughly scientific, and therefore efficient.

This movement had its origin in London in 1869, while the first society in the United States was organized in Buffalo in 1877. Since that time the movement has spread with great rapidity, until now every up-to-date city has some organization on the general plan. The typical Charity Organization Society aims to coördinate the work of the existing philanthropic agencies of the city, without taking the place of any of them, thereby avoiding duplication, overlapping, and waste. The staff of such an organization is usually composed of paid secretaries and office workers, and volunteer visitors.

The Charity Organization Society usually administers little, if any, direct relief. Its distinctive functions are investigation, diagnosis, and perhaps prescription. It treats each case of need as a distinct and individual problem. All possible facts are secured as to the causes and circumstances which affect the situation. Then a plan is worked out, aiming to relieve immediate distress, of course, but designed much more to bring the family back to the plane of comfortable self-support. The administration of direct relief is usually intrusted to the appropriate special agency.

This conception of "charity" at once solves the question as to who ought to receive relief. If relief takes the form, not of a dole of goods or money, but of assistance in establishing self-respecting independence, any one ought to receive relief who desires it, for it can do no harm. Pauperization cannot result from help of this sort. This also reveals the fallacy of the argument so often brought forward as a reason (or excuse) for not contributing to the support of Charity Organization Societies,

that too much of the money goes for administration, and not enough for "relief." If the Charity Organization Society could achieve its ideal, *none* of its money would go for "relief" in the ordinary sense.

Objections to scientific treatment. Many sympathetic and altruistic persons, however, feel a strong prejudice against organized charity on the ground that it is too mechanical and impersonal, and lacks the hand-to-hand touch of brotherliness that philanthropy ought really to have. There is no doubt that organized charity does stand in constant danger of becoming hard, stereotyped, and even cold blooded. But if properly safeguarded it will be less so than the old-fashioned methods. For, as mentioned above, the foundation principle of systematic charity is the individualization of each case, which can be achieved only on the basis of thorough investigation. Nothing could really be more a matter of routine than the habit of giving a dime or a quarter to a beggar on the street, or a cold hand-out to a tramp at the back door. At any rate, systematic and organized charity is the only kind which is scientific at the present day. Direct "benevolence" was legitimate and helpful in the days of which it could be said, "The essence of medieval society was that, in every manor, every one knew every thing about his neighbor," [81] and it is still justified where conditions of that sort prevail. In small villages, there may be a few poor families, known to every one, who will perhaps not be harmed, even if they are not much helped in the true sense, by the receipt of contributions from those who are really their friends. Possibly there is no better way for those who are well off to actually help the destitute, than to make real personal friends of one or two poor families, and give them the sort of assistance

which will be of positive benefit. But there are few who have the time, talent, or inclination for this sort of philanthropy, and, in general, the type of social relations which justify direct methods of charity are not characteristic of twentieth century life.

It is simply another instance of the complex and impersonal organization of modern life. No layman can possibly inform himself, regarding the conditions which surround all of those who apply to him for assistance, with sufficient thoroughness to enable him to administer scientific help. Without this, what he does may be no real help at all. As we have specialized in everything else, so we are forced to specialize in our benevolence. Division of labor has extended its dominion into the realm of charity, and sound relief can now be administered only by the trained expert. We may not like it, but we are compelled to accept it as a concomitant of the existing economic organization.

In the face of these facts, a common specious justification of haphazard giving stands unmasked. This is expressed in the saying, "I would rather help nine unworthy persons, than turn away one worthy person." There are two main faults to be found with this sentiment. In the first place, scientific practical sociologists no longer recognize as valid the distinction between the "worthy" and the "unworthy" poor. Any one who needs help is worthy of it. The help may take different forms. In one case it may consist of free sanitarium care for the husband, and a fresh air outing for the wife and children; in another, three months in jail for the father, the Keeley cure for the mother, and the reform school for the children. But if it is scientifically designed to bring the family back to normality, it is just as truly help, and just

as much merited, in one case as in the other. In the second place, it is a mistake to assume that under modern conditions indiscriminate giving is a help either to the "worthy" or the "unworthy." The only real help must rest upon a thorough investigation and expert diagnosis; failing this, impulsive relief is almost sure to do more harm than good, and is very likely to help to perpetuate the very evil it is designed to remedy.

There is still another group of thinkers who object to the entire practice of assistance to the handicapped on evolutionary grounds. It is asserted that by artificially prolonging the existence of the unfit, the operation of natural selection is checked, and the progress of the human species is hindered. The answer to this argument is furnished by pure sociology, which teaches that the evolution of the human race has for a long time proceeded, not on the basis of individual, but of societal competition, selection, and elimination. The present struggle is between forms of social organization, and in many cases the societal characteristics which conduce to the fitness and survival of the group are the very ones which lead men to protect and sustain their weaker fellows. Social solidarity and strength depend very largely upon the sentiments of sympathy, fellowship, consideration, and coöperation which are fostered by unselfish care of those who are unfit to maintain themselves in the competition of life. Furthermore, because of the intellectual character of societal evolution, it often happens that many who would be too weak to face unaided the battle of life, will nevertheless, if aided, be able to render inestimable service to their group.[82]

CHAPTER X

ECONOMIC MALADJUSTMENTS AND REMEDIES

Three special types of economic maladjustment. There are three great types of social maladjustment which, although included among the causes of destitution, are of too much importance to be treated merely as such. Their effects are varied and far-reaching. These are industrial injuries, unemployment, and crises or depressions.

Industrial injuries. Under the first head are included all injuries suffered by workers in the course of their employment, and as a result or accompaniment of their employment. There are three main types, deterioration, disease, and accident. By industrial deterioration is meant the general wearing down or weakening which results from employment, but does not take the form of any specific disease or injury. Its result is to lower health or efficiency or both. It may arise from a variety of causes, including bad sanitary conditions in factories or workshops, too long hours, too long retention of one position, either sitting or standing, bad positions (stooping, reaching, etc.), too much monotony, etc.

One of the most serious forms of deterioration is overfatigue or exhaustion. This subject is receiving much attention of late. Scientific investigation has revealed the fact that bodily fatigue is due to the accumulation of poisons in the system. These poisons are the by-products of exertion, the wastes resulting from the

chemical changes which take place in the bodily cells as an accompaniment of muscular effort. These toxic agents are normally excreted by various organs, the lungs, kidneys, pores, etc. But the process takes time, and in ordinary forms of work the body cannot dispose of the fatigue poisons as fast as they are formed. Consequently, periods of rest must intervene between the periods of work. If these rest periods are of sufficient length, all of the poisons accumulated during the preceding period of work will be disposed of, and the worker will begin the next period of labor with renewed vigor and efficiency. But if the period of rest is too short, or, conversely, if the period of labor is too long, the body will not be able to throw off the poisons, so that the worker will begin the next period of labor with some poison still in his system. If this situation is regular, the effects of fatigue become cumulative, the poisons are stored up in the system, and produce a progressive decline in efficiency.

Thus the evils of unduly long hours are much more serious than merely the extended irksomeness of labor, or the reduced period for recreation. For the employer they mean an inefficient working force, much bad work, and many interruptions and injuries to the machinery. To the laborer, they mean a constantly diminishing productiveness, and therefore a lessened earning power. The liability to industrial accident is also largely increased by fatigue.

These facts explain what seemed for so long a time like an economic paradox, viz., that the shortening of the working day, within limits, results in a diminution neither of product nor of profits, and in some cases in an increase of both. Mention has been made above of the

long working day which established itself as the normal condition in the early years of the factory system. The reduction in these hours was brought about in the first instance not by the play of economic forces, but by the demands of humanitarianism. It was believed, even by some of its advocates, that it would strike a serious blow to the industries where it was first applied, *i.e.* the textile industries in England (in spite of the fact that Robert Owen had demonstrated the contrary some years before in his own factory). Extremists thought that it meant the practical ruin of the entire industry. Yet experience proved that, with few exceptions, profits were not diminished, and in some cases were increased. It has been a general rule, down to the present day, that actual reductions of hours in various industries have proved to the advantage of the employer as well as the laborer. Yet these changes have invariably met with great opposition. They have usually been empirical, in the lack of reliable data upon which to base them, and various economic theories — the labor theory of value, and the Marxian last-hour theory of profit, for instance — have stood in their way. Employers are likely to think that for their own industry, at least, in their own day, the shortening of hours has reached its justifiable limit. There is, of course, no way of telling just how far this reduction of working time might be carried without interfering with production. No test has yet been devised except experience. Doubtless it differs in different industries. There is a general sentiment among a number of agitators that Nature has fixed eight hours as the proper working day — eight hours for labor, eight hours for recreation, eight hours for sleep. Up to the present, only in Australasia has the eight-hour day

become general. In the light of these facts, it is easy to understand why these changes have had to be accomplished almost invariably by legal means. Because of the nature of individualistic competition, noted above (page 50), well-intentioned employers could not undertake to do what, according to current opinion, meant disaster or ruin.

Industrial diseases occur in connection with a large number of modern industrial processes, and take a wide variety of forms. Prominent among them are diseases resulting from occupation in the chemical industries, particularly those using lead, phosphorus, lacquer, etc., and from the dusty trades, such as the textiles, mining, grinding of various sorts, etc. The United States Bureau of Labor, in one of its bulletins,[83] publishes a list of fifty-four distinct industrial poisons, some of which have several subdivisions. It is needless to attempt to enumerate all the forms of industrial disease which exist. One of the most striking examples of the nature and origin of industrial disease, and the possibilities and means of eliminating it, is furnished by the history of "phossy jaw" in the United States. This is a disease which attacks workers in the phosphorus match industry. It has been practically legislated out of existence by a remarkable combination of public spirit on the part of a corporation which owned a valuable patent, an awakened conscience on the part of the general public, and a somewhat tardy, but eventually effective, response on the part of the lawmakers. It is worthy of note, in passing, that one of the arguments soberly advanced by a congressman against legally favoring the new safety match was that it would not strike on the seat of the trousers;[84] and also, that the thing which finally settled the question in the minds

of the congressional committee was the appearance before them of an actual sufferer from "phossy jaw," his face horribly disfigured by the disease.

Many diseases, not exclusively industrial, are often industrial in their origin. Thus consumption is frequently caused or aggravated by participation in dusty trades. The relative amount of consumption among workers in various forms of dusty trades has been stated as follows: in metallic dust, 28.0; mineral dust, 25.2; mixed dust, 22.6; animal dust, 20.8; vegetable dust, 13.3; while in the non-dusty trades it is 11.1.[85] For this, and other obvious reasons, it is impossible to arrive at an accurate estimate of the prevalence of industrial diseases.

Industrial accidents are the sudden, violent injuries received in the course of occupation. They occur in a wide variety of forms, and in connection with many different industries. Certain occupations, however, are marked by such frequent accidents as to have become known as dangerous trades. Foremost among them are railroading, mining, working in foundries and powder mills, etc. Some occupations combine liability to industrial disease and industrial accident. Such, for instance, is coal mining, where the danger is both from dust and from falls of rock or explosions. No accurate statistics exist of the number of industrial accidents in the United States, but it has been estimated that the total number reaches half a million a year.[86]

All of these forms of industrial injury are to be classed as maladjustments because they arise in connection with the natural, easiest, and cheapest methods of carrying on certain industrial processes, and therefore are sure to appear when the play of economic forces, in a competi-

tively organized society, is left unhampered by any form of social control. Because of the tendency, noted above (page 50), for methods of industry to gravitate toward the standard set by the least socially minded of the efficient producers, it follows that those employers of labor, whose humanitarianism would lead them to maintain better conditions in their plants, are economically powerless to do so without some social support. Accordingly, in every progressive society, an increasing number of these injurious conditions are taken out of the category of maladjustments, and are made crimes. The legislative measures providing for the proper sanitation of workshops and factories, the ventilation of mines, the guarding of machinery, the installation of safety devices on railroads, the proper handling of poisonous substances, etc., are very numerous and inclusive. And no fault is found with them by any one, except those who would naturally prefer private profit to social soundness. It is to be noted further that these measures do not eliminate competition, but fix a certain plane below which competition may not take place.

Unemployment and crises. Unemployment must be considered as one of the permanent factors in the life of the modern workingman. Reliable figures are wanting as to the amount or extent of unemployment in the United States. Some of the estimates are at least startling, if not wholly trustworthy. Certainly unemployment looms large enough to make it a matter of the greatest moment to the wage-earning classes, and to society in general. It is the exceptional worker, in whatever trade, who does not experience some unemployment during the year, ranging all the way from a few days or weeks to six months or more.

Unemployment may be defined as forced or involuntary abstention from remunerative labor during normal working time. It would obviously be incorrect to class under this head the idleness of laborers while on a strike of their own making, or that of the laborer who wishes to work ten hours a day when the legal working day is eight hours.

The causes of unemployment may be broadly divided into personal and social, which is another way of saying that unemployment is partly incapacity and partly maladjustment. In many cases the incapacity traces back to immorality on the part of the individual, but in every case of real unemployment the proximate personal cause is incapacity, since the individual wishes to work and cannot. The specific forms of incapacity which lead to unemployment are virtually the same as those which lead to destitution, since unemployment and destitution are almost interchangeable terms.

The present-day tendency is undoubtedly to emphasize the importance of the social causes of unemployment rather than the personal. As has been observed, much unemployment which seems to be due to the weakness of the individual is really traceable to some social derangement. Both general and particular conditions are found among the social causes of unemployment. It appears to be true that the very conditions of modern production tend to give a certain periodicity to enterprise, and therefore to employment. The same forces which from time to time eventuate in crises or depressions, at all times are causing business activity to wax and wane; the interrelation between crises and that portion of unemployment which may be called maladjustment is undoubtedly

very close. It would be out of place in this connection to seek to examine and analyze the causes of the cyclical nature of modern industry. This is a problem which is receiving earnest attention from many of the foremost economists of the day. To recognize that the same forces, in part at least, lie back of both crises and unemployment is to add another incentive to the solution of the problem and the search for a remedy.

Among the particular conditions which cause unemployment some apply to special industries. Foremost in this category stand what are known as the seasonal trades. Some trades are seasonal because they depend directly upon climatic changes, such as agriculture, forestry, construction work, etc. Others are seasonal because they follow fashions which vary with the seasons; such are tailoring, millinery, the fur, flower, and feather trades, etc. Still others are seasonal because of certain social institutions which are localized at given points in the calendar, though independent of the weather or the climate. The most striking example under this head is the Holiday Season in Christian countries, and all the occupations which are affected by it — clerks in department stores, workers in candy and paper box factories, employees of express companies, etc. But whatever the nature of seasonal unemployment, there is no question that it is very widespread and works great hardship to the wage earners. Even if it were true that the total yearly income in such trades amounted to fifty-two weeks' pay at fair rates — and this seldom is true — nevertheless the moral effect upon the wage earner of such a fluctuating income is far from good, and there is a tendency to extravagance during "flush" times, and a neglect to provide for the slack season.

It is unnecessary to discuss in detail the effects of unemployment — they are obvious enough. A class of people with so narrow a margin between income and necessities as the modern wage earning class must inevitably suffer great hardship from periods when income ceases partly or altogether. It should be recalled, in passing, that one of the most deplorable results of the extreme and protracted periods of unemployment such as accompany our great crises and depressions is the forcing of many previously independent and self-respecting families over the line into pauperism.

As regards the remedies for unemployment, no very great progress can yet be claimed. In spite of all the study and effort which have been devoted to the subject in recent years the evil appears to be on the increase rather than the reverse. The general causes are too deep-seated and too intricately bound up with the entire economic fabric to offer much hope for the adequacy of any specific measure. Some slight gains may no doubt be accomplished by such measures as improved systems of employment agencies, schemes for "dove-tailing" occupations, etc. Particularly noteworthy are the efforts of storekeepers to tide over dull seasons by variously denominated sales, such as the January White Sales. But granting all possible to remedies of this type, it must be admitted that unemployment in its broad outlines is one of those problems the solution of which lies in the future.

Revolutionary remedies. All of the plans or schemes for betterment in the economic field which have been mentioned thus far belong to the specific type of remedy. Each aims at some particular economic evil, and proposes to correct it without altering the general economic

organization of society. There remain to be considered schemes for economic reform of the revolutionary type, of which there are two of importance, Socialism and Syndicalism.

Socialism. Of the various definitions and conceptions of socialism which are to be found in the current discussions of the topic, that which is most consistent, and most nearly expresses the real spirit of the movement, is "the government ownership of the means of production." In the minds of many persons, socialism involves the equal distribution of wealth, or the abolition of private property; in the minds of others it is synonymous with communism, or even with anarchism. All of these conceptions miss the mark more or less widely.

Socialism is the one measurably consistent program before the world to-day which rests upon the conviction that the evils which are so manifest in the economic field are inherent in the very nature of the modern economic organization, and hence can be eliminated only by entirely remodeling that organization. In the view of socialism, the low standard of living of the working classes, the unequal distribution of wealth, the exploitation of the weak, the high cost of the necessaries of life, the worker's lack of interest in his product, etc., are all traceable directly to the individualistic-capitalistic organization of society. Consequently, any efforts to remedy these evils which leave this organization intact are foredoomed to failure. The only way to introduce real economic reform is to abolish either capitalism or individualism. Many speakers and writers, even among socialists, using words loosely, talk as though socialism proposed to abolish capitalism. This idea, however, is very far from the truth. Practical socialism recog-

nizes that capitalism has come to stay, since the advantages it offers in the production of wealth are too great to be dispensed with. The thing to be abolished is individualism, in so far as it is associated with the use of capital. Most, if not all, of the serious evils of capitalism arise from the fact that productive capital is held by private individuals, who utilize it on the basis of competition and private profit. If all productive capital belonged to society, all motive for competition would vanish, and all the profit accruing from the use of capital would be for the benefit of society in general. It is to be carefully noted that socialism does not contemplate the abolition of all private ownership of wealth, but only of that portion of wealth which is capital in the strict sense, *i.e.* is utilized not for the immediate gratification of human desires, but for the production of more wealth. Socialism will allow individuals to own houses, jewels, automobiles, steamboats, and even some land. But none of these things may be put to productive uses, that is, not a cent's worth of wealth may ever come to the individual because of his ownership of these things. The only rewards which society will give to individuals will be in return for services rendered. Consequently, the only way a man may become relatively wealthy will be by saving instead of spending. The possibilities of accumulating a fortune in this manner are evidently strictly limited as compared with the present system, under which a man may acquire indefinite wealth by investing.

Thus socialism, in its conception of economic problems, and in its point of attack on them, is strictly logical and consistent. It is the only plan, worthy of serious consideration, which proposes to alter the present highly

undesirable balance of power as between manhood and money. Under socialism, the mere ownership of wealth would not enable an individual to live a life of comfort and luxury as it does now. The economic power of men and of classes would rest not upon what they owned, but upon what they did and were. Moderate socialists are not so much aggrieved by the sight of men receiving rich rewards in consideration of exceptional ability, industry, and efficiency, as of other men who enjoy even greater privileges simply because a certain amount of wealth stands in their names.

Socialism, furthermore, is the only plan which offers a means of counteracting the forces which tend to keep the cost of necessaries high, while the cost of luxuries declines relatively. If all productive capital belonged to society it would be used to produce those things most desired by society, and since, under socialism, the will of the majority would rule, the things produced would be those most desired by the masses of the people. The things that everybody wants * would be abundant and cheap, while those wanted only by a few would be scarce and dear. Under socialism, also, all the undesirable conditions which result from the use of capital by individual owners, competitively seeking private profits, would automatically disappear.

It is clear, then, that in what it seeks to accomplish, socialism has much to recommend it in the eyes of any impartial student of society. From the point of view of abstract social justice, it would certainly seem desirable that remuneration should depend rather upon service than upon the ownership of wealth. Socialism offers vulnerable points of attack not with respect to what it

* Using "want" in the sense of effective demand.

aims at, but with respect to the means it offers for hitting the mark. If the ends desired by socialism could be achieved without the sacrifice of any of the advantages connected with the present system, almost every unbiased person would be a socialist. But when we come to examine the practical program offered by socialism, it is found to be weak and inadequate in countless details. And socialism is emphatically one of those things of which it has been said, "the details are everything."

The primary fact to be borne in mind in the consideration of all schemes of a socialistic nature is that the existing individualistic-capitalistic system is the product of countless ages of social evolution. It has proved itself superior by the infallible tests of trial and experience, and has survived up to the present time because it is the fittest system of wealth-production which human society has yet devised. While it does not follow that it is, therefore, the best system now, and for all time to come, yet the burden of proof rests strongly upon those who have a substitute to offer. Before the advocates of a new type of economic organization can expect people in general to give it their practical support, they must have a plan worked out which absolutely guarantees a marked improvement over the system which exists, and which we know, in its bad points as well as its good ones.

Without attempting a detailed examination of the weak points in the practical program of socialism, suffice it to mention only a few of the more vital ones. By what means is society to become the possessor of all existing capital, which, at the present time, belongs to private individuals through long centuries of socially conferred rights? When all capital is the property of society, how is the labor upon this capital to be appor-

tioned among the members of society? Who are to be the poets, musicians, and railroad managers, and who the glass-blowers, stokers, and garbage-collectors? In what person, or body of persons, is the control of industry to be vested, and how are they to be selected? How is labor, under socialism, to be prevented from developing into a system of virtual state slavery? What is to take the place, as an incentive to the exertion of the individual's best efforts, of the present rewards of industry? How is invention to be stimulated, and industrial progress assured?

To these questions, and a hundred others like them, socialism offers only vague, inconsistent, and unsatisfactory answers. There is no general agreement among leading socialists, and no concrete and complete plan ready for adoption. Until there is, socialism must remain what it is now, a highly suggestive, important, and promising body of doctrines and theories, but not a practical program for reorganizing society. It is worthy of the most attentive and sympathetic consideration and study, but not of adoption as a scheme of life.

There are abundant indications that the near future will see some far-reaching limitations of the social prerogatives and privileges attaching to the mere ownership of wealth, and an extension of the recognition of service as a basis for social remuneration. But just what form these limitations will take, or by what means they will be accomplished, it is as yet much too early to predict.

Syndicalism. The Syndicalist movement originated in France, and has spread to Sweden, Italy, England, and other portions of Europe. In the United States the movement is represented by the I.W.W. — popularly interpreted as "I Won't Work" or "I Won't Wash," but

legitimately standing for Industrial Workers of the World. This organization (if such it can be called) originated in Colorado in connection with the strike of the Western Federation of Miners in 1903. Its leaders were ignorant of Syndicalism in France, and the two movements are independent as regards origin, but they represent so closely the same body of thought and the same social program that they are recognized as parts of the same general movement.

If the program of socialism is incomplete and inconsistent, that of syndicalism is chaotic, anarchical, and vicious. The line of argument followed by the syndicalists is about as follows: All wealth is produced by labor, and therefore belongs to labor. At the present time, however, it is held by a few capitalists, who, having had no original claim upon it, may be considered to have stolen it. Therefore, capitalists have no present rights to wealth which call for consideration, and labor is justified in taking it by any desired means. The method by which labor is to become the possessor of capital is the following: All laborers are to be organized into unions vertically or on the basis of industries, instead of horizontally or on the basis of trades, as under the present system of trade unionism. Thus every industry will be a unit as regards the affiliation of the laborers engaged in it. These industrial unions are then to be organized into national bodies, and finally into one great international organization, and when the time is ripe they will simply take over all capital, and run it themselves and for their own profit. The method by which capital is to be seized is the general strike. At the appointed time all laborers will cease work. Since capital, without labor, is of no use, all the capital of the world will at

once become valueless, and there will be nothing to prevent labor from taking it up and operating it for the benefit of labor.

While waiting for the great day to come, syndicalists employ themselves in practicing various means of reducing the value of existing capital by cutting down the profits of the owner. The devices by which this result is accomplished go under the general name of "sabotage," and are of a high degree of ingenuity. Anything which will interfere with the smooth running of industry, without seriously endangering the hold of the syndicalist upon his job, is employed. As one syndicalist orator said, "You are treated like dirt — put a little dirt in your work." This is done literally as well as figuratively. Sand is mixed with the grease before it is put upon the bearings of the machine, short circuits are created in expensive electrical installations, a monkey-wrench is dropped into a complicated mechanism, and car-load shipments are addressed to the wrong city. A very original method employed by some clerks in stores is to tell potential customers the exact truth about the goods they are inspecting. Syndicalists have gone so far as to issue textbooks in the fine art of sabotage.

Some attempts have also been made to carry out general strikes on a limited scale, particularly in France, Sweden, and Italy. As general strikes, most of these have failed, though a strike conducted in Italy in the summer of 1914 is said to have revealed an extraordinary degree of organized power on the part of labor.[87]

Syndicalism is evidently to be regarded as a symptom of discontent, and a protest against existing conditions, rather than as a serious plan for social reorganization. In its encouragement of lawlessness and disregard of

the rights of others it contains the germs of its own destruction. For the only basis upon which such a scheme would have the slightest possibility of success would be a membership thoroughly trained in co-operation, and imbued with the highest regard for the interests of others, and respect for the will of the majority.[88] Syndicalism has never achieved great proportions numerically, even in France. Like the bubbles on the surface of a stagnant pool, it may be easily brushed aside, but none the less is of importance as indicating a fermentation going on beneath the surface.

CHAPTER XI

THE PRINCIPLES OF POPULATION GROWTH

Importance of reproduction. The reproduction of human beings is just as essential to the continued life of society as nutrition and the building up of cells are to the continued existence of the individual. Accordingly, the desire which leads to reproduction may justly be regarded, from the social point of view, as equally important and fundamental with the desire which leads to taking food. Self-maintenance and self-perpetuation are the basic interests of all human societies. The social forms and institutions connected with the growth of population are scarcely second to those connected with the economic life, as regards their influence in determining other social characteristics.

Population policies. From the very dawn of civilization, societies have recognized the importance of the growth of population, and have given some attention to the means by which growth is secured and to the institutions which arise in connection with it. Every society has, and always has had, its more or less definitely formulated population policy. The nature of this policy depends upon the character of the factors which condition the life of each society. Most important and determinative among these factors are the economic conditions. Following these come military, dynastic, and religious considerations. Generally speaking, a

society which is favorably situated for the struggle for existence, whose problem of self-maintenance is simple, will exhibit a population policy favorable to the increase of numbers; while a society whose habitat is unfavorable, and whose means of subsistence are strictly limited, will present a code of rules and a set of mores calculated to keep population down to a minimum. The former types of society will be characterized by such features as polygamy, early marriage, and solicitude for the life of infants; the latter type by polyandry, infanticide, and exposure of infants.

These primary adaptations are profoundly modified by other considerations. If a society lives on terms of perpetual hostility with near neighbors, so that many lives are lost in battle, and social survival is dependent upon success in war, then military considerations become weighty enough to cause the adoption of a positive population policy, even at the expense of a lowered standard of living. Again, if the type of government is monarchical or despotic, so that state interests center in the king and his immediate circle, all the common people being regarded as merely sources of wealth and power, a strong incentive is added to the maintenance of a state policy of rapid increase. Finally, most religions have favored a rapid multiplication of their adherents, partly because of the influence of ancestor-worship, partly because of the natural impulse of every religious body to increase the numbers of its followers, partly, perhaps, because many religions owe some of their characteristics to an early veneration of the reproductive forces of man and Nature.

Whatever the reasons, the fact is that, down to the present time, most societies at most times have in-

clined toward the encouragement of multiplication, so much so that the belief is well established and traditional that the welfare of a nation demands an increasing population, and that national progress is almost mathematically proportioned to the rate of multiplication. A nation which, like modern France, exhibits a practically stationary population is alarmed thereby and is viewed by other nations with commiseration, not unmingled with suspicion or even reproach. The duty of fecundity has been impressed upon people by the various agencies which shape public opinion until it has become thoroughly ingrained in the mind of the masses, and a married couple who bring a large number of children into the world are regarded as social benefactors, while a couple who have few or no children are considered to have failed in their obligation to God and mankind.

Not until relatively recent years have consistent efforts been made to place population policies on a rational and scientific basis. From time to time, for several centuries past, philosophers have sought, with the best means at their hand, to reason out the principles which determine the relation between population and national prosperity. But their efforts have been mostly little better than gropings in the dark, and, until the end of the eighteenth century, made little impress upon the public mind, and still less upon public policy. For the most part, the interests of a despotic and militaristic governing class have prevailed. The common people have been made to believe that their highest duty was to be in fact just what their masters considered them — breeders of men to be food for powder.

The Malthusian doctrine. The scientific study of population virtually dates from Malthus. It is true that

practically every one of the principles expounded by Malthus had been enunciated, sometimes with great clearness and consistency, long before his time.[89] But he was the first to combine them into a complete and coherent system, to back them up with an abundance of facts, and to present them in a manner impressive to any intelligent reader. Furthermore, he had the inestimable advantage of launching his theories at a time when social conditions afforded them ample support, and the public mind was prepared, in part at least, to receive them.

From the time when it was first made public, the Malthusian theory of population has furnished the background for all discussions of population questions, and a knowledge of the essentials of the Malthusian system is necessary for the understanding and solution of the problems of the growth of population.

Thomas R. Malthus was the son of an English clergyman, and was himself educated for the church. During the time of his young manhood, the question of the perfectibility of human society was prominently in the minds of social philosophers, and between the younger Malthus and his father many spirited discussions took place as to the possibility of achieving a universally happy state of human society, the older man taking the stand that such a result was possible of accomplishment, the younger man vigorously opposing this view. As T. R. Malthus himself confessed, many arguments were used by him in the first instance merely to support his position which upon subsequent study were found to be even sounder than he had supposed. The result of these discussions was the Essay on the Principle of Population, first given to the public in 1798. This work

ran through many editions subsequently, and was amplified and enlarged, but its essentials remained unchanged.

The Malthusian theory of population may be very briefly summarized as follows: The physiological possibilities of increase of the human species are very considerable, and in general tend to follow the principles of a geometrical ratio. No demonstration has ever been given as to what the possible rate of increase is, but it is a conservative estimate that the human race is physiologically capable, under favorable conditions, of doubling every twenty years. A rate nearly as high as this was maintained for several decades in the American Colonies and the youthful United States. It may be affirmed, then, that mankind *tends* to increase at a geometrical ratio. Actual population, however, depends, not only upon births, but upon the maintenance of those born. The necessity for food is a basic human fact. Unless food can be made to increase at a rate equal to the potential increase of mankind, population cannot grow at its maximum rate. An examination of the actual conditions governing the production of food leads to the conclusion that food does not, and cannot be made to, increase at a geometrical ratio. The maximum possibilities of increase of food could not exceed an arithmetical ratio. It may be stated then that food cannot be made to increase by more than an arithmetic ratio.*

* It should be noted that Malthus did not say, and took especial pains not to say, that food does increase, or tend to increase, at an arithmetical ratio. He adopted the arithmetical ratio as expressing a liberal maximum rate of increase under existing conditions. A misconception of this portion of his argument accounts for much of the criticism of Malthus' system. The facts are, of course, that the principles of increase

Now it is a simple mathematical principle that when two correlated quantities are increasing, one at a geometric ratio and the other at an arithmetic ratio, the former will very speedily outstrip the latter, however nearly equal they may be at the beginning, or even if

of mankind and of food are essentially the same. The food of man consists of plants and animals, and since all animals either live on plants, or on other animals which live on plants, it is accurate to say that the food of man, in the final analysis, comes from plants, and is therefore conditioned upon the increase of plants. The *tendency* of plants, just as truly as of man, is to increase at a geometrical ratio, and a ratio much higher than doubling every twenty years. The inadequacy of the increase of plants to meet human needs is explained by two considerations. First, the plants got here first. Long before man appeared, plants had been increasing for countless milleniums, and had reached the maximum quantity supportable upon the earth as it was. The possible increase of plants was already put under the severest limitations by natural conditions. In short, the world was as full of plants as it could hold when man appeared. All that man could do was to avail himself of those plants which existed of an edible sort, or else to substitute edible for non-edible plants, or, finally, to use his growing intelligence in improving the edibility and yield of various species of plants. All of these methods partake of the nature of addition, and man has gone on *adding* to his food supply down to the present time. The second consideration is that in all this discussion of population we automatically take an anthropocentric point of view. Man is regarded as the center of creation, and all other species as materials for his needs. Hence, his *tendency* to increase is regarded as the only one worthy of consideration. In order to make this clear, imagine a primitive group of men subsisting almost entirely upon reindeer, which in turn live upon moss. We could say, then, that the tendency of moss is to increase at a geometrical ratio, but that it is checked by the natural conditions of soil and climate; the tendency of reindeer is to increase at a geometrical ratio, but it is checked by the increase of moss; and that the tendency of man is to increase at a geometrical ratio, but that it is checked by the increase of reindeer. Suppose further that the same region was inhabited by a species of cave bear which fed principally upon human beings. The cave bear philosopher would be perfectly justified in saying that the tendency of cave bears is to increase at a geometrical ratio, but it is checked by the possibility of increasing the human species, which cannot be expected to grow at more than an arithmetical ratio.

the latter vastly exceeds the former at the start. Consequently, there is no possibility that, over long periods of time, man can increase his food supply rapidly enough to realize his own maximum potentialities of increase. At the time when Malthus wrote, there was very little margin of food supply over the needs of the common people. Suppose, he said, that during the next twenty years the amount of food could be increased by an amount equal to that now produced. During those two decades, then, population could double with no loss in comfort. But during the next twenty years, the increment in food would be the same as before, while the possible increase in population would be double the previous increase. The proportions at the three periods would be 1 : 1, 2 : 2, 3 : 4.

If there were no impulse driving man to increase as nearly at the maximum rate as possible, the growth of population might adapt itself to the increase of food, and there need be no hardship. The fact is, however, that the reproductive instinct is a very powerful force, apparently just as strong now as at any previous period in man's history, impelling human beings to increase up to the maximum limit set by their conditions. Consequently there arises a *pressure* of population upon subsistence, and the food supply appears as an insuperable barrier, constantly restraining population within fixed limits. Whenever the food supply is increased, the rate of growth of population at once accelerates correspondingly, so that there is no more food per capita than before. It is this fact which puts all Utopias into the class of unattainable dreams.

Since subsistence thus sets the limit upon the growth of population, there must be some specific means by

which this restraint is effected. Malthus enumerated these means under the head of what he designated as checks. These checks are of two sorts, positive and preventive. The positive checks are those which increase the death rate, such as war, pestilence, famine, disease, vice, etc. The preventive checks are those which decrease the birth rate, such as celibacy, deferred marriage, and also vice. Both of these sorts of checks involve misery, but the former much greater misery than the latter. Positive checks, however, will inevitably come into operation unless men utilize the preventive checks. As long as the need of food remains, and the instinct of reproduction persists, the life of man is bound to be marred by suffering. It is for man to choose whether it shall be the extreme suffering involved in the positive checks, or the moderate suffering necessitated by the preventive checks.

Every society in time strikes a balance between these forces, and settles upon a general per capita amount of subsistence which is regarded as normal in that society. This constitutes the standard of living, which comes to have immense inertia, and to operate as one of the constant factors in the problem of population. If improved economic conditions offer a society the opportunity either of increasing its population or raising its standard of living, the chance is usually seized by the principle of population; numbers increase with no appreciable improvement in the standard. If, on the other hand, adverse conditions demand retrenchment somewhere, means are generally found to diminish the rate of growth of population, while the standard of living remains about the same. Exceptions to the foregoing rule are furnished

by cases of very profound and sudden change. If such changes are of sufficient extent, the opportunities they offer, or the losses they necessitate, will be too great to be offset by immediate changes in the rate of growth of population. Then there will occur positive improvement or deterioration, respectively, in the standard of living.

The most remarkable case recorded in history of an extensive and sudden opportunity offered to the human race is that of the combination of the discovery of America and the Industrial Revolution. These two circumstances, together, offered a chance for improvement to the nations of western civilization such as had never been known before. The opportunity was too great to be completely absorbed by an increase in the rate of growth of population. Such an increase, indeed, took place, and the population of the western world multiplied at a rate unparalleled within recorded history. Nevertheless a portion of the newly acquired means of subsistence still remained, and afforded the ground for the noteworthy rise in the standard of living of western nations which marked the nineteenth century. There can be little doubt that, if the men of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had possessed sufficient knowledge and control of social forces to restrict the growth of population in the most advantageous way, the tremendous opportunity in question might have been made to yield much more gain in the standard of living than has actually occurred. Such a condition was, of course, quite impossible, and we of the twentieth century have reason to congratulate ourselves that as much advance in the standard of living was achieved as we are enjoying.

Two great factors which condition the growth of population, as has just been shown, are land and the standard of living. It is doubtful if any considerable increase in population has ever been accounted for by a decline in the general standard of living, so that, as far as these two factors are concerned, the increase in the numbers of the human species since its origin has been made possible by an extension of human control over new areas of land. There remains, however, a third factor, which, at the present time at least, is by far the most important means by which the growth of population is achieved without a lowering — often with an actual improvement — of the standard of living. This factor is man's mastery of the forces of nature, by which the native resources of the earth are made to yield ever more and greater utilities for man's enjoyment. The history of civilization has been a history of the steady increase in the number of human beings who could be supported on a given area of the earth's surface, because of the greater efficiency with which man has been able to utilize the materials of nature. The degree of success which any society has achieved in this process is commonly designated as "the stage of the arts." The Malthusian theory is therefore commonly summed up in the sentence: "Population tends to increase up to the supporting power of the environment on a given standard of living and a given stage of the arts."

Modifications in the Malthusian theory. Some few modifications in the statement of the Malthusian theory (which do not, however, affect any of the principles involved) have been necessitated by the social changes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Among these

modifications is the recognition of what are called the "institutional" checks upon the growth of population, such as the education and general emancipation of woman, the demands of life in "society," the extended period of male education, etc. Much more significant, however, is the increased importance accorded to voluntary post-marital limitation of births. Malthus paid relatively little attention to this factor. His practical advice was mainly limited to counseling young people, especially young men, to wait about getting married until they were sure that they were prepared properly to support whatever family might come. Malthus, like most people of his day, considered that the size of the family, after marriage, was a matter for which responsibility rested with the Lord.

Neo-Malthusianism. It was not long after the promulgation of Malthus's doctrines, however, before people began to make an application of them which he had not anticipated, and probably would have deprecated. The line of argument was that inasmuch as celibacy or long-deferred marriage was a cause of misery, it would add a great deal to the total amount of happiness if "prudential restraint" were exercised, not in deferring marriage, but in delaying the appearance of children after marriage. It was claimed that much vice and immorality would also be obviated in this way. All that was needed was to spread broadcast knowledge of the means of preventing conception, knowledge which could readily be secured from France. Once let this information become general, and young people could then avail themselves of all the pleasures of married life, except the enjoyment of children, without adding anything to the undue pressure of population upon subsistence. These ideas were

perfectly logical, and societies were at once formed for their promulgation, and numerous tracts and booklets began to be circulated, purporting to furnish complete moral justification for the plan advocated, and giving detailed descriptions of various methods of preventing conception. Of course this movement aroused a storm of opposition, and the doctrines, which came to be called "Neo-Malthusianism," were bitterly attacked from many quarters, particularly the religious. Nevertheless, the ideas embodied in Neo-Malthusianism made a strong appeal to those intelligent enough to grasp them, and the dissemination of these doctrines has continued down to the present day. While there is no way of knowing exactly how widely voluntary restriction of births, by one means or another, is practiced in modern families, the prevailing opinion is that it is almost universal in the upper walks of life, and is rapidly spreading throughout the lower strata of society. Certainly Neo-Malthusian practices constitute a very powerful and important addition to the preventive checks enumerated by Malthus.

The four factors of social progress. As has been observed above, human progress is largely the product of the operation of the four great factors: population, land, standard of living, and stage of the arts. The interplay of influence among these four factors is so complete that any one may be considered as a resultant of the other three. If the standard of living is under discussion, population, land, and the stage of the arts are regarded as determining factors; if the question uppermost is population, then the other three are considered as causes. The justification for regarding land, and the stage of the arts, as results of the other three

factors, respectively, is less obvious; yet there is no doubt that the arts progress only on the basis of a favorable conjuncture of population, land, and standard of living, while the amount of land *available to human society* is also determined by population, standard of living, and the stage of the arts. The greatest single addition ever made to the land utilized by Occidental society was the discovery of America. This achievement resulted from a growing pressure of population in Europe, the development of the arts of navigation, food preservation, etc., and an existing standard of living high enough to provide the necessary equipment for the expedition.

The antagonism between population and the standard of living. From the point of view of practical social policy, however, the problem virtually resolves itself into the question as to whether emphasis is to be laid on population, or on the standard of living. As far as land is concerned, there is little prospect of any further material increases; the gains made by drainage, irrigation, etc., are relatively negligible; such gains, moreover, are logically to be credited to the industrial arts, not to increase in land. The stage of the arts, on the other hand, offers unlimited possibilities of advance, and demands every possible support and assistance. The gains made in land, and in the stage of the arts, however, are both positive, and are not won at the expense of loss anywhere else. But between population and the standard of living there is a natural and ineradicable antagonism. Other things being equal, population can be increased only by lowering the standard of living, and the standard of living can be raised only at the expense of population. The single general

exception to this rule is furnished by the case of new societies, composed of small groups of people with an advanced mastery of the industrial arts, set down in a thinly populated, or uninhabited, and undeveloped environment. Then, for a time, increases in population are a positive advantage, and raise the general standard of living, because they make possible a better organization of production, and a fuller utilization of technical knowledge and ability. A familiar example, on a large scale, is furnished by the early history of the Thirteen American Colonies. Similar conditions prevail in all typical temperate zone colonies. During the early development of such a society, accessions of population are eagerly sought, and are naturally and correctly regarded as of great value.

Underpopulation and overpopulation. A society, the population of which is so sparse as to preclude the fullest utilization of its knowledge of the industrial arts in the achievement of a standard of living, may be said to be underpopulated; a society with a population so dense, relative to its stage of the arts, that the land cannot be made to yield its maximum per capita return is overpopulated. The dividing line, then, between underpopulation and overpopulation is determined by the question whether an increase in population, other things being equal, will result in a raising or a lowering of the general standard of living. This line exists in every society, though it is exceedingly difficult to discern with exactness, in the present state of knowledge of social laws. In fact, the existence of such a line is not universally recognized. With reference to individual families, it is easy to see that an increase in the size of the family means a lesser degree of comfort for each member;

modern parents consciously strike a balance between their desire for numerous children and their desire for well-nurtured children. But in the case of societies, the line of division is often obscured by the common process of reasoning that men make wealth, and that therefore the more men there are, the more wealth there will be. It is forgotten that men make wealth from the land, in the final analysis, and also, that more wealth does not necessarily mean more wealth per capita, *i.e.* a higher standard of living.

The present inadequacy of social science to meet the practical demands of modern societies could hardly be better illustrated than by the fact that it is impossible to answer one of the most vital questions which any society can ask, viz. whether it is underpopulated or overpopulated. A flood of light, for instance, would be thrown upon the question of immigration in the United States by a decision of the question whether this country is underpopulated or not. The difficulty of arriving at a correct solution of the question of overpopulation is augmented by the fact that there are often powerful, though small, classes whose *class* standard of living is undoubtedly raised by an increase in numbers, even though the standard of the society as a whole is depreciated thereby. Thus the class of capitalist employers in the United States is led by self-interest to resist all efforts to restrict the numbers of unskilled immigrants, whatever the effects of free immigration may be upon the country as a whole.

One of the greatest practical services which social science can conceivably render to mankind is to devise means of determining whether any given society is in a state of underpopulation or overpopulation, to dis-

cover effective and unobjectionable methods of controlling the growth of population, and to break down the barriers of tradition, superstition, and self-indulgence which stand in the way of putting these methods of control into practical effect.

Birth rates and death rates. It has already been indicated that there are two immediate factors involved in the growth of population, a change in either one of which will affect the rate of growth. These factors are births and deaths. It is a common fallacy to speak of growth of population as if it were determined solely by the number of births. Until very recent years, in carrying out the prevailing policy of a rapid increase, almost the entire emphasis was laid on the encouragement of births. Now we have begun to realize that a wiser principle is to seek to limit the number of deaths. It is obvious that the increase in population in any society (ignoring, for the present, the question of population movements) in a given year is mathematically determined by the excess of births over deaths in that year. If deaths exceed births, there will be a decrease in population. The rate of growth of population is the proportion between this excess of births over deaths and the entire population.

In order to simplify and make accurate the consideration of questions of population, the expedient of birth rates and death rates has been adopted. These rates express the proportion between births and deaths and the total population. There are various ways of reckoning these rates, but for most practical purposes the "crude" rates, based on the total population, are satisfactory. Crude rates are usually expressed on the basis of an average thousand. Thus a society which numbered one million members, in which 25,000 persons were born in

a year, would be said to have a birth rate of 25. Correspondingly, if there were 17,000 deaths in the same society, the death rate would be 17. Evidently the rate of growth of population may be readily secured by subtracting the death rate from the birth rate. In the above case the rate of growth of population would be 8.

Rate of growth of population. It at once becomes clear that a given rate of growth of population may be the result of a wide variety of combinations of birth and death rates. A rate of 8 may be produced by birth and death rates such as cited above; or it may result from a birth rate of 18 and a death rate of 10, or from a birth rate of 40 and a death rate of 32. If the only consideration were the mathematical increase of population, it would make no difference what the combination was which resulted in a certain rate of growth. But since the question is not one of abstract mathematical quantities, but of men and women, it evidently makes the greatest possible difference by what combination of birth and death rates a given rate of growth is achieved. Both births and deaths are a tax upon the community, a cause of expense, and of more or less physical and mental suffering. It is therefore a general principle that the smaller the rates of births and deaths by which a given rate of growth is produced, the more satisfactory are the social conditions. It is an unfailing rule that a society which can maintain a rapid growth in population only by offsetting a high death rate by an enormous birth rate is in a degraded condition, and will be found to be characterized by misery, poverty, and general distress. It follows that a society which wishes to increase its rate of growth of population should turn its attention to the reduction of the death rate, rather than

the acceleration of the birth rate; while it goes without saying that a society which wishes to decrease its rate of growth must consider means of limiting the number of births rather than increasing the number of deaths.

The nineteenth century, particularly in its closing decades, witnessed a tremendous decline in the birth rate* of practically all the countries of western civilization such as to constitute one of the great social phenomena of modern times. But so great was the decline in the death rate during the same period that the rate of growth of population was vastly in excess of anything which had ever been known before. The following estimates of the population of seven of the leading countries of Europe (England, France, Prussia, Russia, Austria, Italy, and Spain) at intervals of one hundred years will illustrate this fact: [90]

Year	Population
1480	46,700,000
1580	59,250,000
1680	73,032,000
1780	109,881,000
1880	285,134,000

The population of these countries in 1911 was about 325,000,000. Yet the birth rates of most of these countries show a notable decline during the last one hundred years, as the following figures will indicate: [91]

Country	Average Birth Rate for Period 1821–40	Birth Rate for 1900
France	29.7	21.4
England	33.4 (1841–60)	28.7 (including Wales)
Prussia	41.0	36.1
Russia	44.6	47.1 (1896)
Austria	39.5	39.0 (1896)
Italy	37.2 (1861–80)	32.9
Spain	37.1 (1861–80)	34.4

* Often attributed, in part at least, to the Neo-Malthusian propaganda.

The decline in the death rates which has made possible so great an increase in population in the face of the diminished birth rates is indicated by the following figures: [92]

Country	Average Death Rate for Period 1861–70	Death Rate for 1908
France	22.9	19.0
England	22.6	14.7
Austria	30.4	22.6 (1907)
Italy	30.1	20.7 (1907)
Spain	29.7 (1871–80)	23.3
Germany	27.1 (1871–80)	18.0 (1907)
Russia (European)	—	31.2 (1901–03)

As would be expected, the countries which show a high birth rate in modern years are the most backward as regards social conditions, as, for example, Hungary, 39.3; Roumania, 40.0; Servia, 42.2; Bulgaria, 38.4. These same countries show a correspondingly high death rate, as, for example, Hungary, 24.8; Roumania, 27.7; Russia, 31.2.

Population movements. It has already been suggested that there is a further factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of the growth of population, viz. the shifting of population from one place to another. This factor does not directly affect the rate of growth of mankind as a whole, which is determined solely by the relation between births and deaths,* but it may very seriously affect the growth of population in any society. Population movements, of one type or another, are as old as the human species. One of the things which distinguish man from the other animals is his ability to

* Of course population movements indirectly affect the rate of growth of population by influencing the number of births and deaths.

make radical changes in habitat in a short time. Human history is largely the history of movements of people from one place to another, with the resulting conflicts and adjustments.

At first thought it might seem that the effect of population movements on the societies concerned might be very readily determined by a simple process of subtraction and addition. If 1000 people leave one society and go to another society, it is evident that the population of the former society is diminished by the number of 1000 and the population of the latter society is increased by just so many. This is, indeed, the immediate effect. But if a period of time is taken into consideration, the effects are found to be different from, and in fact almost contrary to, the immediate effects. It has been demonstrated over and over again that a steady, moderate emigration from a country does not diminish its population, but may even increase it, while a regular immigration into a country does not increase its population and may actually diminish it. This seeming paradox is easily understood by reference to the Malthusian principles of population. If it is borne in mind that every society reaches a balance between the various factors that determine population, it will be seen that the removal of a certain number of people simply lightens the pressure of population upon subsistence temporarily. The forces of reproduction, always under repression, at once respond to the new condition; either births are increased or deaths are diminished, and the size of the population remains practically the same. In fact, it has been asserted by some that the sense of easement which is afforded by the knowledge of the possibility of emigration serves to increase the birth rate even beyond

the extent correlative to the emigration, so that population increases faster than it would without any emigration at all. Conversely, immigration into a country simply increases the pressure already limiting the growth of population, and causes the checks, both preventive and positive, to operate more strictly than before. If the immigrant population is of a lower type than the native population, socially or economically, the result may be an actual decrease in the rate of growth of population.

Exceptions to the general rule just enunciated are furnished by cases where the migration from a country is so sudden and so extensive that it exceeds the capacity of the reproductive forces to offset. Then, during the period while population is catching up, there may be a distinct rise in the standard of living, so that when a balance is struck again, it is on a higher plane of existence than before. Also, a country which is definitely underpopulated, so that the Malthusian checks are virtually inoperative, may theoretically suffer a reduction of population by emigration, though such a thing seldom happens in real life. On the other hand, immigration into an underpopulated country may increase the rate of growth of population, while even in an overpopulated country there may be such a sudden and enormous influx as to overtax the elasticity of the reproductive forces, and cause a temporary increase in population with a consequent decline in the standard of living.

Essentials of a population policy. The foregoing simple facts furnish the basis upon which any society must rest its conscious population policy. The first point to be settled is the rate of growth of population

which is desired. In this connection the thing most likely to be forgotten, and most necessary to be remembered, is that every society, unless definitely underpopulated, must make choice, consciously or unconsciously, between population and the standard of living. There is no doubt that invention and discovery will continue to offer opportunities of progress to modern societies. It is for each society to determine to what extent this progress shall take the form of an increased population or of an improved standard of living. Having settled these questions, societies must recognize that limitation of deaths is vastly preferable, as a means of promoting the growth of population, to increase of births, and, finally, that emigration and immigration are most illusive and disappointing expedients for controlling population.

CHAPTER XII

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

The origin of marriage and the family. The two chief social institutions which have arisen in connection with the growth of population are marriage and the family. As to the early history of these institutions, pure sociology has, as yet, given no unequivocal answer. It has not been definitely decided whether marriage grew out of the family, or the family out of marriage. While there is every reason to believe that families, even of the monogamous type, existed long before the processes of evolution produced the human species, and that therefore marriage, as a human institution, must have been antedated by the family, yet there is also evidence in support of the view that the earliest human marriages were instituted on the basis of economic interests rather than of sexual interests, and that accordingly the family, as a social unit, grew out of marriage.

These questions, however, concern applied sociology but little. Whatever the origin of marriage and the family, the existence of these great institutions goes back so far in the evolution of culture as to make questions of origin a matter for pure sociology. Every society with any degree of civilization recognizes marriage as the basis of the family, and places about marriage some form of social sanction and social control. So closely have these institutions become intertwined

that for practical purposes they may almost be regarded as one institution.

Social control. As already suggested, the importance of the interests connected with the growth of population has led all societies to throw some form of social sanction about marriage, and to exert some sort of control over it and the family. The nature of this sanction and control varies; at times it is predominantly religious, at other times it is legal; in some cases it is merely a matter of tradition, custom, or public opinion. But sanction and control of some sort are never absent. In fact the family, rather than the individual, is quite generally recognized as the unit of the social organization.

Characteristic features of modern marriage and family. It follows that the types of marriage and the family which prevail in modern countries will have the most profound influence in shaping the social forms and usages of those societies.

As regards marriage, the first point to be noted is that in most of the countries of western civilization marriage at the present time is regarded as primarily a civil contract. Yet the notion that it also has a profound religious significance is very tenacious, and very generally some religious confirmation is sought, even in countries where a civil ceremony is wholly adequate. In general, however, it is the state, rather than the religious organization, which is considered to be the guardian of the responsibilities incurred and the guarantor of the rights conferred. It is to the state that appeal must be had in case readjustments become necessary.

Both marriage and the family exhibit much less marked changes in mores during the past few centuries than does the economic organization. Monogamy, es-

tablished long ago in western nations as the normal type, still prevails. It is so thoroughly established as to be regarded by many as the form of union approved by Nature herself. There are no noteworthy indications of any impending change in this feature of the mores. Likewise, the principle of male responsibility still maintains itself both in marriage and the family. This responsibility is both social and legal. It is customarily expected that the male partner will take the lead in most of the steps involved in forming and maintaining a family. It is assumed that the original proposal of marriage will come from him. If the proposal is accepted, upon the man is laid the social burden of providing a shelter for the new family. When the married state has been entered into, the entire legal and social obligation to make financial provision for the needs of the family rests upon the husband. The wife has her recognized duties — reduced, it must be confessed, to a minimum in the well-to-do families of modern societies — but they do not include the securing of the means of maintenance. Very commonly, the wife has the right to sue for non-support in case the husband does not provide reasonably for herself and the children. In many other matters, connected with property, etc., the husband is legally and socially considered the head of the family. While there are innumerable exceptions to this principle, in all of its different aspects, yet they are always regarded as somewhat out of the ordinary.

It is true that many noteworthy changes have taken place, within recent years, in the mores of self-perpetuation, mostly in the direction of according more recognition to woman as a person. But these changes still fall far short of putting man and woman on a plane

of perfect equality in respect to the duties, rights, and obligations of married life. Professor Sumner's concept of "pair marriage" is yet to be realized.

Changes in the function of the family. In the family, particularly, some very significant changes are to be noted in recent generations. These changes have to do less with the form than with the function of the family. The typical family of a few centuries ago was not only a social, but an economic, unit. The father carried on his day's toil under his own roof, surrounded by his own children as helpers, and with the mother ever at hand. Each member of the family, except mere infants, had his part in the production carried on there. In fact, the medieval family was the center of most of the activities of all of its members, and the home was the place where most of their time was spent. Recreation and religion enlisted the participation of the family as a whole, within the home, and there the child received much of his education.

Compared with this situation, the modern family reveals a decidedly diminished importance. One after another the activities which once characterized the home have been carried outside. Production, recreation, education, religion, all draw both young and old to specialized centers, away from the home. In fact, the tendency seems to be to reduce a common type of home to merely a place to eat and sleep. The function of the home as the meeting place of all the members of the family is steadily diminishing. Many a twentieth-century father scarcely sees his young children from Monday morning to Saturday evening. As children grow older, they are commonly separated from parental influence for longer or shorter periods, being drawn into

industrial activities early in their teens in the lower walks of life, and being sent away to boarding schools in more well-to-do circles. In families which can afford it, even the traditional duties of the mother are relegated more and more to employees, not members of the family. Taking it all in all, the influence of the family upon its members, young and old, is decidedly less than it was a few generations ago. In view of the fact that the family is the unit of the social organization, the importance of this development can hardly be overestimated.

The changes just noted have borne down more heavily upon women than men. It is sometimes said that most of the work, once the exclusive charge of woman in the home, has been taken out of the home. This is true, but it states only half the case. The other half is that the work of man has also been taken out of the home. The difference is that man has readily and easily followed his work, into factory, store, and office, while it is much more difficult for woman, particularly if married, to adapt herself to the modern mode of production. The result is, that while the burden of women as a whole, even in poor families, has been immeasurably lightened, this easement has been accompanied by the progressive reduction of the importance and value of woman in the family. The wife and mother has been compelled to stand by and see herself deprived of one after another of the things which, while they taxed her strength, yet gave her a sense of usefulness and worth, and enabled her to fill her time with productive effort. So far has this process gone, that the wife in the average well-to-do home finds herself reduced to the two functions of overseer of an establishment, and bearer of such

few children as there are. Meanwhile, the education and general emancipation of woman have been going on apace, awakening in her new desires, new ambitions, and a new sense of power and potential usefulness. In the situation thus outlined lie many of the roots of the present growing unrest among the more enlightened women of the day.

The inconsistency between the economic and marriage-family mores. Even more serious are the maladjustments which result from the inconsistency between the economic mores and the marriage-family mores. This inconsistency is the result of the unequal rate of change in the two sets of mores during the past century and a half. The economic mores have been forced to adjust themselves to the rapid changes in the arts of industry; the marriage-family mores, lacking any such incentive to change, have remained relatively similar to what they were two centuries ago. Consequently, the approximate balance and adjustment which obtained during a comparatively static period have been destroyed, and confusion results.

The most striking example of the maladjustment just mentioned is furnished by the differing economic position of woman in industry and in the home. As was observed in the discussion of the economic aspects of modern life, the woman of the twentieth century is free to enter almost any occupation in open competition with men. In some few occupations women are more efficient than men, in others they are of about equal efficiency, and in many they are nearly enough on an equality to make them real competitors. If they are willing to underbid men sufficiently to offset any inferiority in efficiency, they get the positions. In brief,

in almost every department of the economic field, women meet men in free competition. But as soon as the realm of the family is entered, the economic parity between men and women ceases. There the financial burdens and responsibilities lie wholly on the men. The result is that in modern societies there occurs the phenomenon of women, with no responsibility for the support of any one but themselves, and sometimes not even for that, competing for employment with men who are actually or potentially responsible for the support, not only of themselves, but of an ordinary family. In many cases, young women, by their competition, lower the wages of the very men whom in the course of time they will naturally marry. But as soon as marriage takes place the woman is ordinarily expected to relinquish money-earning, and the diminished income of the man must then support both husband and wife, and any children who may come. It is to be observed, in passing, that woman labor tends to lower the wages of men in two ways: first, by increasing the number of individuals bidding for employment; second, by introducing a large number of individuals who are willing, and able, to work for a much smaller wage than a man can reasonably expect. It is in the latter way, probably, that the greatest effect is achieved. The extreme example of this factor is furnished by girls who work merely to earn "pin-money."

The evils resulting from the maladjustment between these two sets of mores are numerous and weighty. Probably the most important is the lowering of the income of families who depend upon the earnings of the husband alone. In fact, it is a question whether the standard of living of the wage earning class as a whole

has been raised in the slightest degree by the participation of women in wage-labor. In families where there are no women at work, the family income is lower than it would have been if there had never been any woman labor, while in the families where women contribute to the family income, the pecuniary gain is offset by the withdrawal of the mother and older daughters from those unpaid labors which go so far to make the home what it should be. Another evil resulting from the maladjustment in question is the dissatisfaction which many women feel who relinquish well-paid occupations for the financially dependent position of the married woman. If, as often happens, the earning power of the woman is equal, or even superior, to that of the man, the resulting dissatisfaction and friction may be extreme, especially if the man belongs to that class of husbands who force their wives to take the position of suppliants for any money given them for their own uses. Then again, there is the large class of childless women, or women whose children are grown up, who are tremendously irked by the aimless conventional life which they are expected to follow. Knowing themselves capable of doing valuable work, conscious of latent ability in one direction or another, perhaps ambitious for a "career," they resent being forced to spend their time in the meaningless round of luncheons, teas, bridge parties, and stereotyped "charities." Occasionally an independent-spirited woman breaks through the barriers of convention, and takes the place in the world of affairs for which her talents fit her, to the satisfaction of herself and probably also of her husband.

There are, of course, many positive advantages in woman labor itself. The total working force of so-

ciety is increased, and production thereby augmented. Girls whose families are not able to provide them with educational opportunities are doubtless better off employed than idle, and in many cases there is not enough work at home to keep them profitably employed. The feeling of independence which the wage-earning girl draws from her employment is a desirable characteristic, and prevents her from rashly accepting in marriage the hand of the first suitor who presents himself, merely for the sake of providing for her own support, or relieving her family of expense — what the girls themselves call "marrying a meal-ticket." The broadening influence of participating in the busy life of the world is also a definite gain. But it must be noted that all these advantages are to be credited to woman labor as such, and cannot be cited to justify or offset the evils which arise from the maladjustment between the economic and family mores as regards the position of woman.

There can scarcely be a more serious maladjustment than a disharmony between the normal aspects of the two fundamental sets of mores. Such a maladjustment exists in the countries of western civilization. It is bound to be remedied in time, and since there is every reason to believe that the economic emancipation of woman has come to stay, the indications are that the changes by which the readjustment is effected will be in the mores of marriage and the family, rather than in the economic mores.

CHAPTER XIII

MIGRATIONS

Importance of migrations. As a secondary type of factor conditioning the growth of population, the phenomenon of human migrations has been mentioned, and something said as to the general effects of migrations upon the rate of growth of population in the two countries concerned. It need scarcely be said that there are other effects of migrations which are of great importance to the national life, particularly of the country to which the migration directs itself.

Types of migration. There have been, in the past, several distinct types of population movements, corresponding to the different stages of cultural evolution, and the varying degrees of density of population in the various centers of human habitation. At the present time there are three principal forms of migration which are of practical interest to civilized nations; these are colonization, immigration, and what may be called "urbanization."

Colonization. Colonization is the movement from a well-developed, culturally advanced nation to a newly discovered, or recently available, thinly populated, low-cultured country. In cases of true colonization the home state is almost always densely populated, relative to its stage of the arts, while the colonized region

is thinly populated, usually with a native people so far inferior to the colonists as to offer no serious resistance. The distinguishing features of colonization are political domination by the home state, and actual or prospective settlement by people from the home state. Inasmuch as almost all the regions on earth, adapted for colonization, have now been discovered and more or less appropriated by the more advanced nations, the present problems of colonization are rather the maintenance and development of colonial systems than the initiation of new colonial enterprises.

Immigration. Like colonization, immigration is the movement of people from a thickly settled country to a thinly populated country. The countries in which immigration originates are almost always overpopulated in the absolute sense; the countries of destination are either less seriously overpopulated or absolutely underpopulated. In general, the modern immigration movement represents the present aspect of the redistribution of population consequent upon the Great Discoveries, and the countries which are now receiving large currents of immigration are mostly developed farm colonies, which have become independent, either absolutely or in everything but name. Such countries are Canada, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Australia, and, preëminently, the United States.

There are certain distinct differences, however, between colonization and immigration which mark them off as wholly different types of population movement. First, immigration always crosses a national boundary, while colonization never does. This distinction, which at first thought might seem purely arbitrary, is really of the highest practical importance. Countries, as a rule,

do not disapprove of, or seek to impede, the movement of their people to their own colonies; they very frequently regret, and sometimes try to prohibit, their emigration to other countries. Second, the two countries involved in immigration movements are usually on approximately the same culture level — often the country of destination is more highly civilized than the country of source. Third, while colonization is a state affair, carried on with governmental backing and support, immigration is a definitely individualistic undertaking, based on private resources, and frequently, as noted above, prosecuted in the face of governmental disapproval. These three considerations, and others of minor importance, differentiate the practical problems of immigration from those of colonization. The study of colonization furnishes some few analogies and general principles for the guidance of states in framing a practical immigration policy, but it does not by any means supply a complete set of rules or precedents.

The effects of immigration are much more varied and profound, and the practical problems resulting are therefore much more vital, in the case of the country of destination than of the country of source. The principal reason for this fact is that, whereas emigration merely affects the adjustment of the Malthusian factors in the country of source, and brings about some reflex influence on the mores as a result of new contacts with another country, immigration introduces into the country of destination large numbers of people of different racial stocks, with widely variant sets of mores, thereby influencing practically all social forms, institutions, and interests.

It is scarcely an overstatement to say that, from the point of view of the United States, immigration is the greatest public problem confronting the nation, for the very reason just mentioned, viz., that it conditions to a greater or less extent every other public problem. Investigators who get at the heart of the various national questions of the day find, almost without exception, that immigration is one of the chief factors to be considered. It is inevitable that this should be so. It is impossible that over 32,000,000 aliens, from every European nation and many others, should be introduced into a new country like the United States in less than a century, without influencing every thread of the social fabric from one extremity to the other. A knowledge of immigration is almost a prerequisite for the intelligent handling of any other public question.

The criterion of a sound immigration policy is complete and rapid assimilation, by which is meant the perfect transmutation of the new elements into conformity with the normal national type. The words "complete" and "rapid" are used in a relative sense, for as long as immigration is in operation assimilation can never be absolutely complete, and such assimilation as occurs takes considerable time. The essence of assimilation is the substitution of one set of mores for another set of mores. This is a process which probably is impossible of achievement in the case of any adult immigrant, during his lifetime. Such assimilation as takes place occurs in the case of very immature immigrants, or in succeeding generations. The maximum volume of immigration which a nation can safely receive is set by its ability to assimilate the newcomers without permanently affecting the national type of social organ-

ization or mores. This principle should be the basic guide for legislators in determining the question of the restriction of immigration.

As representative of the types of influence exerted by immigration on the life of the United States, the two following, which are among the most important, may be cited. First, the eugenic influence, which results from the introduction into our body politic of a variety of foreign blood strains, the desirability of which, and the fitness of which for American conditions, have not been determined. This general influence is quite apart from the special influence, as to the undesirability of which there can be no question, exerted by those definitely abnormal and antisocial blood strains, which our immigration laws have never yet succeeded in completely excluding. Second, the influence of immigration upon the standard of living of the American workingman. The retarding or depressing effect of immigration upon the wage earner's standard, similar to the effect of woman labor on the general wage level (see page 226), is accomplished in two ways; first, by a marked increase in the number of laborers bidding for employment at just those times when the demand for labor is keenest, and second, and much more important, by the competition between unequal standards of living. The immigrant brings to this country a standard definitely lower than the normal standard of the United States — it is the higher American standard, in fact, which chiefly attracts him — and consequently is willing to accept a wage which will enable him to raise his standard to some degree, and yet will force the American laborer to lower his standard in competition. This competition between foreign and native standards of living is one of the most

menacing social phenomena of recent decades in the United States.

Urbanization. Urbanization is the increasing concentration of population in cities, as compared with country districts and small towns. This phenomenon has characterized the development of all modern countries during the past half century or more to an amazing degree. It is both a statistical and an actual population movement; that is, not only do the figures reveal an increasingly large proportion of the total population resident in cities, but there is a real transference of men, women, and children from rural to urban districts. The extent of such transference which is necessary to effect a certain growth in city population is by no means so large, at present, as it was during earlier centuries when cities were rightly considered the devourers of mankind, and an enormous migration was necessary to provide for any growth at all. The art of living in cities has now progressed so far that every up-to-date city could hold its own without any increments from outside.

The great city is distinctly a modern institution. Before the days of Alexander the Great there were only three cities in the lands of western civilization with a population of over 100,000 each, and none of these exceeded that figure largely. About 200 B.C. there were four cities with over 200,000 each. It was not until after 1000 A.D. that the development of towns really began in Europe. Even then towns were small, rarely exceeding 20,000. The average first class town in England in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries numbered about 5000.[93] The same factors, indeed, which have determined the normal aspects of the modern

economic organization — those factors which we group under the heads of the Industrial and Commercial Revolutions — account for the rise of the modern city. Not until great improvements in the arts of industry freed a considerable percentage of the toilers from the soil, not until the development of large-scale production furnished an incentive to the forming of great human aggregations, could concentration of population take place to the extent with which we are familiar.

In using statistics to portray the progress of urbanization, care must be used with reference to the definition of the term "city." Different interpretations have prevailed at different times, and in different places. A certain "city" in Kansas was once reported as having 79 inhabitants. In general, the figure 2000 is coming to be recognized as the dividing line between city and country in Europe, and 2500 in the United States. The most characteristic and significant growth, however, is not in the smaller urban units, but in the monster cities.

The United States illustrates the shifting of population from country to city to a remarkable degree. Following the definition formerly used in this country (8000 as the minimum size of a city), 2.5 per cent of the population of the Colonies was urban in 1710. In 1790 there were five cities with a population of 8000 or more, and the percentage had risen to 3.3; in 1800, 4.0 per cent; in 1850, 12.5 per cent; and in 1900, 32.9 per cent. Adopting the modern classification of 2500 as the dividing line, the percentages of the total population classed as urban and rural at the last four census years was as follows:

CLASSIFICATION OF TOTAL POPULATION OF UNITED STATES ON A BASIS OF GROUPS OF MORE OR LESS THAN 2500[94]

YEAR	PER CENT URBAN	PER CENT RURAL
1880	29.5	70.5
1890	36.1	63.9
1900	40.5	59.5
1910	46.3	53.7

Even more startling changes have occurred in some European countries, as for instance England and Scotland, each of which has suffered an absolute loss in rural population since 1861. So too, France, with a nearly stationary population, shows a steady growth of cities, indicating an actual diminution of rural population.[95]

Such a shifting of relative importance between the two basic elements of the population must inevitably have profound and varied effects upon almost every social form and institution. More and more is the social life of modern nations coming to be dominated by the city; more and more are the problems of democracy centering about, and within, the great aggregations of humanity. It is not necessary to inquire in detail into the causes of urbanization. As already suggested, they are inherent in the dominant forces of modern economic life. At the same time, city life itself offers many advantages and attractions. The opportunities for the gratification of almost every ambition are greater and more varied in the city than in the country; opportunities for diversion, enjoyment, and excitement abound there, undreamed of in the rural districts. Moreover, the denizen of the city is freed from many of the petty cares, annoyances, and duties — "chores,"

to use the rural term — which characterize life in the country.

To offset these advantages there are numerous drawbacks to city life, particularly in the way of limitations upon personal liberty. It is a law of social growth that every increase in the complexity of the social organization necessitates wider social interference in the lives of individuals, and stricter social control. Numbers of customs and practices, which are harmless, if not really beneficial, in the country, become intolerable in the city. The city dweller finds himself hampered by a host of limitations upon his use of his property, and his personal behavior. In the disposal of sewage, in the use of the street, in the making of unnecessary noise, in the burning of coal, and in countless other affairs, the city dweller is not his own master to anything like the extent that he might be in the country. At the same time, the impersonality of relationships, so characteristic of all modern life, is particularly marked in the city. As one writer has said, "The urban families . . . do not know each other, but they cannot live without each other." [96]

On the whole, there is no doubt that the advantages and attractions of the city far outweigh its drawbacks for the average twentieth-century individual. Particularly after one has become habituated to urban life, any other type of existence seems tame and colorless, even though one's city home be located in the most congested districts. This fact is strikingly illustrated by the experience of factory managers who have endeavored to gather their working force in the immediate neighborhood of a suburban factory, only to learn that the laborers are unwilling to relinquish the delights of

city residence, and afford the striking phenomenon of people commuting out into the country to work in the morning, and commuting back at night to their homes in the slums. It is significant of the great change that has taken place in the relative importance of the country, that rural districts are now recognized as having their own "problems," and a special branch of sociology has been developed to meet them.

What with its general attractiveness, and much more with its economic necessity, the great city has undoubtedly come to stay, and will exert an increasingly dominant influence upon the social life of coming generations. Fortunately, the great city is being studied with exhaustive and scientific care by a host of investigators, and means are being devised whereby the social control which is so necessary may be effectively and profitably exerted with the minimum of annoyance. There is scarcely in existence a more promising field for conscious social betterment than in the relationships which characterize the great city.

There is great need that such study should be expended, and that such devices of social control should be put into operation. For the natural forces at work in cities are such as to lead inevitably to most undesirable social conditions if left uncontrolled.

The housing problem. The fundamental feature of the urban center is the limitation of space per individual. Ground space is an elemental necessity for man for two reasons; first, to furnish him an emplacement; second, to provide him the means of subsistence. The dwellers in cities relinquish the latter of these claims, and depend for their subsistence upon the productive efforts of the rural population, for which they make

returns of a secondary nature. But the former claim cannot be thus transferred. Man, wherever he is, must have some abiding space. In rural districts the importance of land as a place to support men's bodies seems wholly subsidiary; in the city it becomes primary. The stronger the forces drawing men together into close aggregations, the greater becomes the demand for land space, the keener becomes the competition for its possession, and the higher becomes its value. This space is demanded for two forms of occupation, business and residence, and since the economic forces are the chief causes of the growth of cities, it inevitably happens that the demand for land is sharpest, and the value of land is highest, in the business districts. Nevertheless, since everybody wishes to live near to the business district, and to the other centers of civic activity, land for residence purposes within the confines of the city is also in great demand, and brings a high price.

One result of the high price of city land is that only the relatively well-to-do can afford to own sufficient land to accomodate a single dwelling house, even of moderate proportions. The great majority of the population in the largest cities lives in multiple houses. Thus in New York City this type of dwelling accommodates two thirds of the population. In the most desirable residence districts, even the rich prefer to live in multiple dwellings rather than to incur the enormous outlay involved in a single residence. For the poorer classes there is no question of land ownership, to say nothing of single houses. The residence problem for these classes resolves itself into the problem of rent, and primarily of the rent of tenement apartments.

Thus there arises in the great city the modern aspect

of the age-long relationship of landlord and tenant, and because the city presents conditions never before developed, the problem of city rents is different from any problem ever faced by less complex societies. The city landlord is no different from any other type of landlord, in that he owns his land for profit, and wishes to secure the greatest possible return from it. But because of the specialized uses to which city land is put, there are possibilities of increase in the returns from city land which do not exist in rural districts. In short, while city land space cannot be extended laterally, it can, for all practical purposes, be extended vertically. The landlord who tears down a two story flat house and erects an eight story tenement virtually increases his land space four fold. Furthermore, since the unit of the social organization is the family, and rents are paid by families, the landlord who leases his land space for residence purposes desires to accommodate the largest possible number of families on the given space.

These are the forces which have created the typical modern tenement house, the characteristic dwelling place of the poorer classes of cities. The natural economic interests of the landlord lead directly to the utilization of every available square foot of land for building purposes, to the reduction of the size of apartments to the lowest minimum, to the extension of buildings upward to the maximum height, and to the use of the cheapest modes of construction consistent with economic profit. What forces set the limits to this process? Evidently, not the will of the landlord class. For, as already observed,* the desire, even of a majority of a

* Pages 149–152.

certain class of capitalists, to use its capital in social ways, will not avail to prevent the emergence of most undesirable conditions, in the absence of control. As long as there are a few landlords who demand the last cent of profit on their investment, even at the expense of the happiness and health of their tenants, their unregulated competition will be powerful enough to bring the entire standard of tenement accommodations down to the level which they are willing to tolerate. An adherent of the old *laissez-faire* doctrine would have said, "Leave it to the self-interest of the parties concerned. Let the tenants demand such accommodations as they are able to pay for." But society has learned that such matters cannot be left to the play of the forces of individual self-interest. There is too great an inequality of power and advantage between the party who has capital, and the one who has not. The facts of life are that, in the absence of control, the landlord offers such types of accommodation as he chooses, and the tenant, because of ignorance, necessity, or poverty, has to take what he can get. One shudders to think what the housing conditions of the wage earners would be like in the complete absence of control.

Necessity of social control. There is just one way out. There must be control, and the only control which is adequate is social control. Modern cities have recognized this truth — sometimes rather tardily — and no city which lays any claim to respect lacks its more or less comprehensive tenement law, or general housing law. The details included in an up-to-date law of this sort are very numerous, including every aspect of tenement construction and maintenance which can have any bearing upon the welfare of the tenants. Among

the more important items covered are light, air, sanitation, provision against fire, height of buildings, per cent of lot occupied by buildings, etc. One of the chief evils to be guarded against is congestion, of which two sorts are recognized, lot congestion and room congestion. Lot congestion involves the crowding together of too many persons on a given ground space, so that the so-called "free goods" which usually go with land, viz., light and air, are reduced to unsatisfactory proportions. Room congestion exists when more persons are living in a given apartment than the normal standards of decency and comfort will allow. Lot congestion and room congestion frequently occur together, but room congestion may occur in all sorts of environments, even in single houses in rural districts. The evils of room congestion are too obvious to need enumeration, though their extent and their significance to the life of the family and the nation can be comprehended only by thorough study. As an example of lot congestion may be cited the case of the New York block which was inhabited in the proportion of 1672 persons per acre, or 304 persons per acre per story.[97] Cases of extreme room congestion are revealed by every housing investigation; the following example is unusual only in degree, not in kind. "In another case a room containing only 841 cubic feet was occupied at night by a man and his wife, their one child, and three lodgers, while four other lodgers occupied the same room during the day." [98] The practice of taking boarders is a fruitful source of room congestion, especially among the foreign elements in the United States.

The necessity of social control of tenements is verified by the fact that builders and owners of tenements,

in every city, usually operate in accordance with the minimum provisions of the law in force. This fact is exemplified by the notorious case of the dumb-bell tenements in New York City. In fact, New York City has been cited as the horrible example to all the other cities of the nation as to what they may inevitably expect in the absence of efficient housing control.[99]

The foregoing discussion is merely suggestive of the many problems which cluster about the growing city of the twentieth century — problems fascinating to the social scientist, and vital to every citizen. One of the most hopeful signs of the times, as already suggested, is the energy and success with which these problems are being attacked and mastered by some of the ablest men and women of the day. Those who know most about the modern city are most optimistic as to its destiny. The achievements of the recent past are ample justification for optimism as to the future.

CHAPTER XIV

DISEASE. DEATH. DIVORCE

Doubtful cases. Before taking up the consideration of the abnormal aspects of the growth of population, attention should be turned to certain matters which lie on the border line between normality and abnormality, and are therefore difficult of classification.

Disease and death. Prominent among these matters are the phenomena of disease and death. To what extent can disease and death be called abnormal? They are universal and enduring factors in all societies, and death, at least, can never be eliminated. The only approach to a general rule on this question appears to be that so much of disease and death may be called abnormal as might be prevented by the conscientious social application of such knowledge as is possessed at any given time by any society. There is no question that a death rate from cholera such as prevails in India would be highly abnormal in the United States. Perhaps our present death rate from cancer would be just as abnormal twenty-five or fifty years from now.

In scarcely any other department of human existence has the normal been so decidedly raised as in the case of deaths. The death rates cited on a preceding page * are sufficient evidence of this fact. The improvement has been most marked in the case of the infantile death rate.

* Page 216.

As regards the adult death rate, the greatest reductions have probably been made in deaths from what may be called "social diseases," that is, those diseases against which the individual, under modern conditions, cannot possibly protect himself adequately, but which, by social measures, may be brought down to minimum proportions. Practically all germ diseases come under this head, as they are disseminated through physical or social contact of men with each other, and hence spread most widely and rapidly where social relationships are closest. Prominent among these diseases are smallpox, malaria, yellow fever, typhoid fever, and tuberculosis. The progress which has been made toward the elimination of these diseases through the agency of strict social regulation and restraint is decidedly encouraging. It is said that smallpox was at one time so prevalent that it was considered practically a children's disease — that is, all adult persons had already had it and were therefore immune. Now it is one of the rarest of diseases in civilized countries. Similar progress is being made in the control of typhoid and tuberculosis; witness the success of New York City in reducing its death rate from tuberculosis of the lungs from 211.6 per 100,000 population in 1903 to 170.1 in 1913,[100] and the remarkable achievement of Pittsburgh in cutting down the death rate from typhoid fever from 131.2 per 100,000 in 1907 (about the average for several years preceding) to 48.9 in the very next year, and 19.5 in 1913.[101] For the United States as a whole, tuberculosis has been reduced from the first place among the causes of death, which it held up to 1912. In view of the intimate relation between diseases of the foregoing type and modern socialized means of supplying various

human needs — for water, shelter, milk, etc. — there is every ground for confidence in the efficacy of social effort to control these diseases, and every reason to brand as negligent any society which fails to utilize the best methods within its reach to safeguard its members.

The general result of modern scientific and social methods of handling the problem of disease for the country as a whole, is shown by the fall in the death rate for the entire registration area of the United States from 17.6 in 1900 to 14.1 in 1913.[102]

Certain other forms of death are to be regarded as even more definitely abnormal than deaths from typhoid and tuberculosis; such are deaths resulting from industrial accidents, railroad accidents, etc., most of which might be prevented by the exertion of proper social control. Deaths by homicide and suicide are, of course, so clearly recognized as abnormal as to be designated crimes (attempted suicide).

With respect to the venereal diseases, in spite of their highly social character, societies have displayed an amazing and disastrous degree of indifference, which has cost them dear in varied forms of suffering and loss. One of the most hopeful indications of the new social consciousness is the increased attention which is beginning to be paid to this form of abnormality.

Divorce. Another phenomenon which lies on the border line between normality and abnormality is divorce.

Reference is frequently made to the "divorce evil," as if divorce were itself abnormal, and its existence a curse to society. Analysis reveals the distorted and fallacious character of this conception. Divorce is an

established, recognized, and normal social institution. It is not an evil, but a means of eliminating evil. The evil consists in unsatisfactory marriages and unhappy families. Divorce is merely the expedient by which society sanctions the escape from a situation which required social sanction for entrance. It is as absurd to focus attention upon divorce as a social evil, as it would be to bewail the copious use of quinine in a malarial district. Divorce is both the symptom and the remedy of a social disease; it is not the disease itself. It is just as much a misdirection of social effort to attempt to restrain divorce artificially, as it would be to pass laws against the use of quinine. Any evils which attach to the present divorce situation are to be attributed to the misuse of a valuable social expedient, just as many beneficial drugs may be misused. Attention should be concentrated on seeing that those who administer divorce discharge their function for social benefit rather than for social injury, and ultimately, of course, upon the removal of the causes of divorce.

There is no question that divorce is increasing to a remarkable degree in the United States. The number of divorces per 100,000 population rose from 28 in 1870 to 73 in 1900,[103] making a rate more than twice as high as that of any foreign country except Japan.[104] There is a wide difference in the divorce rates in the different states of the Union, Washington showing a divorce rate of 513 per 100,000 married population in 1900, Montana, 497, and Colorado, 409, while Massachusetts had a rate of 124 and New York 60.[105] These figures furnish an excellent illustration of the caution necessary in drawing conclusions from a comparison of sociological phenomena which depend upon legal measures. It

can hardly be imagined that marital infelicity is more than eight times as prevalent in Washington as in New York; the difference must lie, partly at least, in the ease of escape from irksome bonds. So the increase of divorce in the country as a whole admits of several interpretations, the accuracy of which can be ascertained only by careful examination of all the facts bearing on the subject.

As to the social desirability of liberal (some would say "lax") divorce laws, opinions differ between the widest extremes. On the one hand it is urged that divorce should be granted only for adultery, with no remarriage for the guilty party during the lifetime of the other; on the other hand, divorce by mutual consent is presented as the wisest plan. In general, the chief arguments against easy divorce seem to be that it would encourage hasty and ill-considered marriages, would lead to the breaking up of families for temporary or trivial causes, and in the extreme would degenerate into a system of serial polygamy. In favor of easy divorce it is urged that love is the only justifiable basis for marriage, and that when love has ceased to exist, it is more immoral to compel people to live together than to allow them to separate. It is pointed out that marriage exists for happiness, and any marriage which fails of that purpose should be terminated. Much is made of the pernicious influence exerted upon children by the atmosphere and example of a home where friction, animosity, and discord prevail.

In so far as the increase in divorce in this country is an indication of something more than a mere relaxation in the laws, the chief causes of the phenomena are probably to be found in the diminished religious sanctity

attached to marriage, in the emancipation and increased self-assertiveness of women, in the disharmony between the economic and marriage mores, and in the growing knowledge on the part of women of the nature and effects of venereal disease. Perhaps the great prosperity of the country may have something to do with the result, since it is asserted that divorces tend to fall off in periods of hard times, indicating that possibly divorce is a form of luxury.[106]

Upon one point, there seems to be general agreement among students of divorce in this country, viz., that a uniform divorce law for all the states would be an immeasurable improvement. So diverse are our laws on this subject that "cases have occurred where a man has left two legal widows, each of whom claimed and got his estate, so far as it lay within the State in which she was married." [107] A federal divorce law, advocated by some, would be difficult to establish, in view of the complex nature of the interests involved in the marriage relation.

CHAPTER XV

SEXUAL IMMORALITY

Sinful thinking. In no other department of human life is it so clearly recognized that thought may be sinful as in the field of self-perpetuation. Moral and ethical teachers constantly emphasize the inherent sinfulness of certain types of thought about matters of sex, and for good reason, because in this field, more than anywhere else, thought is a powerful predisposing cause of antisocial conduct. So potent is the influence of thought upon human character in this respect, that sexual thinking at times becomes essentially vicious, diminishing even the economic efficiency of the individual.

Basic nature of the sexual motive. In the broad sense, not only sexual matters, but all matters connected with disease, death, and the nurture of children belong under the general head of the growth of population, and therefore all unsocial acts in connection with these matters might be treated in this division. But since the basis of classification is the social force, or motive, back of conduct, it will be expedient to confine attention primarily to those sinful acts which arise from the sexual motive, and leave aside, or treat subordinately, those cases of sin, which, while they affect the growth of population, originate in some other than the sexual motive, such as the adulteration of food, the maintenance of unsanitary tenements, and the exploitation of child labor.

The relativity of sin. The fact that sin is a matter of social standards, not of absolute and universal verities, is clearly illustrated by the matter of sexual morality. Different societies, and the same societies at different times, exhibit the widest variety of mores with respect to this branch of the social code. Mores which are accepted without question by one group of people arouse the greatest abhorrence in another group. Custom exerts a tremendous influence. Practices which would not be tolerated in one period of a society's development become the accepted mode of conduct a decade or two later. Witness the changing code with reference to the dress of women in the United States during the past quarter of a century. Numerous other examples are furnished by our changing standards with reference to the drama, to pictorial art, and to drawing-room conversation. So rapidly do these changes take place that in every generation many people, especially those well along in life, are inclined to feel that their own age is decadent, and that morality is on the wane. Thus a correspondent writes, "In art, behavior, government, fashion, current literature, etc. degeneracy is now accepted as propriety in our best educated society. Our fashions are immodest, if not indecent, our music, much of it, is sensuous or inartistic, and our pictorial art shows signs of decadence." The writer might have added that much of our modern drama seems to assume that there is only one important motive in human life, and that our modern dances are shocking.

Sentiments such as those just expressed represent a mood into which almost every one is apt to fall at times. There is a strong tendency to judge the morality of

conduct by the code of one's own youth, rather than by existing standards. It is clear, however, that morality is not a matter of specific acts, but of conformity to a code. The sinfulness of a generation is not to be judged by the code which it recognizes, but by the closeness with which conduct conforms to code. These facts do not free the *élite* of society from the duty of testing existing standards by the criteria of reason and social experience, and of using every agency of social education to raise the mores to a level more in conformity with the principles of social stability and progress; but they do furnish an antidote for pessimism as regards the morality of one's own society.

In the nations of western civilization a sufficient uniformity has been achieved with reference to the great facts of the sexual life, so that the fluctuations and divergences in the sexual code are confined mainly to those less vital aspects of sexual sin which are neither crime nor vice. Certain types of conduct are almost universally recognized as vicious, and proscribed by the codes of all modern societies; certain acts, arising from the sexual motive, have been definitely prohibited by law, and thereby branded as crimes, by all advanced states. It is in the general field of obscenity, indecency, etc. that diversity of standard prevails. Here the conflict goes on between prudery and pruriency, between Puritanism and Bohemianism, with the victory sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other, and the safe course along the middle ground between.

Sexual crime. As examples of sexual crimes may be mentioned adultery, incest, rape, indecent exposure, and sexual indulgence of any form, or performed under any conditions, proscribed by law. Prostitution is

always vicious; it is criminal only when carried on under circumstances forbidden by the state.

The great underlying cause of sexual crime is the same as the fundamental cause of all sexual immorality, viz., uncontrolled sexual passion, the willingness to gratify individual desire regardless of the interests or welfare of other individuals or of society. The special causes (race character, feeble-mindedness, proximity in boarding houses, etc.) which lead to the gratification of desire in criminal, rather than in other ways, are too intricate to be taken up in a general review.

Sexual vice. So powerful a natural desire, or instinct, as the sexual appetite inevitably develops correlated vices. As in the case of other desires, implanted or evolved in human nature for definite purposes connected with the progress and perpetuity of the species, the way is opened for vice whenever the desire is gratified merely for the sake of the attendant pleasure, rather than for the legitimate end.

The types of vice which have grown up about the sexual appetite are numerous and varied, of which by far the commonest and most representative is prostitution. To a very large extent the whole question of sex vice in modern societies centers about prostitution, and the facts of prostitution furnish a guide to the general character of the allied evils.

Prostitution. An extraordinary amount of public attention has been given, in the last few years, to the question of prostitution. A number of investigations, of a more or less scientific character, have been made, and the literature on the subject has grown to be voluminous. Nevertheless there is still much uncertainty as to the essential facts about this evil. This uncertainty

is particularly marked with respect to the prevalence or extent of prostitution. Practically all investigators agree that the evil is very widespread, especially in Europe, where it is said that participation in prostitution is almost universal among men at some time in their lives. However, some of the efforts to express these facts in figures result in the most glaring absurdities and inconsistencies. A striking illustration of the point in question is furnished by the statement of Dr. Charles E. Woodruff, that there must be nearly 1,000,000 prostitutes in the United States, and since they live on the average only five years after entering the life, there must be 200,000 deaths of prostitutes every year. A simple estimate of the death rate among women in the United States, based on Census figures, reveals the fact that in the year 1909 (in which Dr. Woodruff's book was published) the total number of deaths, in the entire country, of women between the ages of fifteen and thirty-nine was about 113,500, or scarcely more than half the number set down by Dr. Woodruff for prostitutes alone.[108]

The simple fact seems to be that nobody knows, nor can know, the actual extent of sex vice in any society, for the reason that this is a field of social investigation where complete induction is quite impossible, and where general conclusions must be largely in the nature of estimates, with a very large margin of error.

It is an open question how much general publicity should be given even to the well-established facts about the extent of prostitution; there is no question that it is extremely unwise and socially injurious to spread broadcast exaggerated estimates of the prevalence of an evil, which is held within bounds largely by the

belief that it is discountenanced by the majority of the members of a society.

Causes of prostitution. In seeking to analyze the causes of prostitution, recognition must be given to its two-fold aspect. Prostitution is a business, and therefore has two sides, demand and supply. The causes of prostitution accordingly divide themselves into two groups, the causes of the demand for prostitutes, and the causes of the supply of prostitutes.

The demand side. The ultimate cause of the demand for prostitution is simply stated, being the same as the cause of sexual crime, *i.e.* the willingness of men to gratify sexual desire at the expense of the welfare of others, and in contravention of the moral code of society. The existence of sexual desire needs no explanation; the only point to be explained is why men do not hold it under control. Here, too, the fundamental explanation is briefly stated — selfishness. It is for the psychologists and the moral philosophers to account for the existence of that trait in human character; the sociologist accepts it as one of the forces with which he has to deal.

There are, however, certain factors which accentuate the importance of the selfish sexual motive, by adding to the difficulty of control. Prominent among these factors is ignorance. The belief is very widespread — almost universal in certain countries — that sexual indulgence is essential for the health, or even the life, of a male human being after he passes a certain age. This belief originated far back in human evolution and is now thoroughly traditional, having all the weight and inertia which belong to tradition. In so far as this tradition forms a part of the mental outfit of a given man, it must certainly add enormously to the

difficulty of restraining the sexual impulse. The generality of mankind can hardly be expected to follow a course which promises to lead to debility or death, nor can they easily be persuaded that the opposite course is seriously sinful. When medical practitioners support this tradition by prescribing sexual intercourse as a remedy for certain maladies, as was the case not so long ago even in civilized countries, the bonds of self-restraint are thoroughly relaxed.

Within recent years the progress of scientific investigation has made serious breaches in the traditional bulwarks of sex vice. It has been scientifically demonstrated that absolute continence, for both sexes, is not only not injurious, but is conducive to the highest physical and mental vigor. On the basis of these newly acquired facts, and in view of the pernicious influence of false beliefs, a vigorous campaign has been begun for general enlightenment on the subject of sex. The first redoubt to be carried in the prosecution of this campaign was the traditional taboo placed upon all discussion of sexual affairs, the assumption that virtue and safety lay in ignorance, and ignoring, of facts. This "conspiracy of silence" yielded with surprising rapidity, and already there are signs that a reaction has set in, and that people are beginning to realize that anything so well established in the mores as the sex taboo cannot be abandoned at a stroke without entailing unlooked-for and undesired consequences.

On the whole, however, sex education has undoubtedly established itself as a permanent force in social development; the great questions are how, when, and by whom is the education to be conducted? The general feeling seems to be that parents, when willing and competent,

are in the best position to deal with the question; but so many parents are unqualified for the task, that many authorities feel that there should also be sex instruction in the public schools, given either by regular or special teachers. The whole matter is still in the experimental stage, with much promise of future benefits.

Numerous features characteristic of modern life hamper the exercise of adequate sexual self-control. The impersonality of human relationships, particularly in great cities, removes many of the restraining influences which surround young people in a simpler and more personal organization of society. The unmarried young man or young woman in the large city is very much his own master, and subject to very little social supervision during his leisure hours. The loneliness and dissociation of life in great groups lead many a young person to seek companionship in ways which would scarcely be thought of by one surrounded by friends. So too, the dullness and monotony of much of the characteristic industrial activity of to-day stimulate the desire for excitement and adventure on the part of young men as well as of young women. The greater demands made upon ambitious young men in the way of preparation for their life work, together with the other forces which tend to delay marriage, extend the period during which morality demands continence. Many forms of diversion and recreation, sanctioned or tolerated by modern societies, particularly the use of alcohol, tend to stimulate sexual passion, and to lead the weak-willed into vice. Finally, the highly commercialized character of modern prostitution causes those financially interested to place many artificial temptations and incentives to vice in the way of young people.

The supply side. The causes operating on the supply side of prostitution are much more intricate and difficult of analysis than those on the demand side. However, certain well-founded conclusions stand out as a result of the numerous investigations which have been made.

In the first place, there is general agreement that the number of so-called "natural prostitutes," women whose tastes and inclinations predispose them to a life of vice, is relatively very small — quite inadequate to fill up the ranks of prostitution as it now exists. The great majority of prostitutes represent the action of conditions involving compulsion in some form. Many of these conditions are social, and there is a growing tendency to regard the typical prostitute as a social product. Among the conditions which impel girls and women into prostitution are destitute homes lacking the essentials of decency, congestion in tenements, lack of play room, lack of rooms within the home where young women may receive callers, immoral surroundings during youth, particularly the example of fast women living in tenements and furnishing evidence of the possibilities of a life of seeming luxury and ease, and numerous other circumstances which familiarize children, early in life, with the abnormal aspects of sex life. The monotony and strain of factory and store employment turn young girls out at the end of the day with a highly stimulated craving for diversion, excitement, and adventure, and a weakened power of resistance. Low wages constitute a very important — nobody knows quite how important — predisposing cause of vice, particularly in the case of girls whose employment requires them to keep up their personal appearance. In the case of department store clerks, who are continually handling luxurious

fabrics, and dealing with richly dressed customers, the possibilities of gratification involved in the difference between their weekly wage and the earnings of vice are emphasized. The positions held by many wage-earning girls inevitably expose them to the advances of those who seek to place temptation in their way.

The emphasis laid on low wages as a cause of vice has aroused the resentment of some persons, who seem to regard it as an insult to womankind. In the comparison of actual earnings of $6 a week, with the estimate of $8 a week as the minimum cost of a decent livelihood for a single woman, these persons read the implication that a difference of $2 a week is the price of the virtue of the average working girl. This interpretation of the figures entirely misses the point. The facts are not that girls deliberately choose a life of vice for the sake of the higher earnings, but that low wages, with the attendant malnutrition, strain to keep up appearances, lack of recreation, and general grayness and dreariness of life, weaken the girl's power of resistance to the temptations which are ever present in the life around her. Far from furnishing an impeachment of the morality of working girls, the facts — now familiar — with reference to working and living conditions stand as striking evidence of the persistence and firmness with which the majority of working girls, however small their earnings, withstand the insidious and cleverly veiled temptations presented to them. It is in the hour of special weariness, loneliness, and nervous exhaustion, awaited by the tempter, that an occasional girl takes the first step which eventually places her in the ranks of prostitution.

Thus the characteristic organization of modern society exhibits many features which exert a form of social

compulsion, impelling girls and young women in the direction of vicious living. There are other forms of compulsion even more direct, such as false promises of marriage and mock marriages, by which women are brought into the power of men who later force them into lives of prostitution. The climax of compulsion is reached, in the conduct of the "white slave traffic," when women are actually taken by force and reduced to a state of virtual bondage. Taking all these facts into consideration there seems no question that the great majority of prostitutes are drawn into the life against their will, or at least in opposition to their innate inclinations and desires.

Effects of prostitution. The effects of prostitution reach into every department of individual and social life. The moral and spiritual effects are too obvious to need discussion. The physical effects have only recently been fully comprehended, but are now understood more or less clearly by a rapidly increasing number of men and women. Some of the most serious physical effects are connected with the venereal diseases, particularly syphilis and gonorrhœa. Both of these diseases are highly contagious, and very serious in character; both are curable with proper medical attendance, and extreme care on the part of the patient; but both may lie dormant in the system after the superficial evidences have disappeared, and many years later infect an innocent person. Syphilis may be, and occasionally is, contracted otherwise than through sexual intercourse; gonorrhœa practically never.* The effects of syphilis are more serious, on the whole, especially with

* With occasional exceptions in the case of little girls, and, presumably, women.

reference to the second and third generations, but gonorrhœa is a much more prevalent disease and consequently occasions probably a greater total amount of suffering. The ravages of this latter disease are only beginning to be fully comprehended; the estimates concerning them are startling. It is said, for instance, that eighty per cent of all children blind from birth, and thirty per cent of all adult blindness is chargeable to this disease, as are sixty per cent of all surgical abdominal operations peculiar to women, and nearly sixty per cent of all involuntary sterile marriages.[109] There is no question that the growing knowledge on the part of married women with reference to the facts of venereal disease is a very frequent cause of divorce, though other grounds may be specified in the complaint. According to French law, infection with a venereal disease by either party to a marriage is ground for divorce for the other.

Quite apart from the consequences of prostitution to the individual, the social effects of this vice, in the way of broken families, wasted resources, and neglected children are so great as fully to justify society in putting into operation whatever forms of control promise improvement.

Treatment of prostitution. The causes of prostitution suggest the possibilities of betterment. In so far as ignorance is a cause either of demand or supply, the obvious remedy is education. As already observed, much faith has been given in recent years to educational measures as a remedy for sex vice. But there are obvious limits to the efficacy of this expedient. On the demand side, while a knowledge of the possible consequences of vice may deter a few (the deterrent effects of Nature's punishments, as of man's, are likely to be exaggerated),

there is, on the other hand, the growing knowledge of the prophylactic measures by which safety may be achieved. Thus education is a two-edged sword that cuts both ways. Probably in the long run education will do more to check the demand for prostitution than to increase it; but certainly education alone will never prove an adequate remedy for the evil on its demand side. For, as Doctor Cabot once observed in a public address, if education were all that is needed to prevent immorality, the students in a medical college should be the most moral group of young men in the world, since they have all the facts; experience, however, proves this not to be the case.

On the supply side, while ignorance undoubtedly operates as an important cause, the influence of traditional false beliefs is relatively of much less significance than on the demand side, and the scope of education is therefore more restricted. There is, nevertheless, much to be gained by wisely instructing girls and young women in matters of sex.

Another type of remedy, social in its nature, aims to correct or remove those environing conditions which increase the difficulty of adequate self-control and multiply the incentives to vice. An examination of these conditions reveals the fact that many of them are normal aspects of our existing social organization, and therefore not readily subject to alteration. Yet there is unquestionably much opportunity for the application of social control in removing some of the predisposing causes of vice, particularly the artificial temptations and stimuli which increase the demand, and the degrading living and working conditions which add to the supply.

A quite different type of remedy recognizes prostitution as "the necessary evil" and simply seeks to reduce it to minimum proportions, to eliminate unnecessary bad features, and to keep the undesirable consequences within the smallest possible compass. Measures of this sort involve state action, and bring certain aspects of prostitution into the category of crime. Examples of this class of expedient are the various plans for segregation or regulation. Much heated controversy has raged around the question of the expediency and moral justifiability of measures of this sort. The two chief objections are, first, that state recognition of prostitution is morally reprehensible and pernicious in its effect, and second, that these devices cannot be put into efficient operation and are not adequate to secure the results desired. Thus in Paris, where prostitution is supposed to be well regulated, there are said to be from 50,000 to 60,000 prostitutes, but only 6000 regulated; out of 20,000 to 30,000 prostitutes in Berlin only 3300 are registered.[110] The general trend of enlightened opinion appears to be in the direction of complete abandonment of state regulation as a satisfactory method of dealing with prostitution.

There seems to be no escape from the conclusion that, on the demand side at least, the question of prostitution is essentially a moral problem, to be treated effectively only by those agencies in society which are fitted to deal with moral and ethical questions.* After all has been done that can be done in the way of education, social amelioration, and official control, the major part of the task will still remain to be accomplished. This part of the task is two-fold: the establishment of a higher

* See pages 36–37.

social standard — involving the abandonment of the traditional "double standard," — and the elimination of that phase of selfishness in human character which induces men to gratify sexual appetites in ways prejudicial to the interests of other individuals or of society.

As far as the supply of prostitutes is concerned, an abolition of demand would automatically reduce supply to an almost negligible minimum; and this is apparently the only way in which the supply can be materially reduced. A demand so extensive and insistent as that which now exists is bound to be met, if not in one way, then in another. So that while social expedients of a protective and preventive nature are of great utility on the supply side of prostitution, yet it is futile to hope that prostitution can be abolished by checking the supply; the issue still remains essentially ethical and moral. The marked success recently achieved by some cities in expelling the prostitutes is in itself the result of moral awakening, not of the mere application of a social expedient which would be equally efficacious anywhere.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CHILD

Modern recognition of the importance of the child. The twentieth century has been styled the "century of the child," and certainly nowhere is the spirit of the modern social consciousness more clearly revealed than in present-day ideas and customs with reference to children.

The characteristic feature of the advanced social attitude toward children is the clear recognition of the fact that the rising generation contains, in embryo, all the possibilities of the society of the future, and that therefore no question is of greater importance to society than the character and nurture of its children. Because societies are potentially immortal, the immediate interests of any given generation are of almost infinitesimal importance as compared with the enduring interests of society itself. Therefore the rights of society to direct and control the development of each new generation rise paramount to those of any individuals in the older generation; parents are not now recognized as having any rights over their children which run counter to the interests of society as represented by the true welfare of the children themselves.

Child protection. To be sure this principle is only beginning to win universal acceptance, and consequently to be embodied in the legal enactments of various states. Nevertheless, some noteworthy steps have already been

taken. Witness the neglect law of Massachusetts, one of the most advanced states of the Union as regards social legislation. The section of this law defining criminal neglect of children is worthy of quotation at length:

"Any parent, whether father or mother, who deserts or wilfully neglects or refuses to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her child or children under the age of sixteen, or whose minor child by reason of the neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, habits of crime or other vice of such parent is growing up without education, or without salutary control, or without proper physical care, or in circumstances exposing such child to lead an idle and dissolute life, shall be guilty of a crime."[111]

What a change from the days of the "patria potestas!" Children are no longer considered to "belong to" the parents. There could scarcely be a more striking example of the trend of modern social philosophy than this intrusion of social control into the final stronghold of natural rights and individual liberty. It would be hard to conceive of any untoward condition in the home environment of a child which really threatened his future usefulness to society which could not be brought within the meaning of the foregoing statute, and hence become a matter for social interference. In practice, Massachusetts does not hesitate to break up, temporarily or permanently, families which cannot, by any other means, be reshaped into fit homes for children; the removal of children from the so-called home, by court order, is an efficacious expedient in the hands of those agencies entrusted with the enforcement of the neglect law.

The control of child labor. One of the earliest manifestations of the new conception of the child may be traced

in the revolt which arose in the first half of the nineteenth century against the conditions which resulted from the exploitation of child labor under a system of *laissez faire*. The story is a familiar one. The introduction of the factory system, particularly in England, created an extensive and vigorous demand for the labor of children in industrial pursuits. This demand was met largely from the almshouse and orphanage population. In the absence of social control, the play of economic forces reduced the living and working conditions of these children to a degree of misery, vice, and degradation almost incredible to the modern mind. The hours of labor for little children were twelve, fourteen, and even more per day. The squalor and wretchedness of their dwellings can be grasped only by the reading of contemporary accounts. The physical, mental, and moral effects were immediate and appalling. In half a century there was produced "a race of pale, stunted, and emaciated creatures, irregular in their lives and dissolute in their habits." Their case appeared so desperate that for those who believed in *laissez faire*, "'the only hope,' as Harriet Martineau confessed, 'seems to be that the race will die out in two or three generations.'" [112]

The demonstration of the disastrous effects of the unregulated employment of children was complete. Yet so great was the prestige of the let-alone philosophy that, even in the face of such visible evidence, the progress of reform was exceedingly slow. It took twenty-five years of legislation to restrict a child of nine to sixty-nine hours of work a week, and that only in the cotton mills.[113] From this simple beginning the process of extending social control over the labor of children in industry has gone on at an accelerating pace, until to-day

every modern society has on its statute books an elaborate set of regulations with reference to child labor. Not only has the legal working day been progressively shortened, but the minimum age at which children may enter ordinary wage-earning occupations has been strictly defined. In the United States, most of the States have adopted the age limit of fourteen years for most lines of employment, sometimes with an extension to sixteen years in case a minimum amount of schooling has not been secured.

Thus in his home and at his work the twentieth century child is surrounded by social protection against positive abuse and exploitation. But the modern society does not stop here. The need is also recognized for measures designed for the encouragement and development of the latent powers and talents of the child, mental, moral, and physical. Free compulsory education is rapidly becoming universal. Particularly in the case of younger children, the old policy of restraint and coercion is being abandoned in favor of an environment calculated to foster natural growth and self-expression. If this tendency sometimes goes to foolish extremes, it does not differ in this respect from practically all progressive movements.

Juvenile delinquency. Thus the growing recognition of the importance of the child, and the responsibility of society for his nurture, has caused numerous additions to the category of crimes against children. The same forces have also completely revolutionized the social conception of the crimes *of* children, and the social attitude toward the child criminal. This change is exemplified in the imputation of an entirely different sort of responsibility to children than to adults. Under an older

conception of crime, when the attention of jurists was focussed on the act rather than on the agent, a crime was a crime, by whomsoever committed, and a given crime must be accorded a given punishment. Thus young children were thrown in indiscriminately with hardened offenders, and the same treatment was meted out to all. We are gradually learning that the old-fashioned methods of punishment, whatever their efficacy when applied to adults, are the surest possible means of making criminals when applied to children. The modern penology, centering its attention upon the criminal rather than the crime, and adopting individualization of punishment as its guiding principle, recognizes that good results can be achieved only by the adoption of a set of correctional expedients specifically designed for young offenders, and adapted to juvenile character.

The concrete embodiment of the foregoing principles is found in the juvenile delinquency laws and the juvenile court system of modern states. The word "delinquency" is significant. The child is no longer regarded as a criminal, but as one who has gone astray, or one who lacks guidance or control. The idea of punishment, in its strict sense, has been entirely abandoned in the treatment of juvenile offenders. The goal aimed at is reformation, the creation of new ideals, and the re-direction of energies. Probation is the soul of the modern treatment of youthful offenders.

The juvenile court. The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899, though Massachusetts had taken steps in that direction in 1869 by granting delinquent children separate trials, and placing them with private societies instead of in jails and prisons. The Denver court, perhaps the most famous juvenile court

in the world, followed soon after the Chicago venture. Since then the juvenile court movement has spread with remarkable rapidity, both in the United States and other countries. The characteristic features of juvenile court procedure are the following. First, separate trials and separate judges. Where the system is fully developed, there is a court entirely given over to juvenile cases; in other instances, a special day or days are set aside for the hearing of such cases. Preferably, a specially trained judge gives all his time to work with children; otherwise regular judges are assigned to this work for stated periods. Second, private hearings. There is absolutely no publicity attending a properly conducted juvenile case. Either those immediately concerned withdraw to the judge's private room, or, if the hearing is held in the court room, those connected with the case gather about the judge's desk, and the hearing is conducted in a low tone of voice which conveys no information to bystanders or court loafers. Third, the effort is made to secure facts and devise remedies rather than to convict and punish. First of all the judge seeks to gain the confidence of the child, and to secure from him and others a correct notion of the exact nature of the difficulty. Then the judge, on the basis of his knowledge and experience, endeavors to hit upon the treatment of the young delinquent which will be most efficacious in leading him back into law-abiding and orderly ways. The capable judge is one who can establish this relationship of confidence and trust without in the least diminishing the sense of solemnity and gravity which should characterize the procedure in order to impress the child with the seriousness of the situation. Fourth, probational treatment of the child. The basic idea of juvenile procedure is that

ordinarily the young delinquent needs, not punishment, and certainly not punishment by imprisonment, but expert and careful supervision and guidance. Usually the child is allowed to return to his parents, but is placed on probation and required to report from time to time. The probation officer is of hardly secondary importance to the judge in the modern treatment of juvenile delinquents. The qualifications for a competent probation officer are extremely high, while the service rendered to the community is great enough to attract men of a very fine type.

The juvenile court system is amply justified by its results. Instead of turning venturesome, reckless, or wayward boys and girls into hardened criminals and enemies of society, as was so often the case under the old fashioned procedure, the modern methods have succeeded, in a high percentage of cases, in working real reformation. The influence of the juvenile court in preventing delinquency is also noteworthy.

In addition to the official agencies established by modern states to protect, control, and develop children there is a vast array of private societies and agencies devoted to the promotion of the welfare of children. Such are the societies for the prevention of cruelty to children, children's aid societies, children's missions, etc. Under the best conditions, a very helpful spirit of coöperation exists, not only between the various private agencies, but between them and the official agencies, by which waste of effort and duplication are avoided, and efficiency of service secured.

Play. Another sign of the times is the widespread recognition of the right of the child to play, and the increasing provision for the fulfillment of that right. Here,

again, both public and private agencies are united, though the need of provision for play is now becoming so completely recognized as a social responsibility that the playground movement is passing increasingly into the realm of government, particularly municipal governments.

The foregoing discussion is merely suggestive of the manifold ways in which society recognizes the claim of the child to consideration and care. A hundred other instances might be mentioned, such as the formation of the Federal Children's Bureau of the United States, the growth of the pure milk movement, the spread of education for motherhood, and the special attention of visiting nurses to child welfare.

It is worthy of note that all this solicitude for the welfare and development of the child arises not only because we have grown more humanitarian, but because we have grown more scientific. It is realized that the laws of cause and effect operate in the social realm as well as in the material, and that every unfavorable environing condition which surrounds the child of to-day will have its inevitable influence upon the society of to-morrow. That marvelous trait of human character which causes the welfare of future generations to operate as a powerful motive in the conduct of the present generation, inspires the majority of men and women to forego some of their own immediate and personal interests in order that society may progress.

CHAPTER XVII

REVOLUTIONARY SCHEMES OF BETTERMENT

Two revolutionary schemes. To remedy inclusively the evils which characterize our present social organization in the realm of marriage and the family, two revolutionary schemes of betterment have been advocated.

Feminism. The first of these schemes is what has come to be known as feminism, or the woman movement. Stripped of all non-essentials, this movement appears as an effort to place the female sex upon a plane of essential identity with the male sex as regards social rights, prerogatives, obligations, and duties. In an earlier day its aim used to be considered as the securing of "equal rights" for women. But the fact is that the past century or two have seen women endowed with social rights in some respects superior to those of men. This is particularly true of married women. For, as has been observed, the woman who is taken by a man in marriage is thereby relieved of all responsibility for her own financial support or for that of her children, so long as she conducts herself with sufficient conformity to the mores to give her husband no ground for terminating the marital bond. Briefly, she has the right to demand maintenance from her husband as long as he shall live. What wider right than this can be conceived? Beside the right to shift the primary burden of life to the shoulders of another, such matters as the lack of the suffrage dwindle

to insignificance. It is true, of course, that this right is limited to married women; but it is with reference to the marriage relation that the inequality of rights, so much complained of, mainly exists. With the exception of the rights to vote and hold office, the rights of the unmarried woman are virtually the same as those of the unmarried man, in modern societies; on the other hand women enjoy many exemptions.

Within recent years it has become plain that what is wanted by the leaders of the woman movement is not equal rights, but identical rights. And since the more level-headed feminists are logical enough to see that all rights are, and must be, correlated with duties, the more convincing branch of the feminist propaganda demands also that social duties and responsibilities, identical with those of men, be placed upon women.

There is no question that the woman movement deserves the term revolutionary. It sets out to overthrow social institutions, usages, and conventions which have been produced by the action of evolutionary forces during countless thousands of years. All the limitations, handicaps, and restrictions, all the favors, chivalries, and exemptions which have marked woman's lot are to be swept away at a stroke. Woman is henceforth to walk life's path alongside of man, supporting an equal share of the burden of existence, asking no consideration, and accepting no impositions.

Time would fail to examine, or even enumerate, all of the specific proposals that have been made for the consummation of the aims of feminism. Uniforms for women, short hair, surnames for women to be taken from the mother (an expedient which, as some one has pointed out, would logically lead to calling all men

Adam and all women Eve), are only some of the more fantastic and unessential of the changes advocated. More serious are the proposals that equal wages for men and women in the same occupation should be enforced by law; that the grounds for divorce should be identical for both sexes; that property rights should be the same for men and women; that the dual standard of sex morality should be abandoned; that political rights, both as to voting and holding office, should be identical; that women should be under the same obligation to render service, of the sort they are best qualified to give, in times of war, as are men; that the burden of taxation should rest equally upon both sexes; and that the financial obligation of the married woman for the support of the family should be identical with that of her husband.

The basic weakness of feminism. Many of these proposals are either too trivial or too absurd to merit detailed examination, but others, such as the demand for political equality, and divided marital responsibility, are worthy of the most serious and careful consideration. Throughout them all is to be discerned the struggle of the modern woman for complete emancipation, a struggle all the more energetic because she is already so largely emancipated. What has already been accomplished both stimulates the desire and enhances the possibility of complete achievement. Many steps in this emancipation movement seem relatively easy, or even certain, of accomplishment. But there is one great phase of the question that gives us pause. A careful analysis of the changes desired by the feminists reveals the fact that what the modern woman is seeking, in many of her advanced endeavors, is really, at bottom, emancipation from the special limitations and handicaps placed upon

her by her sex and the fulfillment of her sexual functions. For it is just these limitations which, in the course of social evolution, have placed her in the position of inferiority which she now resents.

Inherent sex differences. One of the most heated of all feminist controversies rages around the question as to just what are the inherent characteristics of the female sex. On the one hand it is asserted that all the traits which we think of as distinctively feminine are really sexual characters; on the other hand it is maintained that most of these features are merely the product of ages of cultivation, discipline, and sexual selection, and that men and women are by nature practically identical except for the reproductive system. There is little hope that this problem will ever be conclusively solved. We cannot unravel the evolutionary skein any more than we can unscramble the proverbial egg. Men and women are what they are to-day, and it can be little more than calisthenics for the imagination to seek to determine what they might have been if all social evolution had been different. It must be said, however, that, in response to the claim that women were originally the equals of men in every way, the query inevitably arises, why, if that is so, did women ever allow themselves to be put in such a position of inferiority, and permit man to make woman just what he wanted her to be, as the feminists maintain?

The great fact of nature which underlies the whole discussion is simply that reproduction means a very different thing to woman than to man. While the contribution of each sex, at the moment of conception, is of equal importance in determining the character of the offspring, from that moment on, the significance of re-

production, and the influence of the parent upon the developing embryo, are altogether different for the two sexes. In the case of the man, the reproductive act has no permanent consequences, nor does his future life directly affect the offspring. He may die immediately after impregnation without influencing the character of the new individual. The case is radically different with the woman. Not only does her part in reproduction unfit or handicap her to a greater or less degree for other activities, but also the influence upon the offspring of her manner of life, her health, and her state of mind, not only during the actual period of reproduction, but for all her life before and a considerable period after, is such that society cannot permit her entire freedom to engage in various activities or occupations at will. This fact underlies all modern legislation limiting or controlling the occupational activities of women.

Here lies the great obstacle in the path of feminism. Either some means must be discovered to equalize the reciprocal influence between parent and child in the case of the male and female parent, or else society must allow women to follow their own volition in their activities, irrespective of the effects upon the child. To adopt the latter expedient would be to reverse the direction of social evolution, which, as has been seen, tends more and more to mold social institutions in the interest of the child; there is no indication that society is ready to take this backward step. Likewise, there is no ground for supposing that the laws of nature are to be abrogated, as implied in the former alternative. Feminists have not yet proposed, and it is difficult to believe that they ever can propose, an adequate method of meeting this dilemma.

Woman suffrage. With the foregoing principles in mind, attention may be turned to one or two of the more important specific feminist proposals. In the front rank, of course, stands the suffrage question, which for many years has been the nucleus and rallying-point of the growing feminist movement, partly because it is concrete and definite, and partly because it is the chief of the recognized rights which are still different for the unmarried man and the unmarried woman.

Arguments in favor of woman suffrage. The arguments in favor of woman suffrage fall into three main classes: (1) Women have a natural right to vote, equal to that of men, and justice demands that the vote be given them. (2) Woman suffrage will improve society. (3) Woman suffrage will improve woman.

Natural rights. The first of the foregoing groups of arguments admits of no discussion. The whole idea of natural rights is now pretty completely abandoned by sociologists, and even if it is granted that there is such a thing as a natural right, it is not a subject for argument. Since the idea of natural rights rests entirely upon intuition or introspection, there is no possibility of reaching an agreement as to an enumeration of natural rights or a decision as to whether a given prerogative is a natural right or not. For what one person intuitively recognizes as a natural right will not be so recognized by another person, and one man's (or woman's) intuition is just as good as another's. To those who believe in natural rights, and who believe that the right of women to vote is one of them, there is no occasion for further discussion; the question for them is settled. For others, there is no profit in discussion, for it would not convince them.

A somewhat modified form of the rights argument is

the assertion that since women own property and engage in industrial work they should have the right to help shape the laws which govern property and regulate the conditions of labor. This argument either proves nothing, or it proves too much. For children of both sexes, from fourteen years of age up, engage in industrial pursuits, and according to the argument should also be given the vote. To reply that there are special reasons why children should not have the vote, simply opens the way for the counter-assertion that there are special reasons why women should not have the vote, thus neutralizing the argument in question.

The superiority of women. Many, if not most, of the arguments under the second head rest upon the assertion or implication that women are inherently better than men, and that therefore the entrance of women into political life would tend to "purify politics," reduce corruption, improve municipal conditions, and eliminate various evils which arise from bad government — including slushy sidewalks, according to one indignant owner of "several pairs of white high-laced boots." [114] This type of assertion, like the foregoing, admits of no discussion, or at least of no verification. There is no possibility of either proving or disproving the inherent superiority of women, and therefore no possibility of substantiating claims based on this assumption.

A somewhat different argument for the salutory influence of women on political life rests upon the fact that women represent a different set of interests, and a different psychological element in the population, from men, and therefore would bring a wider variety of tests to the judgment of public questions. It is asserted in particular that women are more sensitive and sympathetic with

respect to the welfare of children, working women, the sanctity of the home, etc., than are men, and that political power in the hands of women would be used to pass better laws in respect to such matters. This argument appears to be one of the most convincing of all those advanced in support of woman suffrage. Since the laws and administration of a democracy are supposed to reflect and embody the wishes and character of the mass of the people, it follows that the larger the number of elements in the population who are instrumental in framing the laws and conducting the government, the more complete and perfect will be the democracy. It does not seem probable, however, that much prominence will be given to this argument by the advanced feminists, since it is based upon the inherent *diversity*, instead of identity, between men and women.

There seems to be no possibility of predicting the influence of woman suffrage upon society on purely *a priori* grounds; it is a question which can be settled only by experiment and experience. So far, the evidence of experience seems to be somewhat contradictory. While many noteworthy social advances have been made in suffrage states since women received the vote, many of them have been along lines already mapped out in man-governed states, and have not exceeded or even equaled the achievements of states without woman suffrage. It would be hard to find a state in the Union where the interests of women and children, and the sanctity of the home, are more adequately safeguarded than in man-governed Massachusetts. In this connection it is interesting to note that Colorado not long ago was commonly characterized as the "worst-governed state in the Union."

In making comparisons of this sort, also, it must be borne in mind that woman suffrage is a "new broom," and therefore "sweeps clean." Any supposed reform which is accomplished as the result of a long and hard fight is under a tremendous pressure to "make good" in the early days of its victory while the leaders are still alive and prominently in the public eye. The enthusiasm and *esprit de corps* which have made victory possible are still available for justifying that victory. If the young men of the United States should launch a vigorous campaign to have the voting age reduced to sixteen years, and should finally achieve their end, there is little doubt that some good effects would be discernible for a few years. The ultimate effects of such a movement are a very different thing, and it is still too early, in the United States at least, to judge decisively of the practical workings of woman suffrage.

The benefit to women. The third chief group of arguments in favor of woman suffrage contend that women should be given the vote because it would improve woman. It is asserted that the broadening influence of participation in the active management of public affairs would bring about a development and self-expression much needed in female character. Particularly is it urged that women would profit by the educational value of keeping posted on current affairs. There is a certain superficial cogency about this type of argument, which, it must be confessed, diminishes upon close analysis. In the first place, the influence, broadening or otherwise, exerted upon the average male citizen by his possession of the vote appears very insignificant. The man whose political life is limited to occasional and grudging trips to the polls is not much affected for better or worse by

his right of suffrage; while the man whose business is politics does not seem invariably to be improved by his business. In the second place, as far as education is concerned, it seems probable that women would get more education in one year of fighting for the vote than they would in ten years of exercising it.

Arguments against woman suffrage. The principal arguments against woman suffrage imply either (1) that woman is less fitted than man for political responsibilities and duties, or (2) that participation in active political life would injure the character of woman or would interfere with her most effective performance of other duties and obligations.

The unfitness of women. Along the former line it is particularly urged that women are constitutionally less fitted to take an impartial, impersonal, and judicial view of matters than are men, that their very nature leads them into emotionalism, inconsistency, contrariety, and at times into hysteria, and that therefore they cannot be trusted to follow out a given policy consistently, nor to handle public questions on a basis of complete equity. All of these assertions are flatly denied by the feminists, who maintain that any feminine traits of the type specified are purely fortuitous, due to environment and training, and would disappear in a few generations of freedom and opportunity. And there the matter rests. Obviously, neither side can be dislodged from its position by argument.

One argument against woman suffrage, very popular in an earlier epoch, has now become a complete anachronism; this is the assertion that the vote should accompany military obligation, and since women cannot fight, they should not vote. The war in Europe has effectively

demonstrated not only that women, if they can disguise themselves adequately, can hold their own with men even on the battlefield and in the trenches, but, much more significant, that many national activities, equally important for military success with actual fighting, can be adequately performed by women. Considering in addition the special services of nursing for which women are peculiarly adapted, there can remain no doubt that woman is as completely entitled to the vote, on militaristic grounds, as man.

The injury to women. As to the effect of political activity upon the character and usefulness of women, two or three considerations demand attention. In the first place, the woman who took her political responsibilities as lightly as does the average male citizen would hardly find that they imposed any appreciable handicap on her, nor interfered in the slightest with her other occupations; neither could they injure the delicacy or refinement of her nature. There remains the question of active or professional participation in politics. No woman would be compelled to take up engrossing political activities unless she felt that she had the time and the capacity to do so; this question could safely be left to the individual woman. For the women who did, politics would probably prove to be what it is for men, a source of manifold opportunities and temptations, an efficient school of corruption for the weak, and an admirable discipline for the strong, an intimate revelation of the world as it is.

In this connection, there is one fact which should be clearly recognized by those who advocate the enfranchisement of women, viz.: that if women ever enter political life on terms of complete equality with men, if they become involved in "the system," if the motives

back of their political activities come to be ambition, greed, lust for power, and the desire to make a living, as well as the desire to serve their country and accomplish reform — in short, if woman becomes a complete participant in political life, it will mean the introduction of sex into politics. Whether this would prove a good thing or a bad thing cannot be decided offhand; certainly it would be a very serious thing. In view of the appalling power for evil which inheres in the present system of bargaining for money and patronage in political life, and the degrading influence which it exerts on all but the very strongest, the consequences which would arise from the introduction of a third object of bargaining would inevitably be of the gravest social concern. For it must be remembered that the vote for women will fall upon the just and upon the unjust, and that there will no more be a moral test for the franchise applied to women than to men. Perhaps the ultimate result would be a higher morality for men as well as for women. But those who advocate complete political emancipation for women must be prepared to encounter some decidedly undesirable corollaries to their program during the period while the mores are becoming adjusted to the new régime.

Small ground for argument. On the whole, there seems to be a very narrow margin for real argumentation in the matter of votes for women. Woman suffrage is, after all, the sort of thing that "cometh not with observation." It is distinctly a matter of the mores; it comes, in any given society, when the forces of social evolution have prepared that society for it. And when it comes, it brings with it both good and ill. If the society is undergoing a really progressive evolution there will probably be more of good than evil. But

the actual conferring of the vote upon women is only to a very limited extent the cause of the good, but rather the accompaniment or expression of forces for good in the social evolution. To force woman suffrage prematurely upon a society not prepared for it will result in accentuating the evil and minimizing the good. A suggestive analogy is found in the theory of revolutions, expounded by Lassalle, which holds that the real revolution is that obscure change in social relationships which takes place gradually, and that the visible so-called "revolution" is merely the outward sign that the change has been accomplished.

The economic independence of women. Among the more radical proposals of feminism none is more important and significant than the movement for the "economic independence" of woman. This term implies identity between men and women, not only as regards economic opportunity, but economic responsibility and obligation. It is not enough that the doors of the world of business should be thrown wide open to women, and the social stigma removed from women who engage in any respectable gainful occupation whatever; there must also be an identical burden of financial obligation resting upon all women, married as well as single, with that which rests upon men.

The foregoing proposal evidently concerns specifically the position of woman in the family, particularly the married woman. The present situation, wherein the wife is socially and legally dependent for financial support upon her husband, is bitterly resented by feminists, and is regarded as the source of many of the most grievous social ills; it is called "parasitism," and is regarded as differing only in degree from prostitution.

The change advocated is the imposition of an equal duty for the financial support of the family upon each parent, and the transference of the social stigma from the woman who works for her living to the woman who does not work for her living. This would mean, of course, that the percentage of females gainfully employed would become virtually the same as that of males.

A proposal so revolutionary as this rises almost above discussion, and certainly above prediction. It is utterly impossible to tell in advance what would be the results, immediate or final, of such a complete inversion of the social order. All that can be done is to note certain general results which might be expected to follow the inauguration of the scheme, assuming that to be possible.

First of all, the establishment of the "economic independence" of woman would correct the great maladjustment which now exists between the normal aspects of the economic life and marriage and the family. No longer would there be free competition between two classes of workers with different social liabilities. The principle that equality of economic opportunity should be accompanied by equality of financial responsibility would be met. The woman in industry would regard her work in the same light of permanence as does the man. Her marginal bid for remuneration would be fixed, not as now by the minimum amount necessary to support one person, but by the amount fixed by her actual or potential family responsibilities. This, in itself, would obviously be a good thing.

There are, however, certain equally obvious disadvantages and obstacles connected with the proposed measure. Most of these arise from the fundamental weakness of feminism already noted. For reasons con-

nected with the permanent welfare of society, women cannot be allowed the same freedom in industrial activities that men can. The interests of the rising generation require that every mother for a considerable period of her prime be required to engage in industrial occupations only under strict limitations, if at all. During this period, her earning capacity in the strictly economic field will be materially reduced. How, then, is she to be enabled to bear her share of the financial burden of the family? How, in short, are the duties of motherhood to be made to harmonize with the obligations of complete economic independence? The only logical answer yet made to these queries is that the state should subsidize mothers during the period when the best interests and fullest development of their children demand their partial or undivided attention. This solution, however, can hardly suit the feminists, since it involves payment for sex functions, which is exactly what the feminists deprecate.

The visionary character of feminism. The foregoing example will sufficiently indicate the general character of the feminist proposals. If woman suffrage involves a change in the mores, much more does complete and perfect feminism! As yet, feminism itself presents no consistent and harmonious program for public consideration. Particularly with respect to the narrower sex interests feminists are divided into two opposing camps, one emphasizing sex, and arguing for a freer sex life for women, including the right of motherhood for every woman, whether married or not, and the other deprecating the emphasis upon sex, and urging a popular conception and treatment of woman based much more largely upon her other capacities and endowments. Taken as a

whole, feminism presents itself thus far merely as an amorphous mass of ideas and ideals, hopes, dissatisfactions, longings, resentments, desires, regrets, imaginings, and speculations. Its importance and interest are mainly in its significance of far-reaching changes which have taken place and are taking place in human relationships. It is a sign or symptom of the direction of social evolution. It is something neither to fight for nor against, but to watch, study, and contemplate. If society ever becomes ready for feminism, feminism will come. In the meantime, if the study of feminism discloses certain social tendencies which promise an increase in welfare on the one hand, or threaten social injury on the other hand, conscious effort may profitably be expended in accelerating or checking these tendencies respectively. If this is done, the question of feminism itself may safely be left to the arbitrament of time.[115]

Eugenics. The second great revolutionary scheme for social betterment in the field of self perpetuation is eugenics. In a sense, eugenics is *the* inclusive scheme for improvement in the entire realm of social relationships, for, in its purpose, it aims at much more than merely the correction of the evils directly connected with the growth of population. It is because the forces which eugenics plans to use are those associated with the growth of population that this movement is classified under this head.

Eugenics is of peculiar interest because it is the only noteworthy social movement that proposes to correct social evils on the basis of heredity; every other reform program centers its attention upon the environment. The long argument as to whether heredity or environment is the more important factor in determining character is

familiar to every student of biological or sociological matters. It is still unsettled. But there is assuredly enough importance attaching to heredity in human affairs to give particular weight to any scientific proposal to utilize this principle in advancing human welfare. In fact, heredity is perhaps more important to man than to any other animal, for the reason that man's life is governed so largely by the human, instead of the physical, environment, and the human environment consists of other men, women, and children, each with his own heredity. Thus in the case of man, not only the original endowment of the individual, but a considerable portion of his most determinative environment, are fixed by the principle of heredity.

In brief, eugenics proposes to use, in the production of a better human race, those principles of development, long known to breeders, by which the grade of cultivated plants and domestic animals has been so greatly improved. Eugenics may be tersely defined as the science of human breeding.

Two branches of eugenics. It is evident at a glance that the science of eugenics, like sociology, and like most other sciences, naturally divides into two departments: first, the theoretic department, which seeks to discover the laws and principles of human heredity; and second, the practical department, which endeavors to devise methods whereby these laws and principles may be put into practical operation. It is obvious that the former of these departments, difficult as it is, presents a much easier field and a much greater promise of accomplishment, than the latter. The general laws of heredity are now fairly well understood; the problem of determining what modifications or restatements are necessary to

make them applicable to the human species is simply a question of sufficient biological observation and experimentation with human specimens. The laws of human heredity exist; the task is simply to find them out. The second department of eugenics, however, involves the modification of the mores to fit an approved and rational, but arbitrary, model. Any one at all familiar with the nature of the mores will at once recognize this as a task of unimaginable difficulty.

Theoretical eugenics. It was remarked above that even the task of theoretical eugenics is by no means easy. The chief reason for this is the familiar one of the limited field of scientific experiment upon human beings. In the case of plants and the lower animals, the subjects are under the direct and complete control of the breeder. He can arrange matings at will; he can refuse reproduction to those types which he does not wish to perpetuate; he can arrange arbitrary and artificial environments and conditions of life. None of these expedients is open to the student of human heredity. He is confined to the sort of experimentation which marks the limit of practically every social scientist, viz. the careful and minute observation of the natural phenomena which occur around him. Even this resource is much restricted in the case of the eugenist by the extreme difficulty in securing the data needed for his inductions.

In spite of all these obstacles, however, much has already been accomplished in the formulation of the laws of human heredity. It is now generally agreed that the principles of independent unit characters, determiners in the germ plasm, and segregation of determiners apply to the human species. Some progress has been made in designating certain human traits as positive or

negative characters. Perhaps the most remarkable and useful achievement thus far is the new knowledge of the origin and nature of feeble-mindedness, which is now recognized as a negative character. On the basis of this knowledge, a workable set of rules has been devised to govern the mating of mental defectives.[116]

Practical eugenics. The task of applying the theories of heredity to the practical improvement of human society involves two separate problems: first, what traits are to be selected for perpetuation and intensification, and what for elimination; second, how people are to be induced or coerced to put these principles into practice.

The difficulties presented by the former of these problems inhere in the uncertainty as to what constitutes the ideal human type. Shall we breed for mental excellence or for physical, or shall we try to combine both? Shall we seek to develop a single, well-rounded type of individual, embodying the highest perfection attainable of all desirable human capacities, or shall we breed for specialists along a thousand different lines? If a family exhibits special musical talent, shall we seek to intensify that gift to the exclusion of all other endowments? To these, and many other questions of like import, no convincing answer has yet been given, though it is often assumed by those who know eugenics as little more than a name that an agreement has been reached on some of these points. One of the most remarkable of these popular misconceptions about eugenics is that it confines its program to the perfection of the physique, at the expense, if need be, of the intellect.[117] This is an excellent example of one of those strange inversions of thought which are not infrequent in the popular mind.

For Sir Francis Galton, the founder of eugenics, laid almost his entire stress upon mental excellence, and his followers have certainly not completely abandoned his lead.

In general, it is recognized as much simpler to determine what characters to breed out than what to breed in. What is sometimes called negative eugenics is accordingly far more promising than positive eugenics. Here again, feeble-mindedness is the classic example; it is generally agreed by eugenists that provision should be made for eliminating all feeble-minded strains.

The final, and as yet wholly unsolved, problem of eugenics is how to get people to adopt the eugenic ideal and follow the eugenic precepts. There are two possibilities, compulsion and persuasion. For the purposes of positive eugenics, and for all but the most obvious cases of negative eugenics, compulsion involves a revision of existing mores so radical as to be almost unthinkable. The idea of the irrationality of our present haphazard methods of human breeding is by no means new. The Italian philosopher, Campanella, in his early seventeenth century description of "The City of the Sun," remarked that the people of that ideal realm "laugh at us who exhibit a studious care for our breed of horses and dogs, but neglect the breeding of human beings." [118] Modern thinkers are prepared, perhaps, to admit the right of the state to control human mating in its own interests. But there is little indication that even the most advanced society of our time is ready to turn the entire arrangement of marriage pairs over to the state.

As for persuasion, the fundamental difficulty with that expedient is that it will appeal least to those who need it most. The mentally defective, the criminal, the igno-

rant, and the depraved are fitted neither to comprehend eugenics nor to obey its behests. Galton hoped that, in time, the eugenic ideal would become a sort of a religion, that it would get into the mores, so that two persons of feeble-minded ancestry, however normal they themselves appeared, would feel the same horror at the suggestion of marrying each other as if they were brother and sister. This hope appears wholly visionary and idealistic.[119]

Finally, there remains the great question, insistently presenting itself to the mind, whether, after all, "Nature" or the natural inclinations, instincts, and impulses which draw men and women together, are not a better and more reliable guide to fit mating than all the precepts and formulæ of the theorists. It will take a very convincing demonstration to persuade men to abandon a system which has worked tolerably well for ages past in favor of a scientific doctrine, except in cases of the most obvious unsuitability.

The scientific character of eugenics. It must be observed, however, that the eugenics movement, as far as its leaders are concerned, makes no extreme claims, nor advocates policies which it is not prepared to support. In this it differs diametrically from feminism. Eugenics is thoroughly scientific. At the present time, the prominent eugenists are devoting their attention almost exclusively to the theoretic side, seeking to build up an irrefragible set of principles and doctrines concerning human breeding. As regards putting their theories into practice, they have advanced only so far as they are sure that they are on firm ground. There is a consensus of opinion that feeble-mindedness is a fit subject for compulsory elimination, and that every society should make

provision absolutely to prevent the reproduction of mental defectives, either by surgery or by segregation. Ample practical justification is furnished by the experience of Italy with the Cretins.[120] The program for dealing with the feeble-minded is the outstanding practical contribution of eugenics to date, and that by itself affords sufficient justification for the entire movement.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ESTHETIC LIFE

The secondary character of the mental reactions. The activities classed by pure sociology under the heads of self-gratification and the mental reactions are usually designated as secondary or non-essential. This grouping is undoubtedly accurate, since the feelings and motives which lie back of these activities, and the social institutions and problems which result, are less fundamental and vital than those already considered under the heads of self-maintenance and self-perpetuation. At the same time, the activities included in the secondary categories are absolutely essential for organized and developed social life, primarily because they furnish the basis for all the various forms of social control. The origin of the societal system and of religion is traced to the mental reactions, while the force of public opinion depends directly upon the motive of vanity which underlies self-gratification.

Thus from the standpoint of origins, that is to say, the standpoint of pure sociology, the activities included in the last two heads rank only a little below those included in the first two, in social importance. From the point of view of applied sociology, however, the categories of the esthetic life and the intellectual and spiritual life demand decidedly less consideration than

the first two groups, partly because the various forms of social control, originating in simple motives, are so necessary for organized social life that they become an integral part of the social fabric in every department of life, and partly because most of the problems arising in these fields have either been pretty definitely settled, or else are of minor importance. Applied sociology practically takes the state, religion, and public opinion for granted, and turns to them for assistance and support wherever the service of either is appropriate. As was noted at the beginning of this study,* many of the vital problems of applied sociology gather around the question as to which of the agencies of social control will be most efficacious in meeting a certain situation. In that connection, something was said about the special field of state action — the treatment of crime — and numerous instances have come up for consideration in the succeeding pages. Something has also been said regarding the place of the family in dealing with non-criminal sin and vice. There remain for consideration the institutions of religion and public opinion, which must be relied upon for much of the social control of sin and vice, as well as for the support of the state in its handling of crime.

Aside from the foregoing aspects of the esthetic, intellectual, and spiritual life of modern societies, there are a few phases of the normal situation under each head which demand consideration because of their distinctly modern character, and a few specific social problems — some of them of large importance — which fall definitely within these fields, and have not received attention elsewhere.

* Page 36.

Vanity. The force which lies back of the activities of self-gratification, or the esthetic life, is vanity. It is necessary to distinguish clearly between the ordinary signification of the term "vanity" and its sociological meaning. In every-day phraseology vanity means self-esteem, thinking well of one's self. Sociologically, vanity means the *desire* to think well of one's self. Only in this sense can vanity be a social force; for action must result from a desire, not from a state of mind. Interpreted in this way, vanity appears not as an unworthy characteristic, but as an admirable and valuable quality; it is, moreover, practically universal among human beings.

The activities which arise from vanity, then, are those which seek to establish in men a sense of self-approbation, or well-being. Since man is a social animal, a considerable element in the feeling of self-satisfaction consists in the conviction that others think well of one. Hence many of the phenomena under the head of self-gratification have to do with men's efforts to win the approval of their fellow men.

Fashion. There are two main interests arising from the motive of vanity; these are fashion and recreation. Fashion, in turn, includes matters of dress, manners, personal appearance and bearing, conversation, and the broader affairs connected with what is commonly designated public opinion. Fashion is thus a highly social interest, as is indicated by the fact that it dominates much of what is included in one of the common meanings of "society." The human relationships which arise from fashion, while they do not penetrate to the very foundations of social existence, nevertheless contribute in a high degree to the smooth running of the

social mechanism, and the enjoyment and peace of daily life. That they are not absolutely fundamental is evidenced by the rapidity and arbitrariness with which they change. No society could possibly tolerate such sudden and wanton variations in the mores of self-maintenance and self-perpetuation as characterize many of the phenomena of self-gratification. Nevertheless, probably the larger portion of the positive surplus of human happiness inheres in the fashion interests and activities. Professor Giddings says, "Of all means of happiness, the social pleasures are the most tempting and exhilarating." [121]

Public opinion. Of especial social importance is that aspect of fashion called public opinion, since, as has been said, it is by public opinion that society exerts much of its extra-legal social control over its members. Public opinion is a force hard to define, hard to analyze, hard to isolate. Most of the time we are not conscious of its influence any more than we are of the pressure of the air. Nevertheless it is always present, bearing upon us with tremendous weight, and once in a while we feel it, as Professor Ross says, "like fathoms of sea lying heavily upon us." [122] The means by which public opinion manifests and exerts itself are numerous and varied. It works partly through commendation and partly through condemnation. There is also "something which is not praise or blame, and this residuum is mass suggestion. From this comes its power to reduce men to uniformity as a steam roller reduces bits of stone to smooth macadam." [123]

Convention. Long-established public opinion manifests itself in convention, which is a conservative factor of tremendous power. Convention has its advantages and its disadvantages. On the positive side, it operates

to hold the rank and file of men in line and to support traditional morality. So great is its force, and so difficult to escape, that there is really little merit in conventional morality. Only the exceptionally strong willed and independent can escape convention either upward or downward. Herein lies the great disservice of convention. It is cramping and confining. It clips the wings of the ambitious and spirited. It places obstacles in the way of art and progress. American literature, for instance, has been criticized because it is composed as if solely with the sweet girl graduate in mind, or as if we were all possible contributors to some ladies' journal. While some may query whether this criticism is really merited in recent years, yet it represents sufficiently well the general influence of staid and stereotyped morality. Convention is a social form necessitated by the weaknesses and limitations of the herd. And because the herd includes almost all of us, convention is one of the most necessary of social institutions.

The influence of the individual The questions of the efficacy of conscious individual effort in shaping public opinion, the means by which this influence is exerted, and the duty of exercising it, are among the most interesting, intricate, and important of all the problems of applied sociology. Public opinion is essentially a matter of the mores, and one of the primary teachings of pure sociology is that it is extremely difficult for the individual to alter the mores of his group. Nevertheless, public opinion is nothing else than the consensus of individual opinions; there is no social mind apart from the minds of the members of society. It follows that the opinion of every individual, however humble and insignificant, has some bearing upon the public opinion of his group.

It is also unquestionably true that exceptional individuals, from time to time, exert an incalculable influence upon the public opinion, and therefore upon the mores, of their group. Great men do not make history, but they play a very significant part in accelerating, retarding, diverting, or intensifying social movements. The greatest man, or the most successfully great man, is the one who succeeds in personifying an existing social tendency at the psychological moment in its development. Yet it would be an error to assume that social movements can develop and culminate without individual leaders, or that human history would have been what it has been without its great men. Between the extremes of the very great and the very humble are the masses of individuals of varying degrees of education, intelligence, culture, and insight, each with his own capacity for contributing to public opinion, and each with his special responsibility for seeing that that contribution is of the right sort. There is scarcely a social duty, beyond that of the ordinary, expected conformity to the mores, which has a more binding weight upon the individual than the duty of studying the social tendencies of his own time, estimating the probable effect of each upon human welfare, and casting the influence of his own opinion in favor of those which promise improvement, and against those which threaten injury.[124]

Recreation. It may seem, at first thought, like a strange interpretation of the facts to classify recreation among the activities which arise from the motive of vanity, and it would certainly be straining the point to assert that vanity is the sole force which lies back of all the varied recreational activities of modern peoples. Some writers on recreation speak of "the play instinct."

In so far as play is instinctive, there is no necessity for seeking to analyze its origins ; sociology takes all true instincts for granted. But with reference to the more developed recreational activities of those who have passed beyond the age of childhood, it becomes clear that vanity is prominent, if not predominant, among the motives which lead to play. This is emphatically true of all competitive sports, and it is significant how universally we prefer the competitive sports. If we cannot find a personal opponent, we set up an artificial one and call him "bogey." This is not to say that it is merely winning, or the desire to win, which gives zest to these sports. It is the desire to do things well, to be conscious of doing them well, and to be known as doing them well. Eliminate these motives from current recreations, and there would undoubtedly be much left; but it would be only a residuum. Even in the non-competitive sports, such as hunting and fishing, there is the combination of the desire to excel with the contest of wits between the hunter and his game. Of course, there are other types of recreation such as dancing, and even more clearly the drama, where the element of vanity is present in much smaller degree if at all. But at any rate, without pushing the argument to an extreme, recreation fits into the general classification more aptly under the head of self-gratification than anywhere else. Certainly the sense of well-being is the chief thing sought in all recreation.

The commercialization of recreation. The most important fact to be noted in the normal aspects of recreation in modern life is that recreation has shared the general fate of almost all social interests — it has become complex, impersonal, mechanized, and commercialized. The natural, spontaneous sports such as are described

in Goldsmith's "Deserted Village," and are still to be observed in the social life of backward peoples, or in the simple rural sections of modern nations, cannot survive in the atmosphere of the typical organization of highly developed societies. There are many reasons for this — lack of room, lack of leisure, lack of neighborhood acquaintanceship, lack of means for some and excess of means for others. The commercialization of recreation is particularly significant. More and more people are ceasing to participate in sports themselves, and are getting their recreation by paying to see others participate in sports. This is, of course, vastly better than no recreation at all. Professional baseball plays a tremendously valuable part in the life of the average urban individual of to-day, by furnishing him something to think about, to talk about, to get excited and argue about, to take him out of himself. But watching professional baseball is a poor substitute for actual participation in the game, however inexpertly. The "movies" are a heaven-sent blessing to the poorer classes of our great cities; but they cannot take the place of the impromptu dramatizations of a simple neighborhood group.

Even in the case of recreations where personal participation still persists, the facilities for such participation are now largely on a commercial basis in our modern centers of social life. The dance hall, the bowling alley, the skating rink, the shooting gallery, the pool room, and the recreation park, are our urban substitutes for lake and river, hill and meadow, village common and virgin wild. Here, again, commercialized facilities are better than none. But there are many disadvantages connected with commercialized recreations, quite apart from the expense which they entail. In the first place, they lack

the spontaneity and naturalness of the un-bought recreations. They are tainted with the very spirit of mammon. In his eagerness to get his money's worth, the participant loses the sense of leisure, of abandon, and of exhilaration which are so essential to true recreation. The public dance hall serves its purpose in modern society; but it ranks very low in social value compared with the folk-dancing of simple peoples.

But the worst features of commercialized recreation belong to that class of maladjustments which inevitably accompany unregulated competitive business, accentuated in this case by the peculiar nature of the business. Here, as in other aspects of social life, the influence of the unsocial, indifferent, irresponsible, and antisocial elements is very potent in dragging the entire business down to the level which the least worthy managers are willing to tolerate. The purchasers of recreation facilities are out for amusement and diversion, and because of the weaknesses of human nature, and the special effects of modern industrial life, the kinds of amusement and recreation which attract most strongly the typical pleasure-seeking crowd are those which appeal to the emotions and stimulate intense sensations. Not all amusements of this sort are calculated to foster the highest welfare of the individual nor conduce to the soundest social conditions, and some of the most undesirable and pernicious amusements make the strongest appeal to an undiscriminating and injudicious, if not actually morbid and depraved, crowd. Accordingly, the purveyors of recreation are under a constant temptation to offer unwholesome forms of diversion, disguised if necessary under some sort of a veil of respectability, of a lower and lower character, extending down to the very

depths of vice and degradation. And because facilities of this kind can be made to pay, and pay well, those managers who are willing to cater to the foibles, depraved tastes, and degenerate desires of their patrons are in a position either to drive the more conscientious managers out of business or drag them down to their own level.

The case of the dance hall is typical. The love of music, the sense of rhythm, and the natural pleasure in association between the sexes, are all normal, and make dancing one of the most universal and popular of pastimes. Since there are no natural facilities available to the majority of the denizens of cities for the gratification of the desire for dancing, it inevitably follows that provision is made on a commercial basis. But dance hall managers soon learn that they can increase the attractiveness of their places, and swell their receipts, by adding certain subsidiary features. Provision for the sale of alcoholic drinks will attract some; the presence of girls who are ready to dance with chance acquaintances will appeal to many lonely young men. From this beginning things progress along a perfectly logical course until the stage is reached where the dance hall becomes merely an adjunct to the saloon and an antechamber to the brothel. Such a recreational travesty has been described as follows: "Many saloons have as adjuncts a dance floor in a room set aside for that purpose. Here, without any attempt at concealment, the drink is the thing. . . . Dancing is carried on for three minutes, and then there is an intermission of fifteen to twenty minutes, when the waiter urges you to drink. If you don't drink, and if you don't get other people to drink, you are not welcome, and the waiter frankly tells you so." [124] In places of this type the

rates of admission are almost always lower for girls than for men, and the managers frankly say that to draw the crowd they must have the girls. The cost of admission is all the girl has to pay, if she is willing to accept the attentions of the men she meets there, as many nervously tired, ignorant, and reckless girls are willing to do.

A similar development naturally occurs, in the absence of control, in other forms of recreation, such as the amusement park, the excursion steamer, and the picnic ground, furnishing a further illustration of the absolute necessity of social control to prevent social disaster. In an unregulated competition, the majority is at the mercy of the minority. The need of control is now more and more widely recognized, and is being met in two ways; by the provision of public facilities for recreation, and by the municipal control and supervision of private enterprises. One of the most significant manifestations of this tendency is the movement for municipal social centers,[125] such as that of Chicago, and the wider use of the public school buildings.

Vices of self-gratification. Like every powerful desire, the desire for the sense of well-being has developed its associated vices, some of them exceptionally characteristic of vice as a whole. The most serious of these vices gather about the use of certain natural substances which have the power of inducing an artificial or spurious sense of well-being, particularly alcohol and opium. These substances are especially effective in fostering vice because they are by nature habit-forming and destructive. The individual who resorts to the use of these substances for the sake of inducing a certain state of mind finds that it becomes increasingly difficult for him to reach that state of mind without the drug, that a

constantly increasing indulgence is required to secure a given amount of gratification, and that indulgence is exerting a destructive influence on one or more of his natural endowments or capacities.

Alcohol. Alcohol is typical of these substances, and furnishes an excellent example of the necessity and justification of social control, even legal control, of vice, and affords an effective refutation of the common assertion that vice, being primarily an individual matter, lies outside the domain of proper state activity. There are two chief reasons for the social control of the use of alcohol; first, society cannot afford to allow its members to injure and destroy themselves any more than it can afford to allow them to injure and destroy others — the soundness of society demands the highest degree of soundness and efficiency on the part of each of its members; second, alcohol has the effect of diminishing or destroying personal responsibility, and the whole social edifice rests upon responsibility. This latter point merits special attention.

It has been observed that the fundamental classification of abnormal acts and of abnormal individuals rests upon the assumption of responsibility. For every voluntary act there must be responsibility somewhere; if any individual is known to lack the ordinary degree of responsibility, he is at once placed in a special category of abnormals, and is (or should be) placed under such restraint that society itself can thereafter assume the responsibility for his conduct. Any practice, therefore, which robs men of their responsibility is a fit object for social control. Society cannot escape the burden of responsibility for attending to such matters. Any society which follows a *laissez-faire* policy and refuses

to place restrictions upon the practice simply finds itself confronted with the ultimate responsibility for the acts of those of its members whom it has allowed to destroy their personal responsibility. Societies partially admit this dilemma by punishing a given crime more leniently if it is shown that the perpetrator was under the influence of liquor at the time. Sometimes society seeks to shirk its accountability by shifting the blame upon the man who sold the liquor. Thus the Illinois Supreme Court awarded damages against a saloon keeper for $3000 in favor of the wife of a man who became drunk on liquor secured from this saloon keeper, and while drunk was robbed of a pay envelope which had originally contained $85, and from which he had spent at least $10.[126] This scarcely seems like a square deal on the face of it. A society which licenses a man to sell a drug, the characteristics of which are well known, should either itself accept full responsibility for the injuries which result, or else should have it clearly understood in advance that the dealer accepted the full responsibility for *all* injuries resulting, at a just and fixed rate of compensation, and without necessity of court procedure.

A rather startling illustration of the principle in question occurred at a Christmas celebration in the city of Calumet, Michigan, a few years ago. While a group of men, women, and children were gathered about a Christmas tree in a small hall, an intoxicated man thrust his head in the door and shouted, "Fire." The result was a panic in which eighty lives were lost.[127] For such a catastrophe there must be accountability somewhere. The lives of those victims — many of whom were little children — are upon some one's head. And

the logical culprit is society itself, which allows such things to occur.

Not all of the injuries of course which result from the use of alcohol are of such a striking character, or so easily traceable to their source as the foregoing; they are almost infinite in variety, and wholly incalculable in their total cost in human misery, suffering, and death. No one has ever yet made even an approximate reckoning of the causative influence of alcohol for abused and neglected wives and children, ruined homes, wasted opportunities, and squandered talents, vice, crime, disease and death. Such a reckoning, however desirable, is not necessary for clarifying the principles involved; every one knows that the amount of suffering due to alcohol is sufficient to justify society in taking whatever steps are most promising for the elimination of the evil.

The problem of the social control of alcoholism is therefore not one of principle but of expediency. The whole question resolves itself into the search for the most efficacious means of preventing the evils which arise from the use of alcohol, with the minimum degree of interference with established ideas, beliefs, and mores. Of course the old argument of individual rights and liberties is advanced in this connection, but it has no more weight here than in any other department of social life — which is to say, none at all. No individual has any right to indulge in any practice which injures, or even threatens, social welfare; the interests of society rise paramount to those of any individual.

Prohibition. The social expedient for the regulation of the use of alcohol which has received the largest adherence in recent years is the device known as prohibition. Like most laws dealing with matters of this

kind, prohibitory measures are aimed, not at the undesirable act itself, nor at the individual who commits the act, but at the individual who makes the act possible by providing the means. We do not pass laws against drinking alcoholic beverages, nor against drinking them to excess, but against the sale of the beverages. This, of course, is quite illogical in the abstract, though it is perhaps necessitated by practical expediency and by our legal traditions and ideas. If the use of alcohol is a bad or dangerous thing, the straightforward procedure would be to forbid the use of alcohol, and to penalize those who violate the prohibition. Unless society is ready to assume the full responsibility for the results of alcoholism, it might be beneficial to make individuals accountable before the law for all their acts, as much when drunk as when sober, thereby holding the individual responsible for getting into a state of irresponsibility.

The whole question of prohibition is still in an experimental state. It is not necessary in this connection to go into the detailed arguments for and against it. The point to be noted is that the valid arguments against prohibition must demonstrate, not that prohibition violates natural rights, and is an unwarranted extension of state interference, but that prohibition will not secure the desired results. Neither is it germane to the question to assert that "you cannot make people good by law." The prohibition movement, rightly interpreted, is not a moral propaganda, and has nothing to do with goodness; it is a prophylactic movement, aimed at social safety and soundness. In other words, when the state undertakes to deal with vice, it does so not because vice is wicked, but because it is dangerous and destructive. If social evils can be eliminated, it is a matter of indiffer-

ence from the strictly legal point of view, whether individuals are morally any better or not. There is ample ground for attack on the present liquor situation from the point of view of morality; but it should not be confused with the justification of prohibition. It is significant in this connection that such progress as has been made in recent years in the way of reducing the consumption of alcoholic drinks, is probably attributable much more largely to education — that is, the dissemination of scientific knowledge as to the nature and effects of alcohol — than to moral suasion or legal restraint. The appeal that counts first of all is the appeal to self-interest.

The question of the desirability of prohibition, and of the most efficacious forms of prohibition, is still in the balance. Some few general principles, however, seem to have been already well established. There appears to be no reason to hope that the most carefully framed prohibitory law will work in a community where public sentiment is opposed to it. It is also, apparently, possible to have a public sentiment sufficiently in the majority to secure the passage of a prohibitory law, but not adequate to its enforcement. The state of Maine furnishes a notorious example of this situation. Furthermore, a wise and scientific prohibition movement must recognize that the saloon has other social functions than the dispensing of liquor, and the abolition of the saloon must be accompanied by the establishment of some innocuous substitute.

In the meantime various large business concerns are taking up the question independently, and are enforcing prohibitory regulations upon their employees of a severity which the most radical prohibitionist could hardly outdo. It is worthy of note that we all approve of such measures,

if instituted by private initiative. We all feel safer on ships and railroads if we know the employees are not allowed to drink. The "safety first" movement is leading manufacturers to seek to remove saloons from the vicinity of their plants.

Habit-forming drugs. The case of alcoholism illustrates sufficiently well the principles which underlie the correct social attitude toward the allied vices. The question of habit-forming drugs has recently attracted large public attention in the United States, following startling revelations as to the prevalence of the vicious use of these substances. In fact, it is easier to recognize the validity of the principles involved in the case of opium and similar drugs, than in the case of alcohol, although they are essentially the same in both cases. This is probably due to the fact that the evils accompanying the use of opiates are much more obvious, and the extenuating or alleviating accompaniments are practically lacking. It is significant that long before the United States is ready for a federal prohibition law, it has passed (1915) and is enforcing a law imposing rigid restrictions upon the dispensing of certain drugs of the opium class.[128]

Tobacco. Any problem in this general field may be analyzed on the basis of these general principles. Take the question of tobacco. The first step in the solution of the tobacco problem is the determination of the question whether tobacco using is a vice. This is a matter for science, and involves the study of the character of tobacco and its effects upon the human system. If it appears that there is no vice, the matter ends there. If, however, it appears that the use of tobacco presents the characteristic features of vice, the question next arises as to how serious a vice it is, *i.e.* to what extent it occasions social evils.

If it appears that there are some social evils, the final question is whether they are of a nature which makes them amenable to social control; if so, what method of social control is most expedient; and whether the good to be accomplished by social control is sufficient to offset the evils always incident to state control of vice, including the violated *sense* of personal liberty. In every case, public opinion must be taken into account.

Luxury. Self-gratification carried to an extreme is called luxury. It goes without saying that luxury is purely a relative matter; what is luxury in one society is merely simple comfort in another. The significant question about luxury is whether it should be classed as abnormal or not. If abnormal, it must be either a sin or a maladjustment. For luxury is certainly not a vice, though it often manifests itself in vicious forms. Neither is it a crime, except in so far as the now infrequent sumptuary laws make it so. The question of the practical treatment of luxury hinges on whether it is to be regarded as wrong or not. Some writers frankly regard it as a maladjustment. Thus Jonathan T. Lincoln writes, "Poverty and Luxury — these are the diseases of our industrial régime, to the cure of which the Socialists offer their ineffectual remedy. . . . Condemnation of luxury . . . is not condemnation of wealth. Luxury is a disease merely."[129] In this view, luxury is merely one of the logical concomitants of the existing organization of society, with its wide diversities in the distribution of wealth, for which no one can be held personally responsible. Others, however, seem to consider luxury, in part at least, sinful. The following passage from Ruskin implies that there is some guilty luxury: "Consider whether, even supposing

it guiltless, luxury would be desired by any of us if we saw clearly at our sides the suffering which accompanies it in the world. . . . Luxury at present can be only enjoyed by the ignorant; the cruelest man living could not sit at his feast unless he sat blindfold." [130]

Yet it would be difficult in the extreme to make out a logical case for the sinfulness of luxury. Luxury is the use of wealth, and if sinful, must harm some one. Yet much luxury is absolutely harmless, both to those who enjoy it and to the remainder of society. While it may be argued that luxury arouses envy and discontent on the part of the less fortunate members of society, yet envy and discontent are not necessarily evils in themselves, but in many cases are essential conditions for social progress. If there is any sinfulness in the matter at all, it must be in the ownership of wealth, and not in its use. For as long as society sanctions private ownership of wealth, it would be impossible to draw a line between the harmless enjoyment of that wealth which is sinful, and the harmless enjoyment of wealth which is not sinful. The rich man is no more guilty in spending his large income for the things that will give him pleasure than is the poor man in spending his small income. Yet there can certainly be no sin in owning wealth under the full sanction of the laws and mores of society. To say that it is right to own wealth without limit, but that large incomes should be spent in part for the pleasure of other people, is merely to quibble. For the ownership of wealth which carries with it a duty or obligation to use it for others, is no real ownership at all. Luxury, in itself, cannot be called sinful, and the fact that many persons who receive large incomes prefer to use them in part for the happiness of others does not brand as

guilty those who choose to use their entire incomes for themselves.

It follows that if luxury is abnormal at all, it is a maladjustment. Yet this assumption is almost as difficult to support as the former. For, as has been shown, luxury is the logical and inevitable accompaniment of the existing normal organization of society, and anything which is a necessary result of the normal constitution of society cannot itself be abnormal. The only logical conclusion appears to be that luxury, like poverty, is one of the normal, though perhaps undesirable, aspects of the life of to-day. Luxury and poverty are the two extremes of the standard of living of modern societies.

CHAPTER XIX

THE INTELLECTUAL AND SPIRITUAL LIFE

Education and religion. The two chief social institutions which have grown up out of man's desire to explain the phenomena of life are education and religion, the one dealing primarily with those phenomena which can be apprehended by the physical senses, the other devoting itself to the effort to comprehend the unseen and immaterial phenomena of the universe and to establish right relationships with the Supreme Being who is believed to be behind and above them.

In view of the fact that these two interests had an identical origin,* perhaps no feature of the modern situation is more significant than the completeness of the separation which now exists between them. There is, of course, a specialized religious education, and much secular education is still carried on under religious auspices; but nothing is more characteristic of modern thought than the conviction that education in general should be a thing apart from religion, and should be primarily the charge of the state. Every advanced state now has its public school system, from which is excluded, more and more, the teaching even of the simplest general religious doctrines, the underlying idea, doubtless, being that the nature of religious principles is such that they cannot be demonstrated with a completeness which will secure acceptance by all competent

* See page 15.

minds. Particularly in democracies is free, compulsory general education regarded as essential to the solidity and permanence of government.

So uniform are the authoritative opinions with reference to the validity of the modern conception of education that it would seem that in this particular, at least, society had nearly achieved the ideal as far as general outlines are concerned. To be sure, there is an element of maladjustment and anachronism in the typical public school curriculum, and there is room for a better adjustment of subjects and methods of teaching to twentieth century conditions; the movements for trade schools, manual training, continuation schools, vocational guidance, etc., are evidences of the recognition of the inadequacy of the old-fashioned system, and the effort to bring it up to date. But there are few, if any, vitally menacing evils connected with education, or fundamental public problems demanding solution.

Intellectual abnormality. The entire domain of the intellectual life presents no distinctive forms of immorality; even sinful thoughts are practically always concerned with some of the other great interests of life. The chief forms of abnormality in this field are instances of incapacity — ignorance, insanity, feeble-mindedness, etc. Ignorance is curable, and the public school system represents society's effort to eliminate this type of evil. Feeble-mindedness is incurable in the individual,* and is to be eliminated from society only by eugenic measures. As long as cases of feeble-mindedness exist, the duty of society is to care for them as efficiently and humanely as possible, and to prevent their procreation. Insanity may be curable or incurable; it appears to be

* With the probable exception of Cretinism.

a social evil intensified by the strain, speed, and tension of modern life. Particularly in the United States is the burden of insanity enormously increased by the host of foreign-born residents whose mentality breaks down under the strain of an unwontedly exacting human environment. Of the insane persons enumerated in hospitals in 1910, 28.8 per cent were foreign born — nearly twice the proportional representation of this element in the population.[131]

The modern view of religion. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the modern religious situation in the lands of western civilization is the increasing tendency to regard religion as a personal rather than a social matter. This is probably traceable to the separation of church and state, and to the emphasis laid by the Christian religion on the personal aspects of religion — personal morality, personal faith, and personal salvation. The result has been that religion has lost much of the social significance which it had in an earlier time, or in the more backward nations of to-day, as, for instance, in modern Greece, where a man is born into his religion just as much as into his nationality, and the national religion serves as a great unifying force.

In a still more primitive stage of human evolution, as has been observed, religion exercises an influence vastly exceeding that which it holds in modern societies; it practically dominates the life of the savage, whose entire philosophy of natural phenomena is essentially religious, and whose efforts to control natural events partake of the nature of worship. As knowledge of the material world has increased, and science has diverged from religion, men have come to seek to control material phenomena on the basis of physical forces

and natural laws, and the realm of religion has been progressively narrowed until it now includes only the purely spiritual phenomena and relationships. Aside from its personal significance in connection with the relationship between the individual and the Supreme Being, the chief social function of religion in the present day is the maintenance and cultivation of morality, and the providing, as Benjamin Kidd has shown,[132] ultra-rational sanctions for altruistic conduct. It would be impossible to determine just what portion of our readiness to sacrifice personal welfare for the sake of others, especially in the interest of future generations, is due to a strictly religious motive; but it is unquestionably a very large portion. This is not to say that it is merely the belief in a future life of rewards and punishments, and the crass conviction that a little sacrifice here will be compensated for by great blessing hereafter, that lead people to practice unselfish conduct. It is rather the faith that there is an inclusive plan for the universe, and an ultimate significance in human life, which extends beyond the narrow confines of time and sense, and reveals the short span of life on this earth as merely a single phase in the great current of existence. However interpreted by different individuals or different sects, there can be no question that religion still holds a tremendously important place in the life of modern society as one of the few institutions which are fitted to deal with problems on a strictly moral and ethical basis, and to inculcate altruistic and unselfish ideals in the minds of the members of society. Many reforms dealing with evils unsuited to state control would be practically impossible without the support of what is intrinsically the religious motive.

As religion has withdrawn within a narrower and narrower sphere, its distinctive forms of abnormality have diminished in social significance until they have almost ceased to exist as social factors. Religion is still alert to detect and attack all forms of social evil; but distinctive religious sins, such as heresy and atheism, religious crimes, such as worshiping forbidden gods (*i.e.* the Moors in Spain), religious vices, such as immolation and asceticism, and religious incompetence, such as fanaticism and superstition, trouble modern societies but little. As far as wrangling and conflict about these matters still persists, it is confined largely within sectarian circles, and scarcely disturbs the general current of social life.

The maladjustment of religion. The outstanding abnormality of a definitely religious type in the societies of western civilization is in the nature of a maladjustment, arising from one of the characteristic features of religion in general, viz., its extreme conservatism, and seriously handicapping religion in its effort to fulfill its chief function in society. It is not necessary in this connection to examine the origins of the conservative element in religion; its existence is unquestioned, and the task of applied sociology is to note the manner in which conservatism hampers the efficient action of the religious institutions of society. This phenomenon is of course especially marked in a dynamic society, where almost all the institutions of life are changing, and the mores are undergoing constant modification. In such a society, any established and formulated religion inevitably appears backward and out-of-date, having received its distinctive features in an earlier stage of cultural evolution, and bearing the impress of an ante-

cedent group of mores. These facts are well illustrated by the situation of the various sects of the Christian religion in the lands of western civilization.

The Christian religion received its outward form and concrete expression two thousand years ago amid a people whose social organization, modes of thought, and habits of expression differed radically from those of modern nations. Miss Semple says, "If the sacred literature of Judaism and Christianity take weak hold upon the western mind, this is largely because it is written in the symbolism of the pastoral nomad. Its figures of speech reflect life in deserts and grasslands. For these figures the western mind has few or vague corresponding ideas. It loses, therefore, half the import, for instance, of the Twenty-third Psalm." [133] But this is not all. The language of the sacred books of the Christian religion is not only that of pastoral nomads. It is also that of war and despotism, as is also the diction of the prayers and hymns which follow the Biblical pattern. A few examples will make this clear. The common appellations for Christ are "Lord," "Lord of Hosts," "Master," "King," "Prince," "Leader." His worshipers style themselves his "followers," "servants," "soldiers," "messengers," "stewards," etc. The Christian life is represented as a warfare, or as the orderly working of a great royal household, with loyal servants always ready to do the master's bidding. Among our favorite hymns are "Onward Christian Soldiers," "Fight the Good Fight," "Hold the Fort," and "Oh Worship the King!" These figures of speech, as well as those based upon the idea of the shepherd and his sheep, originally possessed great utility in vitalizing the relation between God and man, and clarifying the

popular conception of the nature of the religious life and obligations. But in a society organized on an industrial and democratic basis the symbolism and imagery of the Christian church not only do not clarify, they actually confuse; and expositions and commentaries must be provided to afford the average reader of to-day an adequate insight into the meaning of Scripture.

The element of anachronism in the Christian religion is more than mere terminology, it permeates the entire system of forms, ritual, and ceremony. As embodied in the formulated sects of to-day, the Christian religion is essentially pastoral, patriarchal, militaristic, despotic, and feudalistic, and therefore fails to appeal to the citizen of an industrial democracy as a vital and practical thing. All the paraphernalia of thrones, crowns, diadems, armor, and blood-red banners arouse no response in the mind or heart of the day laborer, the clerk, or the mechanic — they are symbols without significance. Even the relationship between father and son is a very different thing in the twentieth century from what it was amid the people to whom Christ spoke. In short, in so far as modern life is dominated by peace, democracy, and capitalistic industry, the Christian Church is trying to interpret herself to the common man in a dead language.

Fortunately for Christianity, and for the world, the fundamental doctrines of this religion, as embodied in the actual teachings of its founder, are neither local nor epochal, but express principles of personal and social life, which are enduring and of wide application, perhaps eternal and universal. This fact alone has enabled the Christian religion to hold its place in the face of revolutionary changes in social organization,

and the periodic interpretations and formulations of sectarian leaders. Christ himself, while forced to use the language of the people among whom he lived,[134] laid special stress upon the more enduring relationships of father and son, brother, and friend. "Henceforth I call you not servants . . . but I have called you friends."

From the point of view of practical social policy, the most discouraging feature of the whole situation is that, because of the very fact that religion is so essentially conservative, the effort to bring Christianity into perfect accord with the facts of life in an industrial democracy meets seemingly insuperable obstacles. The attempt, for instance, to re-phrase the figures of speech of the Bible, of hymns, and of prayer, to fit the corresponding relationships of modern life would certainly not be successful. To call Christ "employer," "manager," "president," "entrepreneur," or "representative," and his followers "hired men," "employees," "hands," "clerks," or "constituents" would strike the most modern ear as ludicrous if not sacrilegious. To speak of the religious life as an "enterprise" or a "business," and of bodies of worshipers as "corporations" or "parties" would add nothing to the appeal of religion. Yet these terms are the nearest modern equivalents to the figures used in the traditional diction of Christianity. The simple fact is that the human relationships which furnished at least a partial analogue to the relation between God and man have disappeared from the societies of western civilization, and there exists no available parallel.

A thoroughly commendable and partially successful effort is being made by the advanced leaders of the

Christian churches to devise means and methods of vitalizing the message of religion to the common man of the twentieth century. The activities typified by the institutional church represent the attempt to give religion a real meaning and utility to each class of society. It is interesting to note, in passing, that the temporary ascendancy of military interests in European society has apparently been accompanied by a recrudescence of religious spirit and devotion, according to the reports from various countries. The hope of ultimate success in the effort to modernize the function of the church is found in the flexibility and adaptability of the Christian religion itself. Every age has its special problems, and a religion which is to be a social force must be prepared to modify its methods and teachings to correspond to the needs of each new epoch. It is this necessity which brings out the difference, and actual conflict, between essential Religion and formulated religions. In so far as Religion is a permanent social force, it is equally potent to meet the needs of every new aspect of society; but in the effort to do so it runs counter to the interests of the conventionalized and stereotyped religious sects of preceding periods. History probably furnishes no more significant illustration of this truth than the long and bitter struggle by which the church doctrine of usury was made to harmonize with the modern necessity of interest as an economic expedient. The great problem is how to interpret religious truths in the light of new conditions, how to disseminate new views without the loss of devotion and the sense of authority, and how to enable the everyday man to abandon cherished religious concepts without abandoning religion itself. In the way of progress

stands ever the hide-bound sectarian, singing at the top of his lungs, "It's the old-time religion, and it's good enough for me."

On a busy street corner in Boston stands a large brick church building. Its architecture is solid and sober, its walls are adorned with stained glass windows, and its towering spire points heavenward. But covering the sides of the building are flamboyant posters announcing to all that pass by that within may be seen "The World in Motion," that there is a "High-Class and Refined Entertainment for Man, Woman, and Child," and that the "Program is Changed Daily." The temple of the Most High is now dedicated to the Genius of the Movies. And the most significant aspect of the matter is that whereas, when the edifice ceased to be devoted to its original purpose, it was probably attracting a few scattered handfuls of attendants once or twice on Sunday, it now draws crowds every afternoon and evening — and they pay to get in. It is evident that the managers of the building are now "giving the people what they want."

How shall the church give the people what they want, and how shall the people be made to want what the church ought to give them? These are the problems of the Christian church in an industrial democracy of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER XX

CONCLUSION

Outstanding principles. To attempt to summarize the general laws and principles which underlie efforts for improvement in organized society would be premature. A survey of the general field discloses conflicting standards, contrary methods, warring convictions, and a good deal of absolute chaos. The study of applied sociology is still too much in its infancy to warrant any complete statement of inductions. A large part of the study itself is the effort to arrive at sound and tenable inductions on the basis of the facts already collected and classified.

Increasing need of social control. There are, however, a few principles which seem already to have risen far enough above the level of hypothesis to merit statement in a somewhat dogmatic way. Foremost among these principles is the truth that increasing complexity in the social organization necessitates and therefore justifies increasing social control, even in the form of state interference. As the relationships between the individual and his human environment become more numerous and complex, the dependence of each upon all and all upon each becomes greater and more vital. Never so truly as in the twentieth century could it have been said that "No man liveth unto himself, and no man dieth unto himself." And because some are weak, and

some are indifferent, and some are antisocial in disposition, the organized force of society must more and more be requisitioned to prevent injury and promote welfare, of individuals, and of society itself.

Abandonment of laissez faire. A corollary of the foregoing principle is the complete abandonment of the doctrine of *laissez faire* as either an inclusive philosophy of life or the starting point for social judgment, which is one of the great social achievements of the past half-century. Not only do we no longer accept the let-alone theory as a comprehensive working hypothesis, but we do not even accept it as an ideal, departures from which are to be regarded as concessions, and kept down to the necessary minimum.

Abandonment of natural rights. Along with other impedimenta of a past epoch, the whole notion of natural and individual rights has been discarded. The only rights now recognized are social rights, and in every case the right of society is seen to rise superior to the right of the individual. The goal of all human effort is social welfare, and the so-called individual rights are merely prerogatives given to the individual by society because it appears that social welfare can best be promoted in that way. Even so fundamental a right as the right to life is admitted only because, and only to the extent that, it conduces to social solidarity and progress.

Devotion to society. The highest altruistic ideal of today is devotion to the interests of society. It is a pity that there is no word in common use to designate that ideal. There ought to be some term to indicate a devotion to all mankind analogous to the devotion to country implied in the conception of patriotism; not the false and outworn patriotism which says, "My

Country! May she ever be right. But, right or wrong, My Country!"; but patriotism in its highest and best sense. Before humanity can rest secure against a recurrence of such a tragedy as is now transpiring in Europe there must be implanted in the minds of men of every race and region a conception of the solidarity of the human species as a whole. The ties of sympathy and fellow feeling which have been extended from the family through the clan, tribe, and small state to the modern nation, must receive their final extension, and be made to include the entire human family. The sense of devotion and kinship must become generic, not national or racial. The object of one's altruistic efforts must be "The Great Society." Such a sentiment certainly merits a distinctive name. It is highly unfortunate that the logical term has already been appropriated to designate a program of limited application and dubious practicality; this is, obviously, "Socialism." "Socialism" ought to be one of the grandest words in human language. It probably never will be now. Sometime, doubtless, the right word will spring into use. In the meantime, there is no question that the true progress of human welfare must rest upon the increase of unreserved devotion to the society of mankind.

The difficulty of improvement. The task of devising practical expedients to reduce altruistic sentiments to a practical working basis is by no means an easy, nor altogether an encouraging one. As the various schemes and plans for social improvement pass in review it becomes clear that the specific reforms are largely inadequate, and the revolutionary programs are impractical. The conviction increases that there is an ocean of truth in Professor Sumner's pithy statement, "If this poor

old world is as bad as they say, one more reflection may check the zeal of the headlong reformer. It is at any rate a tough old world. It has taken its trend and curvature and all its twists and tangles from a long course of formation. All its wry and crooked gnarls and knobs are therefore stiff and stubborn. If we puny men by our arts can do anything at all to straighten them, it will only be by modifying the tendencies of some of the forces at work, so that, after a sufficient time, their action may be changed a little, and slowly the lines of movement may be modified."[135]

The legitimacy of effort. Does it follow, then, that conscious effort for the improvement of social conditions is a useless and unscientific waste of energy? Not at all. It is only the *headlong* reformer whose zeal must be checked. Human civilization progresses on the principles of evolutionary development. The factors which determine the course of this development are many and diverse — racial, climatic, biological, psychological — but among them, and of profound significance, is the factor of idealization, and the rational effort to achieve the ideal. Men have always used their intellects to picture a better state of things, to devise means of achieving this better state, and to put these means into operation. Men will always continue to do so. And this constant and unceasing effort for social amelioration will, in the future as in the past, play an incalculable part in determining social forms and institutions. The one requirement demanded of such effort is that it shall be scientific, and that any reform measure shall be framed upon the basis of logical inductions from a properly classified and adequate mass of facts. Of the two chief types of betterment, that is easier and more promising

which seeks to correct the obvious abnormalities in the existing social situation. Much more difficult, much more exacting in its demands upon intelligence, patience, and will, but none the less necessary or worth while, is that type of reform which seeks to raise the normal itself to a higher level.

The question whether a given reform may be better accomplished by official or private agency is a matter of expediency, not of principle. In any given case, state interference is legitimate exactly so far as it is efficacious, and will not result in more social harm than good.

Prevention. Whatever the evil attacked, and whatever the agency attacking it, the principle is now uniformly accepted by scientific social workers that prevention, to the extent that it is possible, is immeasurably preferable to relief, and decidedly more economical than cure. In fact, the whole spirit of applied sociology is the spirit of prevention, based upon the only scientific ground — a knowledge and grasp of causes. Applied sociology is frequently confused with "charity" or "practical philanthropy." In point of fact, if applied sociology could do its perfect work, there would be no practical philanthropy because there would be no need of it. It is an axiom of applied sociology that the only satisfactory social situation is where every family or individual stands independently upon its own feet, according to the normal conventions and expectations of its own group, neither needing nor wishing assistance from without, either private or public. Applied sociology seeks to get at the root of all forms of social abnormality so that there shall be no more "charity cases," no more "dependents, defectives, and delinquents." The achievement of this ideal is far in the future, is perhaps

impossible; it is nevertheless the goal for which applied sociology strives. In the meantime, applied sociology subjects current or proposed methods of relief, palliation, and cure to scientific scrutiny, with the purpose of determining their efficacy to meet the immediate demands and necessities of the existing social order.

Universal principles. One of the most fascinating fields of speculation in the domain of applied sociology is the question whether there exist, in the very constitution and nature of man, any eternal and universal principles which underlie all successful social organization, and must be taken into account in consciously shaping social growth. It seems at least possible that there are. We know that all men are sufficiently alike physically so that there are certain fundamental laws of hygiene, health, and life. All human bodies demand food, rest, and sleep. If a man takes a certain amount of strychnine, he dies, whether he be Eskimo, Caucasian, or Bushman. Is it not possible that the similarity of requirements may extend into the social realm, and that there are certain standards of social organization which are essential to permanent and enduring social organization? The fact that it would be extremely difficult to formulate these principles in concrete terms does not deny their existence. All the philosophizing, striving, idealization, and experimentation which men have done with reference to social forms may perhaps have resulted in bringing advanced societies ever nearer to the type of social organization demanded by the innate constitution of the human species. It is a point of view which lends a special interest to the practical study of social phenomena.

The power of the individual. Two other problems of great social significance and interest are those of the efficacy of individual effort in shaping the course of social evolution, and of the relative influence of heredity and environment. The former of these questions has already been touched upon, and it has been observed that the influence of no single individual in society is negligible, while at certain times, and under certain conditions, individuals of exceptional strength may exert an incalculable influence. But even in ordinary times, and with ordinary individuals, persistent and well-considered effort is bound to have its effect.

Heredity and environment. A large amount of effort has been expended upon arguments concerning the relative importance of the two great forces of life, heredity and environment, in shaping human society. This effort has been largely wasted, because each of these factors is infinitely important, neither can be neglected, and in the case of the human environment they become so intertwined as to be practically indistinguishable. The human environment of any man consists of other men, women, and children, each with his own heredity, and each affected by his environment. Applied sociology can safely ignore the rivalry which seeks to establish the supremacy of one or the other of these factors, and confine its attention to aiding any promising plan to utilize either one for the improvement of society.

Permanence and progression. Finally, there remains to be noted the inevitable and perennial antagonism between the two fundamental principles of social welfare. These principles manifest themselves in various forms, and are called by divers names. Coleridge distinguished them as permanence and progression. In politics we call

them conservatism and radicalism; in biology, heredity and variation. They are recognized as fundamental in the distinctions between female and male. One of the greatest of all the tasks of applied sociology — perhaps the basic task of all — is the task of enabling men to keep a proper balance between these two principles. The study of applied sociology is the study of the problem how to provide for advance into new and better things without sacrificing the stability and soundness which inhere in the tried and proved forms, institutions, and mores of society.

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